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6 Executive Summary
Executive Summary
The first people to suspect or know about someone becoming involved in planning acts  
of violent extremism, including planned or actual involvement in overseas conflicts,  
will often be those closest to them: their friends, family and community insiders.1 
Such individuals are ideally placed to notice any 
changes or early warning signs that someone 
is considering violent action to harm others, 
as well as being able to influence vulnerable 
younger people away from violent extremist 
beliefs and settings. The willingness of those 
close to potential or suspected violent actors 
to come forward and share their knowledge 
and concerns with authorities is thus a critical 
element in efforts to prevent violent extremist 
action. However, whilst these ‘intimates’ have 
a vital role to play against potential terrorist 
threats and offer a first line of defence, very 
little is known about what reporting of the 
potential violent extremist involvement of an 
‘intimate’ means for community members, 
particularly their views, experiences and 
concerns about approaching authorities, 
especially the police, when they have 
suspicions or knowledge to report.
‘Intimates’ reporting is a critical blind  
spot in current Countering Violent Extremism 
(CVE)/Prevent thinking and strategy 
internationally. When this research study 
was conceived, there was no open-source 
evidence-based research in the UK which 
investigated the views of either Muslim 
communities (who are clearly at the forefront 
of concern for the Prevent Strategy2) or of the 
local government, education and policing 
professionals at the forefront of Prevent policy 
implementation on their experiences of and on 
the processes involved in community reporting 
on violent extremism concerns in the UK (or 
indeed, the European Union). The first study 
of this kind, conducted with both Muslim 
communities and government stakeholders, 
was recently completed in Australia3 through 
government-supported academic research 
partnered by the Australian Federal Police.  
Its findings draw on valuable primary data and 
insights that have contributed to improving 
current reporting approaches, developed new 
information and engagement models for use 
with communities, and provided a substantial 
number of useable insights and key policy and 
practice lessons for both communities and for 
Australian government policy and personnel, 
including first responders. It has formed the 
basis for a new Australian programme trial  
on community reporting.
This new UK research project has built on the 
initial Australian study in order to develop 
a new, localised and contextually- sensitive 
understanding of and approaches to 
community reporting issues in the UK  
context. The research aims and objectives  
for this study were as follows:
1.  Identifying triggers, thresholds and 
barriers for when someone would  
consider reporting;
2.  Understanding more from participants’ 
perspectives about the experience and 
process of (considering) reporting on an 
individual or group who may be involved 
in, or actively supporting involvement in, 
overseas conflicts, or violent extremism 
(including far-right extremism);
3.  Understanding the experiences and 
perspectives of professional practitioners 
– both those involved in the police and 
Prevent and those representing community 
organisations – around the current reality of 
community reporting and what approaches 
could encourage and facilitate greater 
community sharing of concerns and;
4.  Developing from the data usable insights 
for government and community agencies 
in future community-focused policies, 
strategies and campaigns around facilitating 
and encouraging community reporting 
related to violent extremism.
Background  
and scope of  
the report
1Williams, M.J., Horgan, J.G., Evans, 
W.P. (2015) The critical role of 
friends in networks for countering 
violent extremism: toward a theory 
of vicarious help-seeking, Behavioral 
Sciences of Terrorism and Political 
Aggression 8 (1) pp. 1-21.
2Busher, J., Choudhury, T., Thomas, P. and 
Harris, G. (2017) What the Prevent duty 
means for schools and colleges in England: 
An analysis of educationalists’ experiences, 
London: The Aziz Foundation.
3Grossman, M. (2015) Community 
Reporting Thresholds: Sharing information 
with authorities concerning violent 
extremist activity and involvement in 
foreign conflict. Canberra: Countering 
Violent Extremism Subcommittee,  
Australia-New Zealand Counter-
Terrorism Committee.
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The research  
evidence base
Key findings and 
conclusions: 
Community  
respondents
The research aims, objectives and methodology 
sought to understand and assess through 
in-depth individual interviews whether 
community respondents would consider 
sharing (based on presented scenarios) 
concerns with authorities about an ‘intimate’ 
other (a partner, a family member, or a 
close friend) in relation to their suspected 
involvement in violent extremist activity at 
home and/or in planning to travel abroad 
to take part in violent conflicts. Experiences 
and perspectives on community reporting 
processes and actions were also sought from 
a range of professional practitioners. This 
study was designed as a UK replication and 
development of the earlier Australian project 
and as such we have drawn heavily on its 
qualitative design, methods and instruments. 
However, the UK study introduces several key 
refinements to the original Australian research.  
Firstly, we have significantly expanded the scale 
of the original study by doubling the number 
of participants from n=33 to n=66. Secondly, 
whereas the Australian study only drew on 
individual respondents self-identifying as 
‘Muslim’, we have introduced a new sub-sample 
of community respondents from marginalised 
White British majority communities. This  
last modification reflects the increasingly  
varied nature of the extremist threat and  
the explicitly broad focus of the UK Prevent 
Strategy on varying forms of extremism. Thirdly, 
we have purposively over-sampled young  
adult community respondents (18-26 year olds, 
n=21 or 44%) for a number of reasons. Young 
adults have been the core demographic group 
within domestic terrorist plots in the UK  
and other Western countries, with the  
age of those travelling to Syria to join ISIS 
steadily falling; there has also been important 
academic evidence that young people may  
be ‘associate gatekeepers’ in spotting the  
move of peers towards violent extremism.  
48 community respondents and 18 professional 
practitioners were identified through purposive 
sampling methods and individually interviewed. 
Respondents were primarily drawn from 
the West Yorkshire and Greater Manchester 
metropolitan conurbations, with a smaller 
number from London.
The overwhelming motivation for reporting by 
community respondents is care and concern 
for the ‘intimate’, even if the act damages the 
relationship/friendship, a key finding very much 
echoing findings from the earlier Australian 
study. Alongside this are strong moral and 
ethical rationales about a wider social/
civic duty to report concerns around such a 
potentially serious issue. For most respondents, 
the police are clearly the best placed people to 
deal with such situations. However, given the 
gravity of reporting someone close to them, 
virtually all respondents would first go through 
a staged process of attempting to personally 
dissuade the intimate and/or drawing on 
others close to them within their community 
to intervene before eventually, and often 
reluctantly, reporting to the police. 
Within the staged reporting process, threshold 
judgments are crucial, with respondents willing 
to report directly to the police once they judge 
that the situation has passed beyond a certain 
point of seriousness and/or tangible evidence. 
However, such threshold judgments are 
difficult in the making and often far from clear.
An overwhelming majority of respondents 
wanted to report to their local police, not 
counter-terrorism specialists. Alongside 
this, an overwhelming majority of community 
respondents also wanted to report to the local 
police through face-to-face means, so they 
could judge the reactions of those receiving 
the report before proceeding further with or 
hesitating further over their reporting. 
The overwhelming 
motivation for reporting 
by community respondents 
is care and concern for the 
‘intimate’, even if the 
act damages the 
relationship/friendship, 
a key finding strongly 
echoing findings from the 
earlier Australian study.
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Key findings  
and conclusions: 
Professional 
practitioners
The chief reasons for face to face reporting 
were respondents wanting to assess how 
seriously their concerns were being taken  
and actioned, and wanting to have the 
opportunity for questions about implications 
(for the reporter, the intimate and others) 
and what might happen next. Reflecting this 
clear and strong preference for face-to-face 
reporting, telephone modes of reporting, 
including the national Anti-Terrorism Hotline, 
were largely seen as unhelpful or inappropriate  
for something not defined as an emergency, 
whilst the security and confidentiality of the 
internet and social media modes were often 
not trusted or seen as insufficiently interactive.
Much of the public discourse about community 
reporting focuses on the lack of community 
reporting of violent extremism involvement  
and how to encourage greater reporting. 
There is much less consideration of what 
happens for all concerned after a report is 
made, particularly about an ‘intimate’.  
What happens, and what should happen, after 
reporting is a very significant consideration for 
most community respondents. Many identified 
concerns about the negative, collective impacts 
of reporting, including the different forms of 
anticipated or experienced backlash against 
those concerned. The large majority (although 
not all) of community respondents want to be 
kept informed of developments after reporting 
to the police. They understand reporting to be 
a two-way process, with a ‘feedback loop’ that 
keeps them informed about what happened, 
the status of the investigation, and what will 
or might happen next. Such a feedback loop 
can have positive impacts on current and 
future community reporting because it builds 
trust, accountability and a genuine sense of 
collective partnerships in countering the  
harms of violent extremism.
For practitioners, the theme of ‘optimising 
the field’ focuses on the need to build 
stronger partnerships and sense of shared 
responsibilities between communities and the 
authorities over the threat of violent extremist 
involvement. Here, professional practitioners 
were, by and large, empathetic with and 
responsive to the complexities and challenges 
posed by community fears, concerns and 
conflicts when considering sharing information 
with authorities about someone close who may 
be radicalising to violence. For professional 
respondents, however, this development  
can only occur if certain challenges are 
successfully addressed.
One of the major challenges identified by 
practitioners is a clear lack of public trust and 
confidence in various authorities and agencies. 
This includes the Prevent programme, 
Channel, and the police as an organisation 
in some parts of communities. Practitioner 
respondents recognise and often sympathise 
with the very real community fears of reporting 
consequences, including the potential for 
overreaction by authorities to tentative 
expressions of concern that are the domain of 
‘Prevent’, not ‘Pursue’. However, practitioners 
believed there is insufficient recognition of and 
engagement with the role of communities in 
safeguarding contexts and they thought this 
directly feeds into a lack of broad community 
awareness about reporting processes, modes, 
channels and outcomes. Specific challenges 
around increasing community reporting 
identified by professional practitioners 
included maintaining the protection of  
those who report from both community-  
and media-led forms of social harm, including 
isolation, ostracism and backlash. The potential 
for community reporting systems and cultures 
that work for all parties is hampered, in the 
view of professional practitioners, by uneven 
training and awareness by frontline public 
sector personnel with a Prevent Duty in relation 
to what should and shouldn’t be reported 
onward. Additionally, respondents recognised 
the ineffectiveness and inappropriateness 
of the national Anti-Terrorism Hotline for 
reports at the early stages of concern about an 
intimate, as well as the remote, intimidating 
nature of the Hotline.
Professional practitioner respondents also 
identified significant opportunities to encourage 
community reporting. These broadly focus 
on the opportunity to build stronger and 
deeper relationships with key community 
leaders and organisations to enhance 
partnerships in preventing violent extremism, 
including those that may fall outside the 
current, formal Prevent framework. Within 
this, practitioners felt there could be more 
explicit and committed policy support for 
the strengthening of community brokerage 
models to enhance reporting channels using 
trusted local intermediaries. Alongside this 
could come the fostering of more opportunities 
and mechanisms for open dialogue and 
partnerships on the risks and mitigation 
strategies for violent extremism. For this to be 
meaningful there is a pressing need to develop 
formal support mechanisms for those who 
report, and identifying early what individuals’ 
support needs may be when they first  
come forward.
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Common  
ground: shared 
community and 
practitioner  
perspectives
Future  
considerations 
for policy and 
practice
The project findings make clear that both 
community respondents and professional 
practitioners already have a number of shared 
understandings around existing reporting 
processes and dynamics, as well as challenges 
and improvements that can be made to enhance 
better reporting outcomes. Both groups have 
acknowledged the significant emotional and social 
challenges involved in sharing concerns about 
loved ones and other ‘intimates’ with authorities, 
and have suggested ways to ensure that trust, 
confidentiality and minimisation of harmful social 
impacts associated with community reporting can 
be pursued. Both groups have also emphasised 
the value of strengthening genuine community 
partnerships so that those who come forward feel 
they are doing so with the recognition, validation 
and support that is a key ingredient of willingness 
to share difficult information about others who are 
close and cared for. 
There is a shared understanding that, motivated 
as it is by care and concern, the more personalised 
and localised the reporting process is, the 
stronger it will likely be, and both community and 
professional respondents expressed reservations 
about more remote and impersonal methods of 
bringing forward concerns during the early stages 
for someone who may potentially be radicalising 
to violence.
However, community respondents were more 
interested in face to face reporting to local 
police, as well as other community figures and 
intermediaries, than professional practitioners 
believed to be the case. There are clear 
implications here for rethinking the structures 
and mechanisms that are put into place in local 
areas that can facilitate face to face sharing of 
concerns. Professional practitioners were also 
less aware than community respondents of 
the importance of post-reporting support and 
information, and more focused on the dilemmas 
around post-report information sharing in terms 
of potentially compromising confidentiality and 
the legal or investigative integrity of their work. 
These common understandings and points of 
divergence both point towards ways in which the 
future landscape of community reporting can 
be further developed and refined, and below we 
detail some key considerations and potential 
strategic directions for policy and practice based 
on the project’s findings. 
Strategic direction 1: Consider rethinking 
the tone, content and targeting of social 
messaging initiatives around community 
reporting. Counter-terrorism/Prevent policy 
and practice can benefit from shifting toward 
greater recognition that the primary drivers for 
those considering reporting concerns about an 
‘intimate’ will be care and concern for their welfare 
and the prevention of further harms to both the 
intimate and others in the wider community 
and society. Therefore, public messaging and 
policy practice that emphasises ‘safeguarding’ 
and ‘health promotion’ messaging in tone and 
content, rather than a focus on criminality and 
threat, is likely to be more effective in encouraging 
community reporting concerning intimates who 
may be radicalising to violence. 
Strategic direction 2: Sharing concerns with 
authorities is a staged process. Preventing 
violent extremism policy and practice would 
benefit from applying in greater depth the 
understanding that a staged process of sharing 
concerns will be very common for community 
members, with advice, guidance and support first 
sought within family and friendship networks and 
within the local community before reporting to 
the police occurs. Some individuals will only go 
beyond this to contact the police with reluctance 
and with support from others. Community 
intermediaries and conduits thus play an 
absolutely vital role in the ‘supply chain’ 
of reporting processes and pathways.
Strategic direction 3: Localise and personalise 
the reporting process. A large majority of 
community respondents expressed a strong
 preference to report concerns to local police 
staff and other community sites through face-
to-face interaction. This means foregrounding 
in policy and practice the role of mainstream 
neighbourhood policing teams in such community 
partnership work, as well as dialogue with and 
training for mainstream front-line policing 
personnel to ensure that they are ready and feel 
equipped to positively engage with reports of 
concerns when they present.
Strategic direction 4: Develop support 
mechanisms for reporters. Community 
respondents have very significant worries and 
concerns about what happens to the ‘intimate’, 
to themselves, to their family, and to the wider 
community after they take the grave decision  
to report someone close to them. They want 
support and guidance, protection, and to be  
kept informed as far as possible about what is  
and will be happening through a ‘feedback loop’  
that acknowledges them as partners in keeping 
people and communities safe. 
Strategic direction 5: Clarify reporting 
mechanisms. There is confusion and uncertainty 
for many community respondents, and for some 
professional practitioners, around how reporting 
processes actually work and what choices  
people may have in coming forward. Strong 
consideration can be given to developing both  
an information protocol around reporting 
processes for communities, and to standardising 
the information management of reports to  
enable effective and efficient cross-sharing  
of information and also follow-up with those  
who come forward.
 Introduction
The first people to suspect or know about someone becoming involved in planning acts  
of violent extremism, including planned or actual involvement in overseas conflicts,  
will often be those closest to them: their friends, family and community insiders.4 
Such individuals are ideally placed to notice any 
changes or early warning signs that someone is 
considering violent action to harm others, as well 
as being able to influence vulnerable younger 
people away from violent extremist beliefs and 
settings.5 The willingness of those close to 
potential or suspected violent actors to come 
forward and share their knowledge and concerns 
with authorities is thus a critical element in 
efforts to prevent violent extremist action. 
Considerations of reporting by ‘intimates’,  
as we call them, differ significantly from what 
is commonly termed ‘bystander’ reporting. 
Bystander reporting, first popularised in the 
late 1970s in relation to crime reporting,6   
and since broadened out to a range of 
other social regulation settings, can involve 
reporting by more casual or remote contact 
and relationships such as neighbours and loose 
or general friendship or community networks. 
Bystander reporting can be influenced by 
concerns about the impact on self or others  
of coming forward to authorities, but does  
not invite the same extent or degree of psycho-
social conflicts or dilemmas that it does for 
people who must consider the impacts of 
reporting on someone with whom they care 
for deeply through a close family or personal 
relationship, as well as the impacts on their 
relationship with that person.
However, whilst ‘intimates’7 have a vital role 
to play against potential terrorist threats 
and offer a first line of defence, very little is 
known about what reporting of the potential 
violent extremist involvement of an ‘intimate’ 
means for community members, particularly 
their views, experiences and concerns about 
approaching authorities, especially the police, 
when they have suspicions or knowledge 
to report. Without an understanding of the 
barriers and challenges people face in sharing 
information or cooperating with authorities, as 
well as what motivates them to surmount these 
challenges, government prevention of violent 
extremism (PVE) strategies, counter-terrorism 
information campaigns and positive reporting 
messages will fail to fully engage with members 
of these communities in the strongest  
position to help.
‘Intimates’ reporting is a critical blind spot in 
current Countering Violent Extremism (CVE)/
Prevent thinking and strategy internationally. 
When this research study was conceived, there 
was no open-source evidence-based research 
in the UK which investigated the views of either 
Muslim communities (who are clearly at the 
forefront of concern for the Prevent Strategy8) 
or of the local government, education and 
policing professionals at the forefront of 
Prevent policy implementation on their 
experiences of and on the processes involved in 
reporting on violent extremism concerns in the 
UK (or indeed, the European Union). The first 
study of this kind, conducted with both Muslim 
communities and government stakeholders, 
was recently completed in Australia9 through 
government-supported academic research 
partnered by the Australian Federal Police.  
Its findings draw on valuable primary data and 
insights that have contributed to improving 
current Australian reporting approaches, 
developed new information and engagement 
models for use with communities, and 
provided a substantial number of useable 
insights and key policy and practice lessons 
for both communities and for Australian 
government policy and personnel, including 
first responders. It has formed the basis for a 
new Australian programme trial on community 
reporting that commenced in 2017 (see 
https://steptogether.com.au). Important as 
 this work is, however, the reporting context 
 in Australia differs from that of the UK,  
and so would the generalisability and 
transferability of the findings and any  
resulting recommendations.
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4Williams, M.J., Horgan, J.G., Evans, 
W.P. (2015) The critical role of friends 
in networks for countering violent 
extremism: toward a theory of vicarious 
help-seeking, Behavioral Sciences 
of Terrorism and Political Aggression 
8 (1) pp. 1-21; Attorney General’s 
Department (2015) Preventing 
Violent Extremism and Radicalisation 
in Australia. Australian Government 
https://www.livingsafetogether.gov.
au/informationadvice/Documents/
preventing-violent-extremism-and-
radicalisation-in-australia.pdf 
5GCTF Global Counterterrorism Forum 
(2014) Abu Dhabi Memorandum on Good 
Practices for Education and Countering 
Violent Extremism https://www.thegctf.
org/documents/10162/159880/ 
14Sept19_GCTF+Abu+Dhabi+ 
Memorandum.pdf)
6See for example Bickman, L. and 
Helwig, H. (1979) ‘Bystander reporting: 
The impact of incentives’, Criminology, 
17 (3) pp. 283-300. 
7Grossman, M. (2015) Community 
Reporting Thresholds: Sharing information 
with authorities concerning violent 
extremist activity and involvement in 
foreign conflict. Canberra: Countering 
Violent Extremism Subcommittee, 
Australia-New Zealand Counter-
Terrorism Committee.
8Thomas, P. (2012) Responding to the 
threat of Violent Extremism – Failing 
to Prevent, London: Bloomsbury 
Academic; Busher, J., Choudhury, T., 
Thomas, P. and Harris, G. (2017),  
What the Prevent duty means for schools 
and colleges in England: An analysis of 
educationalists’ experiences, London:  
The Aziz Foundation.
9Grossman, M. (2015) Community 
Reporting Thresholds: Sharing information 
with authorities concerning violent 
extremist activity and involvement in 
foreign conflict. Canberra: Countering 
Violent Extremism Subcommittee, 
Australia-New Zealand Counter-
Terrorism Committee.
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As a result, this current UK study was conceived 
by the original Australian researcher, Professor 
Michele Grossman (now of Deakin University, 
Melbourne) in collaboration with Professor 
Paul Thomas and colleagues at the University 
of Huddersfield, UK. This collaboration arose 
from connections through the broader and 
long-standing research involvements both 
Principal Investigators have around prevention 
of violent extremism, community cohesion and 
community-based policy approaches. It led to 
a successful funding application to the Centre 
for Research and Evidence on Security Threats’ 
(CREST) 2016 ESRC-administered funding 
programme. Our application proposed to build 
on the initial Australian study to gain new 
knowledge about the dynamics and barriers 
to community reporting in the UK in order to 
develop a new, localised and contextually- 
sensitive understanding of and approaches to 
community reporting issues in the UK context. 
The original Australian study involved a modest 
purposive sample of study participants (n=33), 
which was entirely appropriate for a pilot study 
and the specific contexts of the Australian 
research base. By contrast, this UK study has 
employed a significantly increased sample 
size (n=66) to address some of the Australian 
study’s sampling limitations. In particular, 
it has extended sampling to over-represent 
young adults aged 18-26 years old, both 
because of the prominence of this age group 
in domestic terror plots10 and travel to Syria/
Iraq and because of important recent American 
academic research evidence11 suggesting  
that this youth cohort may potentially have  
an important role as ‘associate gatekeepers’  
in identifying the move towards violent 
extremism by peers. 
Our UK study has also included a small 
sub-sample of White British community 
respondents from marginalised communities.  
The inclusion of White British community 
members both reflects the varying reality of 
domestic violent extremism threats and the 
explicit UK policy focus on extremism and 
terror threats of all kinds.12 This wider research 
focus, alongside research sites in differing 
metropolitan regions, has helped the study 
to identify and illuminate both distinctive 
and overlapping features of the community 
reporting landscape in demographically-
contrasting communities in the UK. This 
research rationale and our approach is 
discussed more fully in the following 
Methodology section.
Whilst this study has sought to develop new 
knowledge and applications for UK national 
and local policy makers and academics in its 
own right, it has also aimed to contribute to 
comparative analysis between the UK and 
Australia, thereby enhancing the transnational 
knowledge base around global best practice 
in preventing and countering violent 
extremism. The study has been undertaken 
by an interdisciplinary team of researchers 
(combining researchers in education,  
sociology, cultural studies and criminology).
Research  
questions
The research aims, objectives and methodology sought to understand and assess through in-
depth individual interviews whether ‘community respondents’ would consider sharing (based 
on presented scenarios) concerns with authorities about an ‘intimate’ other (a partner, a family 
member, or a close friend) in relation to their suspected involvement in violent extremist activity 
at home and/or in planning to travel abroad to take part in violent conflicts. Experiences and 
perspectives on community reporting processes and actions were also sought from a range  
of ‘professional practitioners’.
10Pantucci, R. (2015) “We love death as 
you love life”: Britain’s suburban terrorists, 
London: Hurst
11Williams, M.J., Horgan, J.G., Evans, 
W.P. (2015) The critical role of friends 
in networks for countering violent 
extremism: toward a theory of 
vicarious help-seeking, Behavioral 
Sciences of Terrorism and Political 
Aggression 8 (1) pp. 1-21;
12HM Government (2011). Prevent 
Strategy, London: Home Office. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/prevent-strategy-2011   
Our UK study has also 
included a small sub-
sample of White British 
community respondents 
from marginalised 
communities. 
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Research aims 
and objectives
The aims and objectives for this study  
were as follows:
1.  Identifying triggers, thresholds and  
barriers for when someone would  
consider reporting;
2.  Understanding more from participants’ 
perspectives about the experience and 
process of (considering) reporting on an 
individual or group who may be involved 
in, or actively supporting involvement in, 
overseas conflicts, or violent extremism 
(including far-right extremism);
3.  Understanding the experiences and 
perspectives of professional practitioners 
– both those involved in the police and 
Prevent and those representing community 
organisations – around the current reality of 
community reporting and what approaches 
could encourage and facilitate greater 
community sharing of concerns and;
4.  Developing from the data usable insights 
for government and community agencies 
in future community-focused policies, 
strategies and campaigns around facilitating 
and encouraging community reporting 
related to violent extremism.
The findings presented below are based on in-
depth, individual qualitative interviews with 48 
‘community respondents’ and 18 ‘professional 
practitioners’ from a variety of professional 
roles, including counter-terrorism police 
officers, local authority Prevent and community 
development staff and Muslim civil society 
organisation coordinators and community 
workers. In both cases respondents were 
particularly drawn from the West Yorkshire  
and Greater Manchester metropolitan regions, 
with a smaller number from London.
We draw on the data provided through 
these interviews in order to develop a 
stronger understanding of the UK context for 
community reporting, its dynamics, processes 
and pathways, and how these may be improved 
through policy and practice developments. 
In so doing, we hope to contribute to shared 
community, policy and practice dialogue 
on how best to enhance the willingness of 
people to come forward as early as possible 
with concerns and information about those 
radicalising to violence; community members’ 
confidence, clarity, trust and safety when they 
do, and their support and follow-up needs that 
can help ‘close the loop’ on reporting impacts 
and outcomes.
Firstly, the report provides a brief background 
summary of the original Australian study,  
about which more detail may be found in 
Appendix 4. It then details the methodology  
of this UK replication study. Data from 
community respondents are presented and 
critically discussed under the key stage 
headings of ‘Pre-Reporting’, ‘Reporting’  
and ‘Post-Reporting’. Alongside this, 
we present data from the professional 
practitioners, enabling us to offer a process 
mapping analysis that draws on insights 
from both key groups of respondents. Taken 
together, these data and findings inform  
our Conclusions and ‘Future Considerations  
for policy and practice’, where we identify  
a number of strategic directions for policy  
and practice supported by the study’s  
empirical data.  
Limitations  
of the study 
The methodological approach outlined above 
is one of qualitative inquiry, seeking insights, 
feelings and preferences from individual 
community respondents in response to the 
scenarios presented to them, alongside the 
experiences and insights of professional 
practitioners. This obviously means that 
such a study is not generalisable, based as it 
is on individual respondents in selected key 
metropolitan regions of the UK. However,  
our study has a robust sample size for such an 
in-depth, qualitative inquiry, with triangulation 
between Muslim and White respondents, 
between young adults and older members 
of communities and between community 
respondents and professional practitioners 
drawn from a range of roles. 
There is also very strong concordance  
between our rich UK data and our resulting 
findings and the findings of the original 
Australian study, detailed in Appendix 4  
and briefly outlined overleaf.
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Australian Study 
Background and 
Rationale 
Background In 2013, the Australian Government’s Countering Violent Extremism Subcommittee funded 
a research study titled Community Reporting Thresholds: Sharing Information with Authorities 
Concerning Violent Extremist Activity and Involvement in Foreign Conflict.13 This study, completed  
in 2015 and the first of its kind world-wide, was premised on the basis that communities are 
a front line of defence against threats to national security and social cohesion, particularly in 
relation to the recent increase of foreign fighter travel and involvement in overseas conflict. 
Close friends and family members in particular 
are often amongst the first to see changes 
or early warning signs that someone close 
to them may be heading towards, or already 
engaged in, violent extremist activity both 
at home and abroad. A key element of the 
Australian study design was thus its special 
focus on what the research team called 
‘intimates’ reporting – that is, what it may 
mean to bring forward concerns to authorities 
about a partner, close relative or friend. 
However, common practice for law enforcement 
has been to focus primarily on perceived 
offenders, and not to prioritise the importance 
of having strong and trusting relationships 
with families, peer networks and community 
members. Yet both community leaders and 
kindship and social networks are often those 
best positioned to know who in the community 
may be at risk of criminal activity, whether 
terrorism-related or otherwise. When a young 
man or woman begins a trajectory towards 
criminality or antisocial activity, such events 
rarely occur without someone from that 
community noticing a change in the person’s 
behaviour, attitudes, and/or social networks.14  
Yet communities that do not trust law 
enforcement are often unwilling to share  
their observations and knowledge. Without 
strong partnerships, vital information is likely 
to be withheld.15
Moreover, virtually no public evidence-
based research had been conducted at 
that stage about community-based views 
on or experience of reporting involvement 
in extremism to authorities, and the 
implications of this for policy, programme 
and operational models and approaches by 
government, communities, law enforcement 
or security agencies. This was despite a range 
of information and persuasion campaigns 
developed and conducted in countries  
including Australia,16 the UK,17 Germany18 
and the USA19 that sought to encourage  
people in communities to come forward  
with information or concerns about people  
in their local neighbourhood, kinship or  
social networks who might be radicalising  
to violence.
However, these campaigns often focused, 
especially in Australia, on reporting by the 
general community of observed activity or 
behaviour that may be suspicious or concerning 
from national security perspectives. While 
certainly valuable as an information, detection 
and intervention resource, general community 
reporting is only part of the story, and gaining 
new knowledge about the dynamics of 
‘intimates’ reporting was thus seen to address a 
critical blind-spot in current Countering Violent 
Extremism (CVE) thinking and strategies. 
The Australian Community Reporting Thresholds 
project broke new ground in seeking to 
identify community knowledge and concerns 
around reporting processes, to propose 
new understandings and approaches to 
community reporting based on these insights, 
and to develop new platforms for community 
education, awareness and increased willingness 
to report based on the data it gathered and 
analysed. Its subsequent impacts have had 
significant policy and practice outcomes,  
and further information about the Australian 
study’s research aims, study design, methods, 
findings and translation into policy and  
practice is contained in Appendix 4 this report.
13Grossman, Michele (2015) Community 
Reporting Thresholds: Sharing Information 
with Authorities Concerning Violent Extremist 
Activity and Involvement in Foreign Conflict. 
Canberra: Australia-New Zealand Counter-
Terrorism Committee.
14Wasserman, Robert (2010) Guidance 
for Building Communities of Trust, 
Washington, DC: U.S. Department  
of Justice, p. 13.
15Ibid.
16Lowe, Sue (2003) ‘Terrorism Kit So 
Dumb It’s a Winner’, Sydney Morning 
Herald, 10 April, http://www.smh.com.au/
articles/2003/04/09/1049567739732.
html; Grossman, Michele (2015) Community 
Reporting Thresholds: Sharing Information 
with Authorities Concerning Violent Extremist 
Activity and Involvement in Foreign Conflict. 
Canberra: Australia-New Zealand Counter-
Terrorism Committee, p. 39.
17Tran, Mark (2014) ‘Top Counter-Terror 
Officer asks Public’s help Identifying 
Aspiring Terrorists’, The Guardian, 27 
August, http://www.theguardian.com/
uk-news/2014/aug/26/met-police-ask-
public-help-identify-aspiring-terrorists; 
Pidd, Helen, Vikram Dodd and Sandra 
Laville (2014) ‘Syria Anti-Terror Plan 
Slammed by Parents and Community 
Groups’, The Guardian, 24 April, http://www.
theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/apr/ 
24/syria-initiative-met-slammed- 
parents-community
18Kern, Soeren (2012) ‘Germany: 
New ad campaign to counter Muslim 
radicalization’, Gatestone Institute. 5 
September, http://www.gatestoneinstitute.
org/3321/germany-ad-campaign-muslim-
radicalization ; Gessat, Rachel (2012) ‘Fake 
“missing” posters to combat radicalisation’, 
DW (Germany), 28 August, http://www.
dw.de/fake-missing-posters-to-combat-
radicalization/a-16197519 
19Bjelopera, James P (2011) Terrorism 
Information Sharing and the Nationwide 
Suspicious Activity Report Initiative: Background 
and Issues for Congress, CRS Report for 
Congress, Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service; Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) (2012) A 
Resource Guide to Improve Your Community’s 
Awareness and Reporting of Suspicious 
Activity for Law Enforcement and Community 
Partners, Washington, DC: U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security; Goldman, Adam 
and Greg Miller (2014) ‘American Suicide 
Bomber’s Travels in U.S., Middle East Went 
Unmonitored’, The Washington Post, 11 
October, http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/american-suicide-
bombers-travels-in-us-middle-east-went-
unmonitored/2014/10/11/38a3228e-4fe8-
11e4-aa5e-7153e466a02d_story.html
 Methodology
Overview  
and research  
rationale
This study was designed as a UK replication and development of the earlier path-breaking pilot 
Australian project20 and as such we have drawn heavily on the original study’s qualitative design, 
methods and instruments. However, the UK study introduces several key refinements to the 
original Australian research.  
Firstly, we have significantly expanded the scale 
of the original study by doubling the number 
of participants from n=33 to n=66. Secondly, 
whereas the Australian study only drew on 
individual respondents self-identifying as 
‘Muslim’, we have introduced a new sub-sample 
of community respondents from marginalised 
White British majority communities. This last 
modification reflects the increasingly varied 
nature of the extremist threat and the explicitly 
broad focus of the UK Prevent Strategy (HMG, 
2011) on varying forms of extremism. Thirdly, 
we have purposively over-sampled young adult 
community respondents (18-26 year olds, 
n=21 or 44% of the community sample) for a 
number of reasons. Crucially, this age group 
have been the key demographic actors in many 
of the incidents of domestic ISIS/Al-Qa’eda-
inspired terrorism, for instance in Britain21 and 
more broadly in Europe.22 Nesser particularly 
identifies young people as the ‘misfits’, ‘drifters’ 
and ‘protégés’ of Isis/Al-Qa’eda-inspired   
plots, who are ‘usually young with limited life 
experience, and are impressionable and quite  
easily manipulated by senior figures they respect 
and look up to (such as entrepreneurs, or other 
mentors, including militant preachers)’.23 Whilst 
these young people have often been in their 
20s, with some having undertaken higher 
education, there was a marked shift downwards 
in the age profile of the youth and young 
adults who attempted to travel to (and often 
succeeded in reaching) Syria towards those  
in late teenage years, with limited education.24 
In this context, Britain’s Prevent counter-
terrorism strategy has focused significantly  
on young people25 and on the responsibilities  
of those who work with them.26
Additionally, our research focus on young 
adults reflects both a finding from the original 
Australian study and an associated finding 
from important recent US-based research.27  
The latter study suggested that friends were 
more likely to notice the movement of young 
adults towards violent extremism than family 
members or professionals, such as teachers/
lecturers, who work with them, and that such 
friends might be ‘associate gatekeepers’ for 
the authorities becoming aware of this through 
their use of the internet and social media as a 
means of raising concerns, both on grounds 
of ease and anonymity. Additionally, this 
American study problematically suggests that 
the closer the friend, the less likely they may 
be to even notice the move towards violent 
extremism, and that fear of damaging their 
close friendship may deter them from reporting 
their concerns. Accordingly, our UK study has 
focussed much more on young adults than 
the original Australian study had, in order 
to investigate the attitudes and dispositions 
of young adults towards reporting concerns 
around an ‘intimate’ being involved in violent 
extremism. Alongside this research focus on 
young adults, our study has sought views from 
adult community members and professional 
practitioners such as counter-terrorism police 
officers, local authority Prevent and community 
work staff, and civil society organisation 
coordinators and community activists.
Finally, our study covers three major English 
metropolitan conurbations of the UK (and 
thus three distinct police force jurisdictions 
and counter-terrorism policing units) – West 
Yorkshire, Greater Manchester and Greater 
London – that have all been at the forefront 
of domestic terrorist events and threats28 and 
of the efforts to counter them through the 
Prevent Strategy.29 Indeed, during the fieldwork 
process, major terrorist events occurred in both 
Manchester30 and London,31 with significant 
impact on our fieldwork plans and the eventual 
sampling, as discussed overleaf.
14 Methodology
20Grossman, M. (2015) Community 
Reporting Thresholds: Sharing information 
with authorities concerning violent 
extremist activity and involvement in 
foreign conflict. Canberra: Countering 
Violent Extremism Subcommittee, 
Australia-New Zealand Counter-
Terrorism Committee.
21Pantucci, R. (2015) “We love death as 
you love life”: Britain’s suburban terrorists, 
London: Hurst.
22Nesser, P. (2015) Islamist terrorism in 
Europe: A history, London: Hurst.
23Nesser, P. (2015) Islamist terrorism in 
Europe: A history, London: Hurst, p.15.
24Coolsaet, R. (2015) What drives 
Europeans to Syria and to IS? Insights from 
the Belgian case, Brussels: Egmont.
25Thomas, P. (2012) Responding to the 
Threat of Violent Extremism – Failing to 
Prevent. London: Bloomsbury Academic.
26Busher, J., Choudhury, T., Thomas, P. 
and Harris, G. (2017) What the Prevent 
duty means for schools and colleges in 
England: An analysis of educationalists’ 
experiences, London: The Aziz 
Foundation.
27Williams, M.J., Horgan, J.G., Evans, 
W.P. (2015) ‘The critical role of friends 
in networks for countering violent 
extremism: toward a theory of vicarious 
help-seeking’, Behavioral Sciences of 
Terrorism and Political Aggression, 8 (1) 
pp. 1-21.
28Pantucci, R. (2015) “We love death as 
you love life”: Britain’s suburban terrorists, 
London: Hurst
29Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) 
(2011) Prevent Strategy, London:  
The Stationary Office
30Pidd, H. (2017) ‘Manchester Arena 
bomb was designed to kill largest 
number of innocents’ The Guardian,  
9th June, https://www.theguardian.
com/uk-news/2017/jun/09/
manchester-arena-bomb-
designed-kill-largest-number-
innocents?CMP=share_btn_link
31Booth, R., Dodd, V., O’Carroll, L. 
and Taylor, M. (2017) ‘Police race to 
establish if London Bridge attackers 
were part of network’, The Guardian, 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2017/jun/03/london-bridge-
closed-after-serious-police-incident-
reports?CMP=share_btn_link
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Research aims 
and objectives
The research methodology and questions 
sought to understand and assess through  
in-depth individual interviews whether 
community respondents would consider 
sharing (based on presented scenarios) 
concerns with authorities about an ‘intimate’ 
other (a partner, a family member or a 
close friend) in relation to their suspected 
involvement in extremist activity at home and/
or in planning to travel abroad to take part in 
violent conflicts. Experiences and perspectives 
on community reporting processes and actions 
were also sought from a range of professional 
practitioners, many involved in delivering or 
working with aspects of the Prevent strategy.  
The research aims and objectives for this study 
focused on:
1.  Identifying triggers, thresholds and barriers 
for when someone would consider reporting;
2.  Understanding more from participants’ 
perspectives about the experience and 
process of (considering) reporting on an 
individual or group who may be involved 
in, or actively supporting involvement in, 
overseas conflict, or violent extremism 
(including far-right extremism);
3.  Understanding the experiences and 
perspectives of professional practitioners 
– both those involved in the police and 
Prevent and those representing community 
organisations – around the current reality of 
community reporting and what approaches 
could encourage and facilitate greater 
community sharing of concerns and;
4.  Developing from the data usable insights 
and tools for government and community 
agencies in future community-focused 
policies, strategies and campaigns around 
facilitating and encouraging community 
reporting related to violent extremism.
Key themes explored in interviews were:
•  The reasons community members might  
feel motivated to share concerns with  
the authorities about those suspected  
of involvement in violent extremism  
and/or violent overseas conflict; 
•  What they would want to know or be 
reassured about before deciding to  
share their concerns;
•  What factors might encourage or discourage 
people to share their concerns, and what 
channels/conduits and modes of reporting 
would be seen as helpful or unhelpful; 
•  Expectations, if any, about the kind of 
support people might need or want at 
various stages of the reporting process, 
including after they make a report;
•  Expectations, if any, about the outcomes  
of the reporting process; 
•  Concerns and fears, if any, about the 
reporting process and its impacts  
(personal, family, community);
•  Views on what agencies who listen to 
community members’ concerns during 
reporting need to know from a community 
point of view when dealing with members  
of the public on these issues;
•  The experiences and perspectives of 
professional practitioners from a variety  
of professional roles on what the current 
reality of community reporting is, what 
the barriers/blocks currently are and what 
approaches would facilitate and encourage 
greater community reporting and sharing  
of concerns about ‘intimates’;
•  Strategies for improving existing approaches 
to community reporting;
•  Strategies for strengthening public 
awareness and knowledge about the  
process of coming forward with information 
to the police/authorities.
What factors might 
encourage or discourage 
people to share their 
concerns, and what 
channels/conduits and 
modes of reporting would 
be seen as helpful 
or unhelpful
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Sampling
Field study sites
Research ethical 
procedures
Recruitment
In-depth, face-to-face, semi-structured interviews were conducted with a total of 66 participants 
(see Table 1 below). These were made up of two primary groups: 
1.  Community respondents (community members and community leaders) (n=48): Recruitment 
of this sample comprised both Muslim respondents (n=40) and a smaller sample from 
economically marginalised White British respondents (n=7).
2.  Professional practitioners (n=18): Recruitment of professional practitioner participants included 
police counterterrorism officers and local authority staff working on Prevent who were involved 
in developing and implementing reporting mechanisms and channels that enable information 
brought forward by community members to be analysed and operationalised, as well as front-
line community/youth workers and teachers and coordinators/key activists of Muslim civil 
society groups. 
Community and professional practitioner respondent groups were drawn from three major English 
metropolitan conurbations at the forefront of UK counter-terrorism policy efforts through the 
Prevent Strategy and the associated Channel scheme. Those areas were: West Yorkshire, Greater 
Manchester (with coterminous policing authorities) and Greater London (Metropolitan Police). 
Our rationale for selecting these areas is based primarily on their counter-terrorism priority status 
(borne out by recent terrorist attacks in Manchester and London in the summer of 2017) as well 
as their accessibility of the two regions in the north of England for the research team. In addition, 
the University of Huddersfield research team has strong and long-established research links with 
youth work, community work and education provision, as well as with police, local authorities and 
community organisations in West Yorkshire and Greater Manchester.
This research project underwent comprehensive ethical scrutiny to ensure that the research was 
carried out safely and with considered consent and respect for the privacy and autonomy of the 
research participants and to ensure data security. This was a dual process. First, ethical approval 
to undertake the study was gained by the two participating universities’ institutional Human 
Research Ethics Panels: Victoria University in Melbourne, Australia (where Professor Grossman 
worked when the CREST grant was awarded) and the University of Huddersfield in the UK. Second, 
the research proposal also underwent additional ethical scrutiny from CREST’s Security Research 
Ethics Committee (SREC) to ensure that rigorous ethical processes were in place. These ethical 
approval processes included scrutiny of draft research instruments, participant consent forms  
and arrangements for the safe storage of data.
A range of professional practitioners were purposively sampled in the three research areas.  
This process was facilitated by the research team’s existing established research links with  
statutory agencies and community organisations. 
Recruitment of suitable community respondents presented some challenges, not only due to  
the sensitivity of the topic but also because our inclusion criteria sought people able to offer  
real insights on a difficult and often confronting issue. This meant we did not pursue a general 
‘call-out’ approach across the two main target populations in order to invite participants.  
Table 1: Project Sampling Across the Three Study Sites
West Yorkshire Greater Manchester Greater London Total
17 x Muslim community 
participants (8 youth)
22 x Muslim community 
participants (9 youth)
2 x Muslim community 
participants (Adult)
41
4 x White community 
participants (4 youth)
3 x White community 
participants (1 youth)
0 x White community 
participants
7
11 x key state professionals 4 x key state professionals 3 x key state professionals 18
Subtotal: 32 Subtotal: 29 Subtotal: 5 N=66
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Instead, we relied on snowball sampling through our existing community networks to selectively 
identify relevant potential participants who aligned with our inclusion criteria. For instance, we 
wanted to recruit Muslim-background respondents from neighbourhoods and situated peer-group 
networks where ISIS/Al-Qa’eda-inspired radicalisation and violent extremism was, or had been, a 
live issue, and/or where participants were politically engaged and where they may have views and 
insights on how grievances and frustration can go in a worrying direction for some people in their 
localities or peer groups/networks. Equally, in selecting socio-economically marginalised White 
British participants, we looked for candidates from local communities where far-right activism and 
violent extremism was present, or where participants had political views on these matters. Whilst 
this approach made the recruitment process more deliberative, it provided the research team 
with stronger and richer data in terms of insights and validity. Thus, the sampling approach did 
not involve explicitly seeking people who had any direct personal or family experience of violent 
extremism, terrorism or contact with authorities on these issues, but rather people who could offer 
insights into peer groups/communities where such risks of extremist involvement, and the political 
and social positions that may underwrite these risks, were genuine and relevant. 
Working with trusted ‘gatekeepers’ to both 
identify such suitable respondents and gain 
their willingness to be interviewed was the 
key to successful recruitment across Greater 
Manchester and West Yorkshire, emphasising 
the importance and strength of the University 
of Huddersfield’s reputation/credibility and 
its pre-existing relationships of trust with 
such ‘gatekeepers’. Similarly, the University’s 
ongoing collaborations with local authorities, 
police forces and community organisations 
facilitated successful recruitment of suitable 
professional practitioners. The project’s 
Advisory Group included a senior regional 
counter-terrorism police officer, local authority 
Prevent and community development officers 
and a retired police Chief Constable. The 
Advisory Group played an important role 
in aiding respondent recruitment through 
signposting and vouching for the research 
team. They also played an important advisory 
role in commenting on early versions of the 
research instruments and on the meaning of 
the emerging findings.
Within these sampling cohorts, the majority 
of community respondents were everyday 
community members, with an emphasis on 
young adults aged 18-26 years. Initially, our 
strategy was to avoid the ‘community leaders’ 
who had featured prominently in the earlier 
Australian study. However, emerging data 
emphasised that most, if not all, community 
respondents would utilise the help and 
advice of others, firstly family and friends 
but then often ‘community leaders’, prior to 
formally reporting. For this reason, the later 
stage of fieldwork saw a decision to boost 
the sampling of ‘community leaders’ who 
had overarching awareness and knowledge 
of community concerns and dynamics. This, 
and their recruitment through the channels 
outlined above, was one of the key reason 
why the original intention to sample equally 
across all three regions became a sample 
heavily focussed on the two north of England 
Regions. The other reason was that the 
London site proved more challenging for 
recruitment, emphasising the importance of 
known relationships of trust and credibility in 
recruiting respondents to research around such 
a sensitive issue. This decision was supported in 
part by the two terrorist attacks in Manchester 
and London discussed above. The Manchester 
attack prompted a number of ‘community 
leaders’ and other community members to 
volunteer to be interviewed by researchers they 
were already familiar with, whereas the London 
attack seemed to ‘chill’ further attempts to 
recruit from distance. A small number of 
community respondents were interviewed  
from London, though, alongside interviews 
with London-based professional practitioners.
For community respondents, sampling aimed  
for an even gender split across the cohorts,  
which was achieved in practice, n=M24/F24  
(see Table 2 below).
All community respondents were compensated  
for their travel and time commitment to the  
project with a £15 Amazon gift voucher at  
the end of the interview.
Table 2: Community Respondent Sex by Region
Region Male Female
West Yorkshire 8 13
Greater Manchester 14 11
London 2 0
Total 24 24
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Instruments 
Procedure
For community respondents, the research design employed semi-structured, face to face 
individual interviews that offered participants a choice of hypothetical ‘scenarios’ (adapted from 
actual cases; See Appendices 1, 2 and 3 for Scenarios used) portraying a person considering or 
planning involvement in violent extremism or foreign travel to a conflict zone as stimulus material 
for community members to respond to. This technique proved highly successful in the Australian 
pilot study in gaining rich data from community participants whilst simultaneously helping 
manage complex ethical and legal challenges and risks. The original scenarios from Australia were 
adjusted to reflect UK conditions and challenges and we introduced a new third scenario for the 
White British participants that dealt with a case of involvement in violent far-right extremism.
The two interview schedules (one for professional practitioners and one for community respondents) 
were closely based on those developed for community participant and government stakeholders  
in the Australian study, with minor adjustments in language appropriate for a UK audience.
Data collection was conducted between 
October 2016 and August 2017 across the 
three study sites. All interviews were conducted 
individually by members of the research team, 
face to face and digitally recorded (unless any 
participant objected32) and were transcribed 
verbatim. The rationale of the project and its 
ethical procedures to ensure confidentiality 
were explained to each participant at the 
outset. All interviewees received an information 
sheet about the research project and signed 
a consent form prior to being interviewed. 
Interviews lasted between 40 minutes to  
1.5 hours with an average interview duration  
of approximately 50 minutes. 
Interviews involving community respondents 
were largely conducted in a variety of local 
community centre facilities and offices. 
Some local West Yorkshire respondents were 
interviewed at the University of Huddersfield 
premises. All interview sites offered rooms 
for participants to speak in undisturbed 
privacy. The only exception to this were 
several interviews conducted opportunistically 
in public venue locales affording quiet 
and adequate privacy at the respondents’ 
own request for convenience, and did not 
compromise the quality or validity of the 
interview. Professional practitioners were asked 
a series of semi-structured interview questions 
to guide their thinking on the key themes of 
the study identified above. This included asking 
these participants to detail their knowledge 
of current reporting processes and structures 
and how well they thought these were working. 
Professional practitioners were usually 
interviewed at their workplaces, in suitable 
quiet private rooms available on site. Several 
interviews for local professional practitioner 
participants in West Yorkshire were conducted 
at University of Huddersfield premises.
Following from the experience of the successful 
Australian study, and given the sensitivity of the 
topic, each community respondent was asked 
to read through a hypothetical but realistic 
‘scenario’ or vignette, which told a story about 
someone who was presented as close to them 
becoming involved in violent extremism.  
Muslim respondents were presented with 
two scenarios (‘Adam’ and ‘Sophia’) and after 
reading both were asked to choose one, and 
White British respondents were presented 
with one (‘Conor’) scenario. (These scenarios 
appear in full in the Appendices to this report.)  
Participants were then asked to respond to the 
interview questions as the close friend of the 
‘at risk’ fictional character presented in the 
scenario. This approach of ‘thinking through’ 
the scenario had the advantage of allowing 
participants to respond to the interview 
questions without fear of disclosing sensitive, 
personal or confidential information that 
might place them or others at risk, as well as 
helping to generate trust and confidence in 
the research process. A further advantage the 
scenarios brought was an often imperceptible 
shift during the course of the interview. 
Respondents would start off discussing the 
fictional character but gradually morph into 
situating the story more within the context and 
concerns of their own lives – ‘if this was my 
friend, I’d...’.      
As with the original Australian study, at the  
end of the interview each respondent was  
given the opportunity to speak, if they so 
wished, about actual events or experiences 
where they may have been involved or had 
knowledge of reporting a concern about 
someone radicalising or involved in violent 
extremism. It was made clear to them that this 
was in no way a requirement of the research but 
rather an opportunity for them to discuss such 
issues or experiences at their own discretion.  
A minority of participants (n=11) took up this 
opportunity. Some discussed cases where 
they had had a concern about someone they 
thought was radicalising or involved in violent 
extremism, whereas others spoke about 
reporting instances of suspected volume  
crime, including serious volume crime. 
32Only one professional participant  
did not want the interview recorded, 
and short hand notes were therefore 
taken by the interviewer.
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Coding  
procedure
Involvement  
of Users in  
the Research 
All interview transcripts for both groups of 
participants were anonymised and synoptically 
coded using thematic and process-based 
codes developed iteratively by the research 
team. Inter-rater reliability was checked with  
a sample of coded transcripts, showing  
good concordance. 
Emerging results prior to the more formal end 
of project dissemination events (see section 
below) were shared in a number of fora to 
enable discussion and challenge as to the 
meaning of the findings being highlighted 
by the research team. As well as this process 
taking place in our Project Advisory Group 
meetings, early emerging findings were 
presented to and discussed in sessions with 
Home Office staff and senior UK counter-
terrorism policing colleagues in February 2017, 
and with Greater Manchester local authority 
Prevent colleagues in July 2017. The purpose 
of these sessions was to invite comment 
and challenge from people with professional 
experience and expertise relevant to this study. 
Anonymised field notes were made at each of 
these sessions. These have subsequently been 
used to critically evaluate out framework for 
analysis and identify assumptions underlying 
our interpretations of the data. Emerging 
findings were also shared with policing and 
academic colleagues (through Public Safety 
Canada and the Terrorism, Security and Society 
(TSAS) network) in Toronto, Canada in May 
2017, with the strong resonance of the findings 
for participants leading to interest in a further 
Canadian replication study.
Project Advisory Group
The project established an Advisory Group comprised of five members. The group met with the 
research team in Huddersfield three times during the lifetime of the project. The Advisory Group 
had three core functions. Firstly, to provide technical and operational advice throughout the life 
of the study. Secondly, to act as an expert forum to discuss the project’s emerging findings, both 
to act as a source of cross verification for findings and to advise how the information from the 
research should be most usefully employed for end users. Lastly, to help identify opportunities 
 to exploit the findings emerging from the research. 
Project dissemination plans
The project has planned a comprehensive and 
varied dissemination strategy to communicate 
our research findings across a range of 
different audiences and channels. These  
have included: 
•  Two dissemination seminars, in London for 
CREST funders, government departments 
and national policing/CT agencies, and in 
Huddersfield for local authorities, regional 
policing/CTU staff and civil society groups;
•  Targeted policy presentations by invitation  
at key national government, civil society  
and policing agencies;
•  Presentations to government, policing and 
academic colleagues in other countries 
interested in the policy challenge and 
research findings, including in Canada  
and Australia:
•  Community Dissemination Forum events 
in Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire 
to present our research findings and 
recommendations to local/regional civil 
society groups, including those acting as 
‘gatekeepers’ for research respondents; 
•  A publications strategy:
 –  Targeted dissemination through a range 
of practitioner publications and articles 
in academic journals; 
 –  A comprehensive final research report, 
made available via the websites of CREST 
and the participating universities.
 Pre-Reporting
Experiences and 
feelings bearing 
on whether or 
not to report
This section of the report will consider what we have termed the ‘pre-reporting’ phase. This 
refers to that period in which family or community members consider what they are seeing 
or hearing that is causing them to be concerned that someone close may be radicalising to 
violence; where to find out more information or seek assistance, and what decisions they  
will make with regard to sharing concerns with others, including authorities. 
For this study, we asked community 
respondents to consider their response to 
the events supplied in the vignette, where a 
course of action (or inaction) is mulled over and 
thought through. Each of the scenarios place 
the respondent in a dilemma with more than 
one possible course of action. We examine the 
deliberative reasoning and sequential thinking 
which accompanies the scenario in four ways: 
First, we explore the experiences and feelings 
generated by the vignette that have a bearing 
on the reporting decisions. Second, we look 
at what behaviours and actions respondents 
say they would undertake in response to the 
scenario. Third, we examine the conflicts and 
dilemmas that the vignette raises, including 
how decision making is navigated, how 
respondents recognise thresholds within the 
scenario and how they consider the anticipated 
impacts (consequences of reporting or not 
reporting) and then identify the barriers and 
enablers are for reporting. Lastly, we examine 
what support respondents said they needed 
or desired in the pre-reporting phase in order 
to make a decision to share their concern or 
suspicion with authorities.
There was a broad consensus amongst respondents that the scenarios were authentic and raised 
serious concerns. In response, respondents expressed a range of often conflicting emotions and 
feelings when considering whether or not to report the concern to the authorities. For some, their 
emotions would see-saw between loyalty to the (fictional) friend and a sense of responsibility to 
wider society to prevent any future harm, including the dangers of spreading a violent ideological 
message. As one community leader noted:
  Even sat here I’m already feeling a sense of guilt, so betraying a friend, even if it’s for the 
greater good, would stoke emotions of guilt and betrayal. So I’d have to think very hard 
about passing on the information about a friend to the authorities. But I like to think I’d 
do the right thing and look for the greater good, whether it’s the good of him or the wider 
community. [...] I think the welfare of the wider community that he might affect would be 
a major concern. I’d be concerned about his welfare [as] a close friend. I can’t dismiss the 
fact that I’d be concerned about his physical, mental, emotional welfare, but again, I’d be 
concerned about how much of this rhetoric is spreading out to other people and not just 
him. [CR28, Muslim male, Greater Manchester] 
The overwhelming majority of respondents found the scenarios disturbing and complex. They 
often experienced some degree of conflict when deliberating on what to do given their knowledge 
of the escalating events described in each. A range of other feelings and emotions to the scenario 
included being shocked, worried, apprehensive, scared, stressed and fearful, for the intimate or 
about the situation:
  I’ve never been into a situation like this and I wouldn’t like to. Never.  
[CR09 Muslim female, West Yorkshire] 
20 Pre-Reporting
Actions and 
behaviours in 
pre-reporting
Some respondents said the first action they would want take is to find out more information to 
try and satisfy themselves that their concerns were warranted. This was one of the most frequent 
responses to the scenario [CR30; CR28; CR26; CR25; CR24; CR16; CR17; CR20; CR21; CR02; CR09; 
CR10; CR12; CR03]: wanting to talk to the person in an effort to determine the veracity of what 
they had learned by researching the topic independently, and also gauge how seriously involved 
the intimate was, or as an opportunity to challenge or reason with the views and beliefs they 
were espousing. Throughout, the overwhelming concern was to try and help the person at risk of 
radicalising to violence. This early avenue of inquiry was often a first step, the outcome of which 
was central in formulating a decision about whether to proceed to report to the authorities. 
  First I’ll try and find out what [Sophia’s] position is, I’ll try to find out more about [the 
boyfriend in the scenario]. Try and get more about his background. I’d try and find out as 
much as I can through Sophia, and if not I’ll see if there’s any other link. [...] first of all I’ll 
see if I can do it directly. If not then I’ll get the third party involved, a close friend, yeah. 
Another close friend. [CR26, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
  First step, I’d talk to him, listen to him, not cut him off straight away [...] See what he’s got 
to tell me first, and then work through that. I wouldn’t give him that long after I’ve spoken 
to him, I would monitor him within a few days, and I will know [through my own] instinct, 
you know your own child.[...] [Then] I would speak to my husband. I would sit down With 
[my child again], if in a few days it hasn’t worked I would contact people where, on 
internet they are given numbers where to contact people if you need help. There are  
sites where you can contact them, you can contact police or you contact engagement. 
[CR10, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
These emotions were often complex and highly personal, with some common elements (almost 
always involving degrees of worry and concern for the intimate) along with other more distinctive 
feelings. One respondent discusses how she felt burdened by both the unwelcome knowledge she 
acquires through the scenario, and uncertainty about the consequences of sharing this knowledge 
for both the intimate and also herself: 
  Like it’s just your friend and even if it is serious it doesn’t feel serious, but once  
the authorities are involved a lot of people are going to be up, like might want  
to talk to me or talk to my friend. And then if they want to talk to my friend and  
it’s because of me it’s just, like, a bit awkward [...] It’s the fear of the unknown  
and I don’t like this uncertainty. I think I’d feel scared about it all because,  
like scared for my friend and everything, but scared for myself as well. I think  
all around I’m more thinking about myself in this situation, not my friend.  
[CR30, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
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  I’d talk to her first, because it’s like, if she thinks she’s got an issue, an actual problem or 
she’s just generally ‘oh, I don’t want to hang out’ or something. So I feel like it’s wrong 
of me to go around first and be like ‘oh I think this is going on with her’, because it’s like 
spreading rumours isn’t it, and it could just be completely false and not even true. I think I 
would be reluctant to tell other people, like I said not unless like I, maybe I saw something 
that was like, oh this is really serious. [CR03, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
  I’d speak to him. I wouldn’t go to like authorities just yet. I’d speak to his other friends,  
I’ll speak to his family members as well, to see what’s going on, but like I wouldn’t take, 
you know, anything official just yet. [CR20, young Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
In keeping with this cautionary impulse, some simply wanted to see if there was an innocent 
explanation for the behaviour, for example, a misunderstanding or a joking comment.  
Most respondents said it was important to them to find out more information before  
deciding how to proceed: 
  She’s being withdrawn and I don’t understand why but I need to find out, so I’m going  
to be looking into it. I won’t give up until I get my answers. [CR27, Muslim female,  
Greater Manchester]
  I think you’ve got to be really sure that the difference between maybe a joke to a  
difference between the seriousness or, or how serious, depending on the evidence  
that you have, that might hold me back. Because I’m the kind of person who needs  
to be pretty sure, but not leave it too late for it to become, you know, dangerous.  
[CR25, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
This information seeking could also include actively questioning and contesting the ideas and 
beliefs the person held in an attempt to change their mind or to deflect or divert them from  
the radical path they appeared to be on:  
  So you’ll exhaust your personal friendship, you’ll try and counsel, you’ll sit down  
and talk to him, and then when you think that it’s gone to a certain level then  
you’d, you know, you’ll actually take it further or take it higher. [CR17, Muslim male,  
Greater Manchester] 
  If Adam was a close friend I’d want to speak to him in the first instance. I’d like to think I’d 
try and counsel him and understand where he was coming from and trying to persuade 
him that it’s not the best course of action, and try and undo some of the corrupt thinking 
that’s entered his head. [CR28, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
   I think talking to her about the consequences of, first of all, getting her to open up  
about it [...] trying to explain to her the consequences of her actions, which is hard,  
not just in this situation, but just in relationships in general, trying to explain that  
she may have been manipulated. So she’s only doing what she’s doing for her boyfriend 
and questioning her own beliefs and whether she thinks that this is the right thing to do, 
whether she thinks her boyfriend is doing the right thing, whether she fully believes  
what he believes and if she’s supporting him, does she truly support him, does she  
believe in that support that she’s giving him, or is she just giving it for like I said before, 
because that someone that she’s in a relationship with, for that sense of security.   
[CR01, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
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Several Muslim respondents stressed that the course of violent extremist action outlined in the 
scenarios misrepresented the tenets of their religion, and argued they would want to also try to enter 
into theological discussion to persuade the intimate that they have misunderstood their religion:33 
  First of all, I would try and talk to my son. About what’s going through his head, and  
then secondly as a mother I would tell him our religion, it doesn’t teach us that. [...]  
Then I would contact people who can get involved and who can help the young people. 
[CR10, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
  First, because I’m his friend, I’d keep it to myself, but I’d tell somebody who’s got  
good knowledge on the religion that could help change his ideas away from  
being extremist. [CR21, young Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
There were some differing views on the likely outcome of this information-seeking venture.  
Whilst several respondents noted that they didn’t think they would be able to change the mind  
of the intimate, they would nevertheless want to be better informed about what was taking  
place, hence the inquiry. However, another respondent’s reluctance to share information with  
the authorities resulted from overconfidence in the friendship, which then became willingness  
to divulge ‘everything’ if the friendship did not meet her expectations at a later date:
  I wouldn’t share it yet – obviously I’ll do my little investigation to see if she’s mentioned 
it to anybody or she’s talked or if her behaviour’s like that around other people. But 
obviously I know Sophia because I know she’ll confide in me. All she needs to know is I’m 
there for her. So eventually she will open up. I’d keep it to myself. I wouldn’t share with my 
friends. The thing is obviously, like I said, me and her are close and I want her, obviously 
she confides in me in everything and she’ll know that I’m there for her. One day she is 
going to confide in me because she knows she can trust me. And I won’t share anything. 
[CR27, Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
Others spoke about needing to discover how deeply involved the intimate was in the group or 
to gauge the intensity to which the intimate held the radicalising belief. For some, whether the 
matter was reported appeared to be dependent on this information seeking and checking process.
  Depending on his response, the actual response. If he’s well involved in that group and 
gives that sort of argument too, saying that ‘no, they’re right’ and everything, so then 
obviously I would report, after I’ve spoken to him and get some information out of him,  
and then report it. [CR12, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
For some such as the respondent above, the threshold for reporting a concern to the authorities 
remained high, based on their struggle to balance their need to feel fairly confident in their 
assessment before proceeding, on the one hand, with the potential consequences of not  
reporting their concerns in a timely way on the other.
The difficulty of establishing the right threshold for sharing a concern was a key issue which was 
explicitly raised or touched on by many respondents. This was a difficult issue of which the earlier 
information seeking is only one feature. Other features included anxieties about reporting ‘false 
positives’ for the individual intimate, and the burden this might create for authorities who would 
investigate only to find nothing of consequence: 
  I think maybe I’m getting a group of people into trouble when they don’t deserve to be in 
trouble. It’d be that, it’s that whole uncertainty about it, like I’m just not sure like what’s 
going on. [CR30, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
  What would worry me most is just kind of jumping the gun and thinking oh, it’s really 
important when it turns out that it’s not that big of a deal or anything and wasting 
[authorities’] time, maybe. [CR19, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
Conflicts and 
dilemmas in the 
pre-reporting 
phase
33The ‘Adam’ scenario dealt with 
someone who was a recent covert 
to a religious faith that became the 
source of grievances and a decision to 
conduct violent action. There was no 
specific faith group identified in the 
scenario itself.
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For some respondents, the reporting threshold for going to the authorities involved crossing the 
line into active law-breaking or imminent violence:
  Once I’ve satisfied myself that it’s genuine, the threat is genuine, and potentially likely to 
be carried out, you know, I’d want to kind of involve people pretty much straight away. 
[CR15, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
  I think the only time that I would consider reporting it is if, like you said, it got to a level where 
I thought, this guy’s made his mind up, and I know him quite well and this isn’t like him. [...]  
In a situation where I can’t get anybody to try and help him, and I’ve used all my resources 
up, and if I’ve thought that he’s genuinely going to do something I’d do it. Obviously to 
prevent him from carrying out or doing anything that he was going to do, because he’s  
sort of like got his thoughts set on that. [CR18, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
  Maybe if I could speak to them, if they were to come, or maybe her brothers, or if,  
worst case scenario, I felt like it was something that’s life threatening, maybe call the 
police, and keep it anonymous, so as like our friendship wouldn’t be on the rocks.  
[CR29, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
  I don’t necessarily think I’d do that because obviously he’s my close mate and I don’t want 
to get him in trouble. So I’d just take him aside, talk to him and be like ‘what you are doing 
is not right’, you know, ‘go home, think about it and come back to me and then tell me what 
you think’. If he doesn’t listen to me, then I don’t think I’d go to the authorities yet. Like that 
would be my last option. Like first of all I’d go to his family members, his mum and dad, 
tell them that, you know, ‘Your son’s doing this, I don’t think it’s right’, you know, ‘can you 
talk to him about it?’ and all that. But obviously if he’s still going to do it then I’d go to the 
authorities with it and tell them like, ‘My close friend Adam is doing this and that’, because I 
don’t want anyone to get harmed. [CR16, young Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
For some of these respondents reporting the concern to the authorities is a last resort, undertaken 
only after they have exhausted all other avenues of action, including pursuing informal sources of 
help. Other respondents referred to wanting to rely upon some form of evidential proof in reaching 
a decision about sharing their concerns with authorities. 
  For me it would just be a matter of working out whether he’s genuine about what he’s 
planning to do and once I’m pretty satisfied that he does mean it, then it’s at that point 
that I would go and approach his family, I’ll raise it within my community and so forth. 
[...] Yeah, but if I had more proof that he was leaning towards doing something illegal, or 
supporting any extremist activities, then I’d go forward [immediately to the authorities]. 
[CR01, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
Whilst this did not entail a legal burden of proof threshold, it was not unusual for respondents 
to discuss the role of evidence when deciding whether and when to share their concerns with 
authorities. The status of an act being ‘criminal’ presents one clear dividing line in any justification, 
here the move from informal solutions in the community to shifting the issue to the authorities. 
The threshold issue demonstrates one aspect of the challenging nature of reporting such concerns. 
Considering the gravity and implications of reporting for the person of concern is another: 
  So because my experience, not my personal experience, but me observing the news, the 
media and how things are handled in this country in terms of when things are reported to 
the authorities, or when a crime is committed, I wouldn’t want to report anyone for what is 
seen as quite a large crime [...] because of how it would get handled afterwards, until I knew 
for definite that they were definitely involved. [CR01, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
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Other information seeking-activities were more dependent on the content of the scenarios. 
Some respondents [CR25; CR11; CR03) said they would try and find more information about the 
political organisation itself featured in the Sophia scenario (including trying to attend meetings, 
etc.) before making a decision to report. Two others would talk to the two older men (in the Adam 
scenario) to garner more information on their intentions:
  In terms of the brainwashing or whatever you want to call it, or training secretly that they 
may be undertaking to prepare themselves, then I may go talk to people who may know of 
the organisation. So whether it be friends or people in different networks that may have 
heard of this type of organisation [I’d try to] find out what it’s about, which is, I suppose 
what you would do naturally anyway. And then maybe escalate it up to faith organisations 
that may be aware of what’s going on. [CR25, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
For several others [CR29; CR27) this information seeking enterprise extended to being prepared 
to violate the privacy of the intimate by covertly investigating their online activities (this was most 
notable in relation to the Sophia scenario) through subterfuge:
  I’d be looking for some clues. Well obviously she’s on her Internet and every time I do, 
like it says on the scenario she’s very secretive when she’s around the computer. I might 
even ask her can I borrow her computer now and again, just to see, just to do my own 
investigation. [CR27, Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
A number of behaviours were identified as particularly concerning in the scenarios that would 
act as early warning signs and motivate respondents to consider reporting their concern. These 
included acting in a secretive manner; self-isolating and withdrawing from existing friendships; 
spending extended time online, and the partner in the Sophia scenario attending a training camp. 
  She’s being really secretive, she’s always around a computer, and I’m just picking 
behaviours up from her that don’t seem to – according to the scenario – be naturally 
like her, so it just raises an alarm as to what’s going on; something’s definitely going on.  
[CR03, young Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
  What would motivate me? The fact that she is so secretive and like after meeting her 
boyfriend, and with the political group that he’s in, by this it seems like it’s not a good 
influencing group. [CR29, young Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
  Because, you know, her behaviour, like when you go and see her she’s not actually 
responding to what we’re saying as well, and she’s telling us that, you know, ‘Can you just 
leave me? I’m busy’, or she just turns her computer off as well when you walked in. So we 
can tell that there’s something which is not right. [CR09, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
During this pre-reporting phase, a range of barriers and considerations were found to influence 
respondents’ reluctance to come forward and share their concerns with authorities. These barriers 
involve several key themes including: harming the friendship or the welfare of the intimate; the 
reporter getting into trouble; and an insufficient knowledge about when to report and how to go 
about sharing a concern or suspicion.
Many respondents worried that reporting a concern would damage their friendship as well as the 
many possible negative implications that reporting might carry for the individual seen to be at risk:
  My friendship with Sophia, my concern about her more than anything. [...] Obviously my 
concerns for Sophia would hold me back because I’d be like really worried about what it 
could do to her future. So I would hope that it would be dealt with sensitively. I wouldn’t  
like to think that I’d put her future, her career, in danger because I’ve misread the  
situation. [CR11, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
Barriers to  
reporting
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Some worried that sharing the information would lead the authorities to a punitive response and 
prosecution rather than diversion and rehabilitation. Almost always the impulse was to want to 
get help for those heading towards violent extremism, rather than seeing them punished. For 
one respondent, the perception that the criminal justice system would pursue ‘joint enterprise’ 
considerations was an added concern:   
  Obviously the friendship with Adam. [...] Knowing that he’ll be getting in trouble as well, 
for getting the involvement in, because obviously when they prosecute they prosecute 
the whole group as some involvement in there, even though he [might be] innocent and 
groomed into that group, not knowing his past life and how they’ve actually groomed 
him. [CR12, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
The acute vulnerability of the persons at risk in the scenarios was a recurrent theme throughout 
respondents’ navigation of decision-making about reporting. For one interviewee, maintaining 
the friendship (here, with the Sophia character in the scenario) was seen as critical in providing an 
alternative avenue of a support outside the boyfriend and radical group’s influence. The impulse 
was not to risk closing down the friendship that reporting might entail, but to maintain the 
friendship as a potential route out of the group:
  The fact that she is my friend and she might not be able to trust me again, and say if 
she doesn’t have anybody else, doesn’t want to speak to her family and only has this 
boyfriend that seems to be leading her onto the wrong path, then what can I do?  
[CR29, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
Some respondents cited a concern that reporting would result in stigmatising the intimate 
or indeed further stigmatise a wider Muslim community already under pressure in relation to 
perceptions about Islam and violent extremism [CR01; CR30; CR25; CR15):
  I mean when you’re associated with the police it’s, well, it’s negative isn’t it? I don’t think 
I’d want to. So that’s why it’d take me something, like something really serious to get to 
that stage. [CR30, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
  Friends and family falling under suspicion, the media getting hold of the story [...] and 
running with it in very negative ways and stigmatising the family. It’s about protecting 
the community, about protecting Sophia, about protecting myself, about protecting  
their friends. I think because the Muslim communities are tarnished enough as it is. 
[CR01, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
The potential negative reactions from family or from the wider community was a very common 
worry for respondents:
  The other concern would be from my family or whoever, or relatives, [who might] say, 
‘Why are you concerned about this? Just leave it, you don’t know anything about it’,  
you know? Maybe they might stop me. [...] That’s the real concern I would [have] with  
the family and that, you know. [CR09, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
  As well as me being concerned about him, and him being stigmatised by the system and 
the authorities I’d be concerned about the community and the way they viewed me and 
saw me as somebody who’s colluding with the authorities against a fellow citizen. 
[CR28, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
Other barriers to reporting included being seen as disloyal, betraying a confidence, or being 
labelled a ‘rat’ or a ‘grass’:
  Adam might be annoyed with me. He might be angry or he might say, ‘Why are you  
doing this?’ or ‘I’ve spoken to you secretly about what I’m going to do or what I’m  
thinking, and you shouldn’t be telling anybody my business’. [CR14, Muslim female,  
West Yorkshire]
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  I don’t want to be seen as a rat. So in some cases, it is, but there’s so many things  
to consider. [CR01, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
  Grassing is a massive thing, right? Because obviously it shows that there’s no loyalty, 
there’s no trust, you can’t rely on that person. So obviously [what people] normally  
say is ‘snitchers get stitches’. [CR18, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
  A friend, somebody who other people no doubt will be aware of and be friendly with,  
and people might see me as someone who’s betrayed that trust and gone to the 
authorities. People will be asking the question, ‘Why didn’t he come to us first?  
Why didn’t he go to the community people first? Why didn’t he speak to him first?  
Why have you gone straight to the authorities?’ [CR28, Muslim male,  
Greater Manchester]
The possibly concrete reality of a backlash following reporting is discussed further in the  
later ‘Post-Reporting’ section. Several other respondents raised the added difficulty of  
maintaining confidentiality if they were to report a concern in some close-knit Muslim 
communities, expressing anxieties about intra-community surveillance that provides  
currency for gossip and rumour:
  If you live in an Asian area there’s an awful lot of, how can I put it? It’s not busy-
bodyness, but… It’s going to sound really bad, but they’ve nothing else to do, so it’s 
keeping an eye, it’s ultra-neighbourhood watch [...] Sometimes I think it’s very intrusive. 
So it’s the repercussions of local gossip, of anything out of the ordinary, other people 
seeing this would question that, and then obviously, that’s why I’m saying her future 
[would be compromised within the community]. So you don’t know who’s watching,  
to be honest. [CR11, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
The concern that neighbours would notice anything unusual in the area and make this the  
subject of gossip added to concerns about police officers visiting the person of concern’s  
address (‘door-stepping’), even where officers might attend in plain clothes to be more discreet.
Another respondent worried that reporting would incur an uncertain longer-term impact on  
the intimate:  
Well, from what I know about Prevent and things like that, the whole kind of game…it’s 
like, say for example if a kid in school is identified as somebody and then they go on that 
watch list and then it’s on their record for a very long time. So even if they’ve not done 
anything they could be being watched all their lives, and even getting jobs and things, or 
going on holiday or making a contribution to society becomes harder for them because 
of something that was picked up in school which probably was innocent. [CR25, Muslim 
male, Greater Manchester]
A number of respondents had had previous negative contact with the police and consequently  
did not like the police as an organisation [CR18; CR20). Several other respondents mentioned  
the difficulty that some non-native English speakers have in some Muslim areas in reporting  
a concern due to the language barrier.
 Grassing is a massive thing, 
right? Because obviously 
it shows that there’s no 
loyalty, there’s no trust, 
you can’t rely on that 
person. So obviously [what 
people] normally say is 
‘snitchers get stitches’. 
[CR18, young Muslim male, 
West Yorkshire] 
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When considering the decision to report, some respondents either expressed degrees of confusion 
about the process of reporting, or did not understand where or to whom they should speak [CR12; 
CR09; CR07; CR12; CR24; CR26; CR29; CR30). Typical comments from respondents included:  
  That would be my main concern, knowing who to speak to actually.  
[CR12, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
  So I think I’d probably have to tell someone, but I don’t know who I would go to. 
[CR29, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
  Well, when you say authorities it’s like who is the authorities, where do I go? I wouldn’t 
even know. I’ve never been like involved in stuff like that, so I wouldn’t even know  
where to go or who to tell. Or I feel like there’s like specific people you go to about  
things, like who do I tell about this? Who’s actually going to take it seriously?  
[CR30, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
  Like I said, I wouldn’t know who to kind of contact in situations like that because I’ve obviously 
never dealt with anything like that. [CR24, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
Even when this information was known regards the suitable agency to approach it would still be a 
cause of apprehension and some confusion:
  I think, yeah, because you hear all of this stuff on TV and news and things like that, so 
people are aware of the problem. You hear now and again it’s happening everywhere, so I 
suppose there is like, like a certain number that you can get in touch if something like that 
does happen. I don’t know what number, really. […] I’d be worried because it’s like, personally 
if it was me and if I were doing that it’s something that I’ve never done before, so I don’t 
know what the answers are going to be and what to do about it and how to approach 
people, or where to go about it. [CR26, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
Several other respondents argued that there needed to be greater community awareness about 
reporting processes, with several suggesting more advertising to achieve this, whilst others wanted 
to see more directly engaged community education work being undertaken [CR07; CR29; CR28; 
CR27; CR26; CR11; CR14). 
A further barrier to reporting raised by several respondents concerned the lack of trust amongst 
some community members towards the wider Prevent programme, with long-standing concerns 
about authorities ‘spying’ on the Muslim community that have been exacerbated by negative 
media coverage. As one respondent put it in an extended comment:
  Because the communities are not hearing it. All they’re hearing is the negative 
connotations of Prevent and agendas like that. They’re hearing about the wrongful 
arrests, they’re hearing about the wrongful identification, they’re hearing about the 
terrorist houses, etc. around the clock. The main thing here is about trust. I think the 
communities are very mistrusting of the authorities and until that trust is built, until the 
relationships are built and communities further understand why information is collected, 
what happens to that information, what happens to the individuals and groups of people 
that are made aware to the authorities, that trust will never be built. I know people who 
vehemently support the Prevent agenda, people who work for the government and 
understand the agenda, and they’ve become more and more critical of the communities 
who are critical of the agenda. But the halfway point has to be if the Prevent agenda 
has good intentions and goodwill, that isn’t being communicated or marketed to the 
communities. [...] The community haven’t got full information about what the processes 
are, what the systems are, what the government’s intentions are, and I think that leads  
to a lot of the distrust, and I wouldn’t want to be part of that machine of distrust.  
[CR28, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
Moving toward 
reporting:  
Process  
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Reporting
Motivations and 
rationales for 
reporting
This section analyses community respondents’ motivations, feelings and preferences once they 
have decided to report their concerns about the ‘intimate’. Amongst virtually all respondents 
there was a preference for a staged process of reporting using various avenues to informally 
share their concerns before taking the grave step of formally making a report to the police. For 
some respondents, this staged process would be protracted and only continued with reluctance. 
The data is discussed under a number of sub-headings, focussed around motivations, processes 
(including channels/conduits and modes), experiences/feelings and support needed or desired.
Respondents offered a number of distinct rationales and shared various motivations for their decision 
to report the intimate. These rationales and motivations very much echoed the findings from the 
earlier Australian study, including the primacy of respondents’ care and concern for the intimate:
  She is a friend and if that happened to any of my family, I wouldn’t want that to happen  
to my family, so that’s probably why I would try to help. [CR26, young Muslim female, 
Greater Manchester] 
  It’s my responsibility to make sure that Adam is safe, and his family’s safe away from  
all these violent things that are going on. [CR14, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
  For Adam’s safety, to safeguard him, to go further, nobody can stop me to go to the 
authorities. It’s for his own benefits, to go further. [CR08, Muslim female, West Yorkshire] 
This focus on care and concern meant that respondents would report even when they recognised 
that doing so may well damage or even break their relationship with that person: 
  I probably will [report]. Because I would say to her ‘I’m being cruel to be kind. I’ll have to 
do something’, but throughout I’ll be honest. I’ll tell her ‘this is what I’m doing’. The thing 
is either way I’m going to lose her, so I might as well help her. [CR27, Muslim female, 
Greater Manchester]
  I would rather report it and find out that it’s not true rather than leave it and find out  
that it is true and then I’ve lost my friend because he’s decided to do something stupid. 
[CR32, young White female, West Yorkshire]
  Obviously the health and safety of Adam would be put before me. I feel like especially 
if he was younger than me then I would think, you know, this child needs to be saved or 
needs help, and I would put him before myself just to, in order for him to get help and  
get that attention that maybe he needs. [CR17, young Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
One of the key enablers for respondents deciding to report was the calculation that the likelihood 
of damaging their friendship by getting their friend into trouble was outweighed by the risk of a 
greater future harm from occurring if they did not report their concerns. 
  I would rather him getting in trouble with the authorities rather than do something really, 
really big that would affect lots and lots of people. [CR14, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
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  But, once again, I’d rather tell them than have like everybody’s lives at danger if, if it was 
that serious, and if it wasn’t then I’d just apologise. I’d be like, ‘Well, you’ve been acting 
up. What do you expect? You’ve been closing your laptop as soon as we all walk in, you 
don’t want to go out when we all do, so what do you expect?’ [CR29, young Muslim 
female, Greater Manchester]
  If it is indeed something bigger well what if they’re planning to, you know, do another 
terrorist attack on, I don’t know, the buses or the trains or whatever, and then something 
happened? I would feel so guilty that I was, you know, that I knew, or possibly knew, 
 and could’ve stopped it. So I think I would, I would rather report it and be wrong than  
not report it and my suspicions are proved right, because the consequences would  
be worse. [CR11, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
This care and concern motivation for reporting even extends to recognising that an ensuing 
criminal investigation, even one resulting in imprisonment, represents a preferable outcome for  
the intimate than the alternative of staying silent and their involvement in violence going forward:
  At least she’d be saved, the family would have her, because I’ve heard some children… you see it 
on TV, don’t you? They’ve all gone away, they’ve had, you know, the bombings, self-bombings… 
And they’ve passed away, so they’ve lost them now, haven’t they?...if they were maybe just 
put away and taught them a lesson or something or whatever, then at least they’d have them 
back...At least they’ve, at least she’s still alive. [CR09, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
It is important to note this care and concern for the intimate expressed by respondents was not at 
the expense of the concern they also had for other citizens who might be harmed by the actions of 
the intimate. Here, respondents offered moral and ethical rationales for the social duty to report 
and how this was the best course of action for all concerned:
  My first response is, it’s just wrong, isn’t it? It goes against my own moral beliefs and any 
normal person’s moral beliefs. So the right thing to do would be to tell the authorities, 
but I wouldn’t do that initially as he’s my friend. So I’d tell him that it’s wrong and then  
I’d tell him that he needs help...It might be snitching but it’s still the right thing to do.  
[CR21, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
  Let’s say like he’s gonna do it and I hadn’t reported him or anything like that, it’s just like 
the guilt and the remorse like, I know I’ll wake up every morning and it’ll chew away at 
me and break me down, you know, and the fact that I could’ve done something… It’d eat 
away at you ‘cos you’ll just constantly thinking about it, there’s no escaping it and then 
to think of about the, the many others that’ve been affected, like the families and the 
friends and so on and so forth, like. [CR07, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
One way of reading the scenarios presented to community respondents is as a question, namely, 
what is the right thing to do given this set of events? It is perhaps then not surprising that personal 
morality featured in respondents’ deliberations about reporting, generally taking a utilitarian form 
[CR15, CR11, CR02, CR07, CR10, CR29, CR28, CR14, CR18, CR21, CR12, CR20, CR08). Within this 
focus on the moral responsibility to report is an overt utilitarian rationale around the ‘greatest good 
of the greatest number’ that outweighs any personal or communal loyalty the reporter might feel:
  In the situation I would be helping them, and I wouldn’t be thinking, oh Adam’s my friend 
or so-and-so and no, no, no he’s a Muslim and I’ve got to be with him and whatever he 
does is right. I wouldn’t do that. [CR14, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
  His safety and other people’s safety because, you know, like you can see some unforeseen 
circumstances, you know? If you do this like a hundred people might get hurt, he might 
get hurt, and obviously Adam might be, he might go like to jail and all that, prison.  
So basically everyone’s safety. [CR16, Young Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
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In a similar vein, having to live with the knowledge that they had suspected the person might harm 
others but failed to act in time served to prompt willingness to report: 
  For me the important thing from the very beginning would be not so much my allegiance 
to him. It would be kind of what impact his actions would have on people. Now if he 
was to carry out a bomb threat say, if people were to die, if I was not kind of, if I did not 
report that I would have to live with the conscience that, you know, I could have maybe 
prevented that from happening right at the source. So although he might be a friend  
and what have you, you know, at the end of the day, you know, he’s made a choice  
about what he’s going to do. [CR15, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
Some respondents had painful personal experience of what extremist violence can lead to if it is  
not prevented:
  When I think about this I think about something, and it is ISIS, you know, it makes me  
really angry that many people join that group. They go to my country and they kill my 
people [respondent becomes tearful], and my people, including my own brother, are 
fighting against them. Why would someone here go back to my country and kill my  
people there? [CR13, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
Alongside these motivations was a clear rationale that the police are the best placed people to act 
before the intimate moves forward with their plans:
  The police would have, or the government would have, more of informed knowledge on 
people who have extremist views and they can offer safety to those who they’re going  
to attack or cause a threat to. [CR21, young Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
  I’d alert the authorities really, because obviously they’d know best... My main priority 
would be to tell the authorities that would be able to deal with that sort of situation. 
Because somebody’s going to get hurt. [CR32, young White female, West Yorkshire]  
  I would physically call the police, I’ll call the police and I will inform them that I am concerned 
about somebody, and, you know, that person needs to be stopped. [CR36, Muslim male, London]
For many respondents, this recognition of the need to involve the police would follow initial 
attempts to either personally, or through family and community resources, dissuade the intimate 
from their course of action. Many respondents spoke about seeking support from another close 
friend, a family member (their own family or the family of the intimate), or a community leader to 
help them come to a decision about whether to report their concerns. Turning to a family member 
or a community leader [CR28; CR25; CR24; CR16; CR20; CR21; CR02; CR09; CR10) was the second 
most cited support seeking avenue (although not mutually exclusive from talking to the intimate). 
Who to approach in the family could depend on the quality of the relationship or how serious the 
incident was viewed:
  I think I’d go to a family member. So maybe her mum. [...] Or maybe her siblings, because 
like sometimes people are like, if you go straight to the parents it’s a bit too serious.  
But if you go to siblings, maybe you can kind of sort it out amongst yourselves first. 
[CR24, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
This strategy also reflected the cultural values and the relative importance of the family structure 
and the immediate community for some Muslim respondents, one which further distanced them 
from external institutions:
  Adam is, in this context, is somebody that’s close to me or close to thing, so in that sense 
I would try to handle this within our sphere of, you know, it’s like, you know, like if you’ve 
got a matter that develops within your own home you wouldn’t go, you know, you wouldn’t 
necessarily, going to the police wouldn’t be your first course of action. You try to handle it 
within the framework of your family structure. So in the same way I would look to try to 
handle this within the structure of say either his family or the close network of people that 
we might both know, like let’s say the mosque or within our communities for that, you know, 
without kind of involving the outside thing. [CR15, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
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The motivations to initially attempt to use intra-community resources before formal reporting are 
grounded in the individual and community experiences highlighted in the ‘Barriers’ element of the 
‘Pre-Reporting’ section above:
  The way I’ve been brought up is just when matters, internal matters occur we try to 
resolve them first within ourselves before seeking the outside help. I’m not, that’s not 
to say, you know, the outside help, you know, everything can be resolved within that 
structure, you know? Sometimes you do need that outside help but I guess it might partly 
be to do with, maybe a bit, you know, the stigmatisation of, you know, this one person 
who comes from your community, your family, your close... So for that reason, you know, 
we would try to kind of resolve the situation amongst our wider network of people before 
kind of involving the authority. [CR15, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
  You would first go to the family; you’d go to your friends before anyone else. You would 
just see what the problem is and why he’s coming about that. [CR20, young Muslim 
female, West Yorkshire]
Given the gravity of the act of formally reporting an ‘intimate’, some respondents were initially 
adamant that they would not report to the police:
I wouldn’t go to the authorities. I don’t think, I think they’d just straight, just put him into a 
circle and just, just to get him in trouble for it or something, yeah. That’s how I feel anyway. 
[CR18, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
However, underpinning the motivation and rationale for reporting for all community respondents was 
their identification that the ‘threshold’ of seriousness or concern had been crossed by the intimate: 
I’d like to think I’d know when it was more serious rather than just talk and bravado,  
and I think if it was genuine that he was intending something I would have to contact the 
authorities. I think if someone is so serious and they’re that far gone, I don’t know if I would 
have the influence to undo what, the path he’s gone down... it looks like, in this scenario, 
Adam is quite advanced in his thinking and it’s getting to a scary point where we need to 
put a stop to it. [CR28, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
As a friend, I couldn’t come forward and go to the authorities. But as soon as I think I did 
find something, some form of evidence, or something that was more alarming than what 
we have in this scenario, that then I would go to the authorities... If I found any evidence...I 
could see it happening, that’s definitely something that, that I would alert the authorities 
about. [CR01, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
Given the reality, discussed above, that most respondents would first attempt directly or indirectly 
to dissuade the intimate from their apparent path, for many this threshold was where the intimate 
refused to listen or clearly stopped engaging with attempts at dissuasion:
If I spoke to Adam and explained that what he is doing is wrong, you know, if I explain 
everything and try to make him think that what he is doing is totally wrong...If he didn’t 
listen then I would report him. [CR13, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
When he’s reluctant in changing, when he just doesn’t listen, just doesn’t listen to what I’m 
saying and he just goes forth with it. [CR21, young Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
If she’s like threatening about it or just completely puts her guard up and doesn’t want  
to talk about it, then maybe I’d have to go as serious as in going, talking to the police.  
[CR29, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
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For most respondents, once that threshold had been reached, they would not be dissuaded  
from reporting:
I’ve got a really strong personality. And if I’ve got a concern … it’s a concern and I will  
raise it and I don’t think there would be anything holding me back from raising my 
concerns. [CR03, young Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
However, the identification of the threshold was far from straightforward for a lot of respondents, 
with concerns expressed over how to judge the seriousness of a situation. Here, respondents were 
acutely aware of the ramifications for all concerned once a report is actually made:
I guess timing is more how you interpret it in a way, like… It’s more personal and it’s  
more based on an individual and how they interpret when’s the right time to report this. 
[CR07, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
I suppose because there’s no evidence at this moment in time, I can’t see that she’s actually 
done anything, apart from being secretive, I don’t think there’s, there’s much else I can do 
at that point...if I physically saw or if I definitely knew that she was actually committing an 
act that was supporting this group and their beliefs and what they intend to do, if I had  
sort of hard evidence. [CR01, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
Processes of  
reporting
This section discusses respondents’ feelings and understandings around the process of  
reporting concerns to authorities, including their preferences over the conduits/channels  
and modes of reporting. It presents both individual views and a summary of the respondents’  
scale responses, from ‘most preferred’ to ’least preferred’, regarding the conduits and modes  
of reporting.
Community respondents clearly identified that reporting concerns about an intimate to the 
authorities would be a staged process, whereby they would only contact the police after first  
trying to positively influence and alter the apparent intent of the intimate, either directly or 
through utilising family or trusted figures within the local community:
So in the first instance I’d definitely speak to [Sophia] myself. And then possibly the  
parents, and then, if nothing’s happened from there, then the police would be the last. 
[CR29, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
I’d go to the people I know first, maybe talk to the family priest or whoever who’d keep  
the confidential, go to these ladies here who I know, the social workers, to the ladies  
who work here. And then take their views, what is happening, they’d actually ask  
me that question as well, make sure first, a hundred per cent, if we’re really sure  
about something, and then we report it, then they’d help me, wouldn’t they?  
[CR09, Muslim female, West Yorkshire] 
Whilst there was a clear and consistent response of using a staged process in reporting,  
there was also significant uncertainty over how to actually report:
I don’t even know what the process is. [CR19, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
I honestly don’t know who, I think I’d have to do a bit of research to be honest.  
Because I don’t really know who I’m supposed to approach regarding issues like this.  
So I’d definitely have to research into that. [CR24, young Muslim female,  
Greater Manchester]
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Respondents explained their preferences around who they would first attempt to share  
their concerns with within the staged process by commenting on specific people and  
roles/agencies. Here, there was a strong focus on first utilising family members,  
friends and trusted ‘community leaders’. Yet there were also strong views on which  
professional roles and agencies were preferred or not as sites of sharing concerns.
Sharing their concerns with family members of the intimate was a favoured approach  
for many respondents:
I think the first person I’d probably go to is, you know, either Adam’s parents,  
or if I couldn’t approach them, you know, another person who could be a person,  
you know, like an intermediary to, you know, so you could actually go to them.  
[CR15, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
I’d go to family members, his family members... somebody that I can speak to in 
confidentiality with, trust, who would listen to what I’ve got to say, try and advise me. 
[CR18, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
Family knows you more than anyone, I guess, do you know what I mean? They know  
how you behave and they know when something’s wrong. They could see that change,  
it’s someone who’s consistent in your life. [CR20, young Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
This stress on family included the desire of community respondents, especially young adults,  
to take advice from their own family members or close friends before they decided how to 
proceed with their concerns:
[My dad would] probably tell me how to deal with it, or if I should tell someone.  
So level of comfort... yeah I could easily speak to my dad. [CR29, young Muslim female, 
Greater Manchester]
I’m close to my mum, let’s say, or my siblings or whoever, so in terms of support I’d 
obviously go to the person I’m closest to, I’d go to my best friends, my family. 
[CR07, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
I would go to the people who I know, talk to them first...I wouldn’t just report it.  
[CR09, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
The idea of sharing concerns with mutual friends of the reporter and the intimate provoked more 
mixed responses. Some favoured this – ‘I think first it would be a friend.’ [CR14, Muslim female, West 
Yorkshire] – but others were more sceptical:
A friend? A friend I’d be comfortable with as well but it depends what they know about her, 
and it depends which friend because you sort of know what other friends think about other 
friends. I wouldn’t go to one that didn’t like her in the first place, but then I wouldn’t want to 
go to one that was like completely like, I don’t know, her best friend or something like that. 
[CR30, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
It depends how well-informed the [friend] is about the situation, about the politics, about 
something like this. [CR29, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
In addition to friends, there was a significant focus on ‘community leaders’ as a conduit:
Someone in the community who’s like a community leader, just because their motive is to, 
you know, protect the community, definitely. [CR17, young Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
I would probably give our community elders, you know, the mosque leaders the first chance 
of trying to resolve it. [CR15, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
Because community leaders would be strong influences and he’s got a tendency to have his 
views changed and he seeks advice from strongly influential people. [CR21, young Muslim 
male, Greater Manchester]
Conduits/ 
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However, the existence and reality of the ‘community leader’ role was contested, particularly by 
some female respondents:
[Community leaders?] I’m not bothered about them...Sometimes they’re okay but 
sometimes you just think, I don’t know. [CR14, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
To be honest I don’t really know one, but if I were to know where he or she would be  
how comfortable would I feel? [CR29, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
I wouldn’t know who the community leader is to go to for support. Obviously if it’s a male I 
won’t feel comfortable. They’re all male. You haven’t got really a female role model though, 
have you, or a community leader? There isn’t anybody that you can go to if you’ve got any 
problems, there isn’t anybody. [CR27, Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
For some Muslim respondents, a ‘community leader’ was likely to be an Imam, partly because of 
the standing they have and partly because their religious authority may be helpful in assessing 
violent extremism:
My community leaders are generally like, you know, the imams or the mosque men or 
somebody that represents the community... They’ve all been sort of, like mine have all got 
qualifications in this country, they work in prisons, they’ve worked in hospitals, they work 
in schools. So they work in professional sort of settings, do you understand? So they’ve 
already got that understanding and they’re on that level of how to speak to a young 
person. [CR18, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
If he’s an imam he’s religious isn’t he, and he’d probably have a lot of knowledge about  
this stuff. [CR16, young Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
Not all respondents, however, saw ‘community leaders’ as simply religious figures:
A community leader is, I don’t know, just an ordinary person in the community who’s 
got some sort of a leadership role and has a representative leadership role within an 
organisation or generally, who has influence over community matters. They could 
be a youth leader, a youth worker, could be a community leader from a community 
organisation, could be a mosque leader, could be an imam. Could be an individual,  
doesn’t have to be associated with any groups, but somebody who’s kind of an 
inspirational charismatic person who has, who when he or she speaks or has some  
sort of a strong closeness to people and people would listen to them if they had  
something good to say. [CR25, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
The potential role of state professional practitioners and their agencies in preventing violent 
extremism has been underlined by the 2015 Counter-Terrorism and Security Act, which placed  
a legal duty on professionals such as teachers, lecturers and GPs to spot and report any signs  
of radicalisation amongst their clients. Respondents discussed their likely willingness or  
otherwise to confide in education and health professionals over concerns about extremist 
involvement. Given our research focus on young adults, the potential role of school, college  
and university staff was discussed and many younger respondents were positive about confiding  
in educationalists:
I’d definitely go to a teacher. [CR18, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
I’d ask for a teacher’s help to ask who to report it to when I think the situation’s gone  
a little too far and he’s not, just not taking in what I’m saying. [CR21, young Muslim male, 
Greater Manchester]
Speak to one of... my social policy lecturers. I feel very comfortable speaking to them. 
[CR29, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
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A minority of respondents were less sure about confiding in teachers:
A teacher?...I don’t think they’re equipped or well enough informed to deal with the 
situation. And also if it’s a friend I don’t think the teacher would talk to me about their 
behaviour or any behavioural changes in the classroom, unless I was a governor or  
some other way attached to the school. [CR28, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
Respondents were much less positive about confiding in their GP/doctor about a concern over 
violent extremism in someone they were close to:
My local GP? Would I talk to them about it? No, definitely not. (laughs) Because I feel like 
what have they got to do with this? I don’t see the connection, that’s all. But in my head as 
well I see the doctors as like physical problems, not even mental. Like I know people go for 
like other issues, but personally I’d only go for like, I’ve got this thing wrong with me.  
[CR30, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
No, I wouldn’t contact the GP. [CR10, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
A few respondents acknowledged that GPs could have a role to play:
If it’s causing me distress and like, you know, stress and stuff, like sometimes you just go to 
the doctor’s and then you tell them all your life story eventually. It just comes out doesn’t it? 
[CR20, young Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
The other non-criminal justice agency that respondents were asked to consider the likelihood of 
sharing concerns with was local government - their local authority. This also provoked uncertainty 
from some respondents:
I’d just be completely confused with [the local council]. I’d feel like, I don’t know, I don’t 
think I’d be uncomfortable but I wouldn’t know how to reach them. [CR30, Muslim female, 
West Yorkshire]
However, other respondents were more positive about the potential role of local authorities, 
seeing them as part of the staged process of help-seeking before the last resort of the police:
[The local council authority] Maybe, they’re on the same kind of level. You know?...To an 
ordinary person it probably seems like, I’m not going to a uniform first, I’m going to a  
non-uniform body. [CR25, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
It’s less scary [reporting to a local council than to police]...because it doesn’t have that like 
persona of like they’re all going to lock you up. So it’s not as daunting. So it would be more 
comfortable to approach them but I think that they would have less power in the solution, 
like in sorting it out, so. [CR29, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
Seven respondents stated they would benefit from having some pre-reporting support in the 
lead up to making a decision about sharing their concerns. These respondents spoke of turning 
to both informal sources and formal statutory services. In part this reflects earlier points to do 
with uncertainty about the current reporting procedures and practices, as well as the loneliness 
and burden of the imagined experience of reporting. For instance, several respondents wanted 
signposting to the best person to initially speak to by a duty holder [CR30; CR12).
Maybe a little group or something, you know, like that’s from the authority. Go and speak to 
them and then they’ll tell you what kind of next step to do. [CR12, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
Before or, I guess I’d like, I don’t know, like people that feel that they’re in my situation, like 
is there something that would help you, to be like ‘oh this is your best place to go to’. [...] 
And it’s like who is out of them places the best person to go to? Because it’s alright like 
saying I’m comfortable talking to a friend or my mum but it’s like that’s not, that might  
not get us very far with the helping my friend out. [CR30, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
37 Community Reporting Thresholds
Based on the preference for a staged process of reporting discussed above, any consideration of 
sharing their concerns with professionals such as teachers, GPs or local authority staff was seen by 
some respondents as a possible staging post before the much graver decision to report formally 
to the police:
Police? ...obviously it’s going to be my last resort isn’t it? And I don’t think they’re going  
to treat Adam fairly towards that. [CR16, young Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
Here, wider scepticism about the police and policing culture influenced the views of a minority  
of respondents:
[On police/authorities] I think firstly, like I said, they might not be able to have the skills and 
be able to understand the situation. Secondly, because they haven’t experienced it or gone 
through it they haven’t been a victim of it... I mean sometimes, you know, the police have 
got targets and stuff, and it is a big problem, so for them to clamp down they could get 
Brownie points. [CR18, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
However, other respondents wanted to immediately contact the police once they judged the 
‘threshold’ to have been breached:
My first one would be the police. [CR10, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
I’d want to firstly go to the police...I think I’d be concerned and go to the police  
and see what they can do. [CR24, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
I’d just go to the police in a confidential way. I wouldn’t talk to anybody else. 
[CR08, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
Here, community respondents had very clear preferences for reporting to local police:
Walk into the police station probably, like tell them everything that I know so far.  
[CR19, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
I feel like it would be better to go to [police] locally because they would be more concerned 
because they live in that community or they work in that community and they will be 
focused on that community and the people within it, and they will be focused on Adam. 
[CR17, young Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
This preference for local face-to-face reporting emerged despite respondents seeing 
engagement with the police as somewhat daunting:
My local police station looks scary. I mean I don’t even know like, what, do you just  
walk in? Like I don’t know like how you would, I don’t know what you’d do to go to  
a police station. Or like would I ring up [the police]? I don’t know. [CR30, Muslim female, 
West Yorkshire] 
Never got in trouble with the authorities, so [going to police station to report] would  
be daunting, but if something had to be done it needs to be done, so I would do it.  
[CR29, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
This preference for contacting local police was in contrast to contacting national counter-
terrorism police or security and intelligence agencies such as MI5:
MI5? I wouldn’t know what that is, MI5. Is that some sort of secret agents or something? 
No, I’d probably say that’s the least really. Because, I don’t know, that sounds scary.  
[CR26, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
MI5? No, definitely not. I wouldn’t even know how to contact them. I think in the first 
instance it could go to the local police and if they deemed it necessary to go to the MI5  
I think that’s their job not mine, yeah. [CR28, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
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The preference for talking to the local police rather than security/counter-terrorism specialists 
also extended to a reluctance to contact Prevent for some respondents. As the preventative arm of 
counter-terrorism policy and operating in the pre-crime space, it is a moot point as to whether Prevent 
at the local level should welcome or be equipped to receive local expressions of concern about possible 
violent extremist activity or recruitment: 
I know the police are there for crime prevention, I know where the police station is. I know you 
don’t necessarily need to know who the Prevent officer is within the police station, they’ll all 
deal with it as another crime. Well, I think it’s the most direct organisation to go to in terms 
of dealing with criminal activity and criminal behaviour. I think it cuts out all the bureaucracy 
that’s surrounded with Prevent that we don’t necessarily understand. [CR28, Muslim male, 
Greater Manchester]
Underpinning these preferences of community respondents for both a staged process of sharing 
concerns and local contact with reporting channels was a focus on the desired attributes and  
skills of those receiving the report:
I’d like to think it’s someone who has like the attributes and skills, like knows how to lead, knows 
how to listen to the people, knows how to deal with the problems, can like pick out what needs to 
be sorted, what needs to be done, and does it. [CR29, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
You’ve got to feel comfortable about who you’re going to talk to, but I suppose depending on what 
authority means then you would, I would probably try and figure out somebody I know within the 
authorities that I could confide in, in raising an issue. [CR25, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
This desire obviously connects closely to the discussion above around the preference of some 
respondents to first share concerns with a ‘community leader’ but also the scepticism of others about 
the suitability or even the reality of the existence of such figures. For some respondents, this focus on 
the attributes of those receiving a report extended to the personal background of that figure, with the 
perception that someone of the same cultural background might understand this concern better and/
or respond more helpfully:
So that’s why I said either someone in authority that’s been through this or that’ll understand 
the situation, so somebody of the same background that’s had similar experiences that  
could try to understand, okay. I mean there’s no excuse for terrorism  
or anything like that, but I mean sometimes you’ve got to take a step back and think,  
what’s going on in the community? [CR18, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
Alongside questioning community respondents about their preferences over the processes and 
conduits/channels for sharing concerns and making reports, interviews also probed respondents’ 
preferences for the mode of reporting (see also Table 3 below). This data highlighted a clear preference 
for face to face reporting and a distrust of internet and social media methods of reporting.
Modes of  
reporting
Table 3: Ranked Community Respondents’ Preferred Mode of Reporting (%) 
Face to 
face
Phone App on mobile 
phone
Secure 
website
Letter sent 
by post
Most preferred 79.2 10.4 4.2 4.2 0
Second most preferred 8.3 50 0 6.3 6.3
Third most preferred 2.1 12.5 10.4 31.3 18.8
Forth most preferred 8.3 10.4 20.8 25 14.6
Least preferred 0 8.3 37.5 10.4 29.2
Rejected as reporting mode 2.1 2.1 22.9 18.8 20.8
Missing data 0 6.3 4.2 4.2 10.4
Percentage Total 100 100 100 100 100
39 Community Reporting Thresholds
This preference for face to face sharing of concerns was shared by a large majority (more than  
four out of five for those respondents who answer3ed this question) and mirrors the findings 
 of the earlier Australian study:
It is just so much better to talk to somebody face-to-face. I’d be more comfortable.  
And open probably. Especially compared to a phone call. [CR30, Muslim female,  
West Yorkshire] 
I’d probably go for face-to-face because then I know who I’m actually talking to  
[CR32, young White female, West Yorkshire]
I just feel as though if I see them face-to-face I can give a more detailed account  
and be able to write down whatever it is that has happened and give a full report.  
[CR19, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
To a very significant extent, this preference for face to face reporting is about being able  
to gauge the reaction of the police officers receiving the information and assessing how  
seriously the report is being taken:
Yeah, I just think in general, just in terms of communication, talking to someone and,  
and being able to trust someone and you can also see their body language as well...  
if I am saying something and they may be concerned about me and they may, they  
may have suspicions about me, I might be able to see that through their body language.. 
[CR01, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
I feel like when it’s face-to-face you can kind of suss out where it’s going, you can see by the, 
like not, more than tone of the voice, like their body language, their responses, what they’re 
saying, what they’re doing, and then even at the end of the conversation you’d be like, keep 
saying, ‘Oh, okay, is something going to be done about this?’ [CR29, young Muslim female, 
Greater Manchester] 
I prefer face-to-face. There’s so much, like body language is so important when 
you’re talking to someone and how they, like how they’re actually like taking what  
you’re saying on board. You can tell through things can’t you? [CR30, Muslim female,  
West Yorkshire]
For some respondents, this preference for face-to-face reporting was to enable them to both explain 
their concern fully and to have the opportunity to ask questions about what might happen next:
If you’re talking to someone face-to-face you’d probably feel more comfortable,  
you can ask more questions ... you’d probably have more time to, you know, talk to them. 
[CR32, young White female, West Yorkshire]
[With face to face reporting] at least then you know who you’re talking to, you 
get more, like for example if you’re taking face-to-face you’d probably feel more  
comfortable, you can ask more questions. [CR26, young Muslim female,  
Greater Manchester]
When you’re face-to-face you’re talking to somebody and if you don’t understand you  
can ask again or they can change the question or word it differently and you understand 
more. [CR14, Muslim Female, West Yorkshire]
This preference for face to face reporting even extended to some respondents suggesting that 
they would take the opportunity to share their concerns if they physically encountered a police 
officer, such as on neighbourhood patrol:
If I saw them on the street I would tell them. [CR13, Muslim female, West Yorkshire] 
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Not everyone was comfortable with the idea of face to face reporting, partly because of their own 
lack of confidence or social awkwardness:
If it’s face-to-face it’s kind of more awkward and you won’t give the full story because 
they’ve seen your face and then, you know, you might feel ashamed. [CR16, young Muslim 
male, Greater Manchester] 
This meant that some respondents favoured initial use of the telephone (10.4% as a first choice) 
partly because of its perceived initial anonymity:
You can be a little bit anonymous and you don’t have to be nervous about facing somebody 
and you can make the call from anywhere. [CR28, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
Some people aren’t comfortable with talking to the police, so the hotline would be 
preferable for them. [CR32, young White female, West Yorkshire]
I would do a telephone hotline because, as long as they kept it like, if I got told that it’d be 
confidential and, because obviously you’re ultimately getting advice from them, and I’m 
sure that they’ve managed or experienced many cases similar to it, so they’d probably  
be able to give you certain guidance of which way to go or what approaches to take.  
[CR18, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire])
This even extended to one respondent having used such a hotline number to report concerns 
about a member of her local community: 
I think I just reported, I just went on Google, and I think I Googled something like,  
I honestly can’t remember. It might’ve been something like ‘security services’ or  
‘reporting your concerns’ or something, and I found a number and I phoned it in  
and I gave them the information, and it was actually his wife that had told me  
some information. [CR11, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
Such views were outweighed, though, by considerable scepticism about the use of the telephone 
to report concerns, partly based on wider experiences of using telephone call centres for other 
aspects of life:
On a telephone you might just be like, whoever’s on the other line would probably be... 
putting the phone down. [CR26, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
I wouldn’t use a telephone...because people, they just don’t really know the answers and it’ll 
just be a waste of my time and their time. So I’d rather go to somebody that knows what they’re 
doing. They don’t have the experience, they don’t have a qualification, they’re just reading off  
a screen. And anybody can do that. [CR29, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
Anyone could make a phone call and do it in a malicious way. [CR13, Muslim female,  
West Yorkshire]
This doubt over phone use to report included specific negativity about the role and purpose of  
the ‘Anti-Terrorism Hotline’:
It just doesn’t seem like the right place to go to, a telephone hotline. [CR21, young Muslim 
male, Greater Manchester]
I wouldn’t be averse to maybe getting some initial advice from the telephone hotline. So if 
it was a hotline for advice and information rather than just, as I said, dobbing people in and 
reporting people I think it might be good idea. I think for a hotline to be effective it would 
have to be marketed and advertised effectively, but I also think that, depending on how it’s 
advertised and marketed, it can further stigmatise communities, because as soon as you get 
out there there’s a hotline to report certain kinds of behaviour the wider community will think 
there’s more of a problem than there actually is. [CR28, Muslim male, Greater Manchester] 
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For some, this doubt around the hotline was based on a belief that calling it would be the equivalent 
of phoning ‘999’ when the reporter is not necessarily sure yet of the seriousness of their concern:
I’d be a bit worried because that would be connected to the authorities possibly. I don’t 
know who they’re connected to, the police or the, or MI5, and maybe it’d be just too much, 
you know? So there’s very little difference between a hotline and MI5 or the police as I see 
it..., it may be something or nothing but they’d be acting like a sledgehammer to a small 
nut and it could ruin his life. [CR37, Muslim male, London]
Alongside this rejection of the telephone as a medium for reporting concerns were very 
considerable doubts about the utility of the internet and social media as a mode of reporting. 
The latter is perhaps surprising, given both its ubiquity in everyday life and the American research 
evidence that young people may favour this mode in reporting the potential extremist involvement 
of friends and acquaintances. However, the rejection of the internet and social media modes by 
our respondents was shared by Australian participants in the original study, and partly reflects the 
lack of effective interactivity shared by the telephone as well as concerns about digital traceability:
Normally people take ages to reply to their emails, even whether it’s with work experience 
or if you need to sort things out. I just don’t think I’d get the support or feedback as  
quick as I need it. So I’d do it, to give it a shot, but I just don’t think it’d get anywhere.  
[CR29, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester] 
A secure website? Not really, no, because you’d be waiting for your answers. Obviously if it’s 
serious you want to sort it out straight away. [CR27, Muslim Female, Greater Manchester]
Respondents’ negativity about digital reporting modes also reflected, perhaps in part as a 
consequence of the revelations stemming from the Snowden leaks, broader social concerns  
about the security and privacy of any internet and social media communications:
I wouldn’t trust that at all because an app, although it might be secure and all that sort 
of stuff, every single app might claim to be, but obviously people can always find ways to 
bypass that and find ways to get information or maybe steal information or ...hacking into 
it. [CR02, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
You can’t trust them, these websites, can you? [CR16, young Muslim male, Greater Manchester] 
I don’t feel like you’d be able to trust and express your concern over social media. What if 
that person were to screenshot the information and send it to someone else? [CR17,  
young Muslim female, West Yorkshire] 
This scepticism might reflect the marginally greater support we found in the data for a secure 
website than reporting though an app on a mobile phone. Nevertheless, such digital modes were 
also not seen as proportionate to the seriousness of the issue:
I feel as though the app itself would be something that concerned neighbours would use 
for like somebody knocking down dustbins or something, I don’t think it would be anything 
serious. [CR19, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
In order to utilise an app you have to have it downloaded onto your phone. The likelihood 
of someone having a Prevent app downloaded into their phone in case they report 
somebody is a bit of a stretch. [CR28, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
A policy focus on using the internet and social media to report also makes a lot of assumptions 
about the technological confidence and competence of the family members, especially parents 
and grandparents of ‘intimates’ at risk:
Mobile app? Not really, no. Me personally I wouldn’t know how to use one. So I wouldn’t 
know how to go about it. I’m not all that familiar with social media and things like that. 
[CR26, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]  
Well, I don’t use computers anyway. [CR09, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
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As with the telephone, a minority of respondents did see some utility in digital modes of 
reporting, possibly as part of the staged process:
Accessible information on the Internet to allow me to report it. I think some  
people would want to be anonymous, so I think that option should be there.  
[CR09, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
Respondents very largely rejected the more traditional option of writing and posting a letter. 
I don’t trust letters. Yeah. Just because in the past...I once posted like these documents to 
some place and they were like ‘no we never received them’ so I just don’t trust post now. 
[CR30, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
I just find it very impersonal, even though it’s something I would be writing. I don’t think  
I’d want to put anything in writing, which sounds awful but I wouldn’t...Also snail mail,  
you know? Why send something and then sit and wait for god knows how long.  
[CR11, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
Some respondents saw a possible role for letters, either as an initial anonymous report or as a  
last resort if other modes had failed to gain a response:
The only thing about letters is as much as I’d like to write a letter, so again you can 
anonymise things a little bit, if you need a response you need to give an address  
so it gives less anonymity. [CR28, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
A letter? Yeah, I’d try it...it wouldn’t be the first thing on my agenda. If I felt like nothing  
else was working and nobody else was replying then possibly, but it wouldn’t be my  
first means. [CR29, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
This section discusses the experiences and feelings that community respondents felt they  
would go through during the process of reporting. Unsurprisingly, the emotions and feelings 
identified are mixed and even contradictory. Some emotions were negative, focussing on  
feelings of betrayal and guilt, anxiety and fear, and anger, whilst others were more positive  
and centred on relief, alongside pride and happiness that they had taken action and  
reported their concern.
Feelings of betrayal and guilt are inevitable in reporting someone close to you to the  
authorities, not matter what the focus of concern:
It would definitely make me feel guilty. [CR27, Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
I may feel a bit guilty because of what that could, what could happen to her after that. 
[CR19, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
I’d feel guilt, because I’d feel like I’ve cheated him. [CR21, young Muslim male,  
Greater Manchester]
Alongside this guilt came feelings of anxiety and fear about what the act of reporting could  
lead to all for all concerned, including the reporter:
I would be anxious and fearful, both...I don’t know what the outcome’s going to be  
and if her boyfriend finds out that, you know, I’m involved, if it comes back to me.  
[CR26, young Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
I would feel like there is a bit of concern for my safety, like have I done the right thing,  
is this going to, you know, turn out to be something, have I expressed my concern for 
something that’s not even... [CR17, young Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
Experiences and 
feelings during 
reporting
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Some of this anxiety and fear related to a concern that the report would further damage the 
intimate that they are concerned about:
I don’t know what the implication of that may be, on the, on Sophia and people directly, 
directly involved with her. So that’s a worry for me, about what my actions may have done 
to her. [CR01, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
Above all, anxiety and fear of reporters focussed on the personal ramifications for them in relation 
to the intimate, their family and the local community:
I would be kind of afraid...I lost the friendship, not too much but, you know, it’s not nice to 
lose your friend. [CR13, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
It might sort of, might sort of have an impact on the way people look at me, or people think 
of me. [CR02, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
I guess I mentioned it before in terms of being labelled... one person’s freedom fighter 
is another person’s terrorist, it’s all about like perception and, you know, you can’t win 
everybody, you know, not everybody’s gonna go, that was the right decision and so on and 
so forth...that sort of judgement I’m, I’m gonna expect that, I really am, I know I’m gonna 
expect that because I’ve lived with it so long. [CR07, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
For some respondents there is anger at the situation they are having to navigate:
I would feel also angry, someone twenty-four years, why would he think this way? I would 
be angry. [CR13, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
Many respondents identified a determination to report despite the ramifications and fears 
discussed above:
I don’t think anybody can hold me back. If I want to report it, I’ll report it. Nobody can stop 
me...If I have to report it I’ll report it. [CR08, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
I don’t think anything will hold me back, no. I’m worried that it may lead to violence that 
harms her and others around her. So if something like that was to happen I don’t think I’d 
be able to live with it ‘cos I’d feel as though I were in a position where I could’ve spoken,  
I could’ve prevented it. [CR03, young Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
Underpinning this determination to report for some was a feeling of responsibility to act:
You do know that it’s a responsibility, that you need to do something...I know that you need 
to do something and you’d go to somebody that could help and say ‘yeah, this is right’ or 
‘this is wrong’ or ‘yeah, we should be worrying and we need to take action’, and you’d do 
that. [CR14, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
He was going down a wrong path and you stopped that. [CR07, young Muslim male,  
West Yorkshire]
In contrast to the negative feelings discussed above, many respondents expressed the view that 
reporting the intimate would lead to feelings of relief:
I think I’d feel relief that it’s, well for one part that it’s out of my hands, so there’s somebody 
with more control, more experience to know what they’re doing. [CR19, young Muslim 
female, Greater Manchester]
I think it’d make me feel like, it’s a big thing, I’d feel as though it’s a massive burden on 
my shoulders and [after reporting] I just think it’d make me feel relieved. A lot more 
comfortable that I know something’s being done and action’s gonna be taken.  
So, all good feelings. [CR03, young Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
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Well I’d be relieved, yeah, yeah. If it was, if the situation was that like I’ve saved a girl why 
not? Yes. If I’ve saved her and the family, at least she’ll only be put away and she won’t be, 
she won’t have died or anything. [CR09, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
Alongside this sense of relief following the act of reporting was happiness and even pride for  
some respondents:
You could say it’s a good thing as well, if I’m looking at it not from a personal perspective, 
because if they do report that a friend raised concerns, then it might encourage more 
people to come forward to say look, this is the result of people who, of a person who had 
concerns about their friend and they weren’t afraid to come forward, they have come 
forward. [CR01, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
I’d feel happy as well, as I’m benefiting his safety and others. [CR21, young Muslim male, 
Greater Manchester]
It would also make me feel proud of myself that I’m being able to try and help someone. 
That I’ve actually tried to help someone, and if the outcome comes out really good then it’s 
going to be - I’ll be more pleased that I’ve actually helped someone. [CR26, young Muslim 
female, Greater Manchester]
This section discusses the support community respondents felt that they would want and need during 
the difficult act of reporting their concerns about an intimate. Some of the support identified was 
about how to report, whilst other aspects focused on wanting to be guided, protected, counselled 
and supported through the process. The context of such needs is obviously the unease and even 
trepidation many would feel in actually approaching the police, as discussed above:
Police - they’d probably just make me feel more uneasy... It’s just that whole stigma around 
it isn’t it? Just police. Just saying the name, police, just makes me feel a bit ooh, police... 
[CR30, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
Many community respondents identified the need for personal support, reassurance and 
protection as they reported:
Reassurance that I wouldn’t be getting into trouble. [CR11, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
If they had a non-judgmental approach or they did help you and support you and they 
didn’t, the fact that just because you’re a Muslim and this is the situation, or just because 
you’re black. [CR20, young Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
I would need some sort of support in terms of understanding the journey of what’s going to 
happen next and just getting to know what’s going on really. [CR25, young Muslim female, 
Greater Manchester]
This desire for support meant that for many community respondents their preference for a staged 
process of sharing concerns discussed above would extend to wanting support from family or 
community during the process of actually reporting:
Well, I wouldn’t go on my own, I’d have to have support from a higher person who is,  
you know, who would actually help me, you know?...I’d have to have somebody to do  
it for me. [CR09, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
I think the accusation as a whole would make me really uncomfortable so I think I would 
need help and support hence the reason I’d speak to like someone in a senior position at a 
university that maybe knows a little bit more... [CR03, young Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
Support needed 
and desired  
during reporting
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Respondents will report to the police once they believe that the ‘threshold’ of seriousness  
has been reached but virtually all would do so through a staged process that would involve 
seeking advice and guidance from family members, friends and trusted community figures  
and ‘community leaders’ before taking the significant step of approaching the authorities.  
Here, the overwhelming preference is for local reporting to the local, (rather than specialist) 
police and to do so through face to face means, with very considerable scepticisms about 
telephone, internet and social media-based means of reporting. 
This suggests a number of ‘Future considerations for policy and practice’, which we discuss  
in greater depth in the ‘Conclusion’ section.
Key reporting 
findings
For some this suggested a need to build reporting capacity within communities:
A lot more awareness required in the community because I myself, if I was put into 
this position it would be very tough, so I think we need to be taught what to do in these 
occasions, how to react to it, because some people will make the wrong decisions,  
they’ll just let it pass and keep quiet. [CR21, young Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
A government thing where they should be trained and knowing, telling us where to,  
how...Helping me go through the stages of reporting it and knowing how to do it.  
[CR12, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
I think the community needs some more support in terms of advice and information about 
the processes and what to look out for beforehand. I think during the situation, so in the 
situation that Adam’s been identified, it’d be very useful to have that ongoing support 
whilst you’re dealing with a person...There’s that presumption that the whole community 
needs to be experts in everything. That isn’t what happens. So in a situation like this where 
Adam has become involved in a dubious area there’s a presumption that the community 
will know about what to do, will be interested in what they do, and want to support him. 
The community generally speaking are getting on with their lives in terms of work, 
prayer, shopping, looking after their kids, whatever, and they’re not necessarily involving 
themselves in this agenda. [CR28, Muslim Male, Greater Manchester]
The data presented and discussed in this section has highlighted a number of important findings 
around how community respondents would both approach reporting and how they would  
feel about it. 
 Post-Reporting
The collective 
impacts of  
reporting 
Much policy and public debate about community reporting of an intimate’s extremist involvement 
focuses on whether or not community members will report. There is much less focus on what 
happens after people do report, both for those who share information and those identified as being 
of concern. Consequently, this ‘post-reporting’ phase is an under-examined yet important  
stage in the reporting process. Previous research34 shows that if the authorities get the ‘ 
post-reporting’ phase wrong in terms of the feelings and experiences of community reporters 
and those close to them, this will deter others from considering sharing their concerns.
This section considers what our community 
respondents said about this post-reporting 
phase – what their expectations were about 
the impacts of the broader community and 
society as well as on themselves, what they 
hoped and thought would happen next, and 
their views on issues such as being kept 
informed of subsequent developments and 
on confidentiality and anonymity for them. 
Underpinning all this were their views on how 
they would feel and what they would be likely 
to experience after the very difficult decision 
to formally report someone close to them. 
Most respondents considered this phase  
of post-reporting an important element  
of their thinking about sharing concerns  
with authorities and had clear expectations  
of what could and should happen after 
reporting, with those expectations  
involving being guided, supported and 
protected, and varying views around whether 
they would want to be kept informed. 
 This section will focus on the importance of 
the post-reporting phase, first by exploring 
perceptions of the likely collective impacts  
for reporting on the family, the wider 
community and even the broader society. 
Second, it will highlight the anticipated impacts 
on the individual doing the reporting. Finally, 
it will examine the hopes and expectations 
community respondents have about the 
communication, support and guidance they 
would want to receive after reporting. 
Most respondents recognised the importance and the gravity of sharing concerns with authorities. 
However, Muslim community respondents in particular were concerned that reporting had 
particular consequences not only for the person coming forward, but also collective impacts on 
his/her immediate family and close friends and the wider local community. These consequences 
were overwhelmingly seen as negative in part because they opened the door for different types  
of backlash from a range of different groups, including the media, police and extremist groups. 
The fear of backlash from extremist groups or individuals with whom the intimate at risk was 
involved led some respondents from both Muslim and White communities to feel anxious and 
nervous about what such extremists might do to them – in such cases respondents felt that  
total confidentiality or even anonymity in reporting was the best option available for them.  
This is clear from the following: 
If it came back to the group, if somebody had got away with it and the group knew that, 
there was like somebody like myself reporting it obviously I’ll be risking my family, myself, 
thinking that something might come back to me as well. So obviously that would be that 
fear of knowing, because as far as you’re concerned you don’t know how large that group 
is. It might be just based in a little thing, but the main, actual main thing might  
be somewhere else, and obviously if they find out who actually has reported it and  
the information has got out to them then obviously risking my family and myself,  
my children, for just reporting it. [CR12, Muslim female, West Yorkshire] 
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34Grossman, M. (2015) Community 
Reporting Thresholds: Sharing information 
with authorities concerning violent 
extremist activity and involvement in 
foreign conflict. Canberra: Countering 
Violent Extremism Subcommittee, 
Australia-New Zealand Counter-
Terrorism Committee.
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I wouldn’t want that information to get back into the hands of people in the community or 
such as this political group. I guess as somebody who lives in the community as well, any sort 
of, repercussions for me or my family or people that I know from this group that Conor’s a 
part of because, say, if he is arrested and he’s not around then that leaves us vulnerable,  
I guess. I guess even with confidentiality there’s always the possibility that information  
can be leaked out. I’m aware of plenty of cases when, you know, certain information has  
got back to people and so on. [CR04, young White male, Greater Manchester] 
There was also a clear tension between fulfilling one’s civic duties in reporting potential violent 
extremism and the negative impacts this might have for both self and others. This is evident in  
the following observations:
I would be anxious and fearful, both, but like I said I don’t know what the outcome’s going 
to be and if her boyfriend finds out that, you know, that I’m involved, if it comes back to me. 
[CR36, Muslim male, London]
I imagine if it did come to court and I’d have to give evidence, you know, then Conor or co 
could easily find out that it was me, I think I would want to remain anonymous all the  
way through, basically. [CR04, young White male, Greater Manchester]
But if it was something so serious I would kind of be scared because I wouldn’t want those 
people coming after me. But if you think about, if everybody had that kind of attitude  
of being scared or not doing, you wouldn’t get all the positive movements or the things 
that have happened today. [CR29, Muslim female, Greater Manchester]
Despite these intra-community concerns, some Muslim community respondents who served in 
leadership roles within their communities felt the need to challenge the perception that Muslims 
are reluctant in reporting because they wanted to protect their own communities from wider 
media and political backlash. For these respondents, it was important to lead by example as  
well as by statement through demonstrating behaviours aligned with active citizenship: 
There’s also, I fear, generalisations of a community not coming forward at a time because 
they’re protecting one of their own, in inverted commas. And I don’t want to be part  
of that reinforcement of negative stereotypes of a community. [CR28, Muslim male, 
Greater Manchester]. 
Following the 2017 terrorist incidents in London and Manchester, the question of Muslim 
community reporting of fellow community members featured even more prominently in public  
and political debate, with allegations that community members were not reporting what they 
knew. The data discussed above under ‘Reporting’ strongly challenges such claims, with the  
vast majority of community respondents willing to demonstrate ‘active citizenship’ and report  
even someone close to them about whose welfare they cared deeply. 
In addition to demonstrating active citizenship for its own sake, many respondents were also 
mindful of the potential for social backlash against their wider community and the possible 
impacts on community relations between Muslim and non-Muslim communities if they failed  
to do so. This was especially so given perceptions in some quarters that acts of terror are not 
individual criminal acts but rather a collective community problem. This puts considerable  
stress on how the police handle a community report of violent extremism: 
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I think from the police’s point of view they, you know, they have to make sure that it’s  
kind of ideally reported in a way that doesn’t kind of marginalise the community,  
you know, make, you know, [pause] it doesn’t kind of create a, you know, tensions across 
the things, you know? Ideally, you know, it’s reported in a kind of a non-judgemental  
way, you know, and in a way which is not going to kind of make people from other 
communities want to, you know, have more hatred or anything towards, you know,  
towards us. [CR15, Muslim male, Greater Manchester] 
Partly because even if it is true and it is going to be dealt with, the stigma doesn’t need  
to be [increased] amongst the communities or even in the media; it needs to be dealt  
with subtly and sensibly. […] The issue is so loaded, you know? The stigma attached to  
it is so massive. Maybe it doesn’t need to be but that’s the way it’s become now.  
[CR28, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
In order to prevent or perhaps minimise this type of backlash, respondents felt that it was  
crucial that community members receive the correct, appropriate up-to-date information  
on how and to whom to report. As one respondent argued:
First and foremost, I need to make sure confidentiality is maintained, that there are 
no repercussions, there is no backlash on the people reporting, because that will then 
stop people from coming forward and reporting incidences. What is also important is 
information, advice and guidance, because a lot of people might not be aware of who 
to contact, how to contact these people. We’ve all got mobile phones, you know, and  
the vast majority of the mobile phones these days cost you nothing to make calls.  
[CR36, Muslim male, London] 
Because of the kinds of concerns expressed above, respondents wanted maximum confidentiality, and 
often anonymity, to prevent anyone outside of the authorities that they might have come forward:
The other type of support is keeping the anonymity. [CR25, young Muslim female,  
Greater Manchester]
Anonymity, that’s important, yeah, especially if some serious stuff were going down.  
I don’t want to be involved. I just don’t want to be like connected to something.  
That scares me. [CR30, Muslim Female, West Yorkshire] 
Anonymous and no one can know who’s saying it. Very important. Because then no one 
knows it’s me, no one can like say that I’ve done it, no one can, like, say names to me,  
call me a grass for telling people. [CR06, young White female, West Yorkshire]
Fear of retribution against themselves or their families was another concern raised by community 
respondents when thinking about sharing a concern with authorities. However, this was raised 
more of a consideration than a deciding factor in any decision to report.
If the other guys find out, if he knows where I live, if he knows my details and everything  
like that then I’ll try and hold back a bit. [Because then I’ll be] involved. I’d want to  
get involved to help her but not get directly involved with her boyfriend.  
[CR12, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
You know, going out, like you’re on your own and somebody might, you know, if you talk 
to the authorities and like terrorism and things are, they just frighten you sometimes,  
you know? So you want to be safe when you go out. So when you’ve talked to somebody 
you feel a bit frightened, isn’t it? [CR08, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
The individual 
impacts of  
reporting 
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A relatively small minority of community respondents were not interested in being kept informed 
after a report: 
Irrespective of the outcome, it could be good, it could be bad, I don’t want any further 
information ‘cos then I’d feel it would be a selfish decision, if something good happened 
out of it then I’d feel it would be a selfish decision. Like, oh yeah, I’m just an amazing 
person and this and that, it was ‘cos of me only and, you know, I wouldn’t want further 
information. [CR07, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire]
I don’t care [about being kept informed], you know what I mean, I wouldn’t care.  
I’ve done what I’ve done, I’ve told then what I have to tell them, I don’t care. [CR05,  
young White male, West Yorkshire]
However, the majority of the respondents felt that post-reporting communication from the 
authorities is a vital stage within the reporting process, which may actually assure community 
members with concerns about an intimate that reporting them to the authorities will best serve 
the interest of their loved ones. Many respondents were adamant that reporting was critical to  
their own sense of wellbeing and engagement as an extension of their initial decision to come 
forward, as these representative comments suggest: 
Before, during and after, [so that I can have the maximum amount of confidence] to report 
and to have Adam’s interests at heart, to be able to understand what’s happening at the 
time so that, you know, I can still assist Adam in another capacity, and afterwards so  
that I can again assist Adam after the process. [CR37, Muslim male, London].
Expectations  
following  
reporting 
Most community respondents were aware of the fact that withholding sensitive information 
regarding potential terrorist related cases could get them into legal difficulties, as both White  
and Muslim respondents confirmed:  
That, the fact that it’s not going to get stopped if I don’t, it will just carry on and if someone 
gets hurt, and then there’s, I think if, I think with the law if you know about terrorist activity 
you can get arrested for it as well… But then something happens and all of a sudden you’re 
locked up as well (short laugh) because you knew about it. It’s one of those, ‘Well, I didn’t 
actually think he was being serious.’ [CR32, White female, West Yorkshire] 
Yeah, criminal justice consequences, like what may happen if you don’t go forward, for you,  
and how this situation could escalate if you don’t go forward, I think people need to be informed 
on that. Yeah, those type of consequences. [CR01, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire] 
Community respondents felt that recognition or acknowledgment by authorities for their  
act of reporting an intimate would give them clear acknowledgement that they have done their 
civic duty in sharing concerns about their friends or family member/s. For some respondents,  
this reflected the desire for confirmation that they’d done something helpful or protective of 
others; as one respondent put it, to know that they’d done ‘something positive and good, 
to make him change his mind’ [CR13, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]:
I don’t want to just report something and then it go into the ether and I never know what’s going 
on, and I’d like to know that I’ve done something good. [CR11, Muslim Female, West Yorkshire]
For most community respondents, however, the concern that those reporting could face backlash 
from their local community and/or the media, as well as possible criminal investigation because 
of their association with the ‘intimate’, helps to explain the very considerable focus on navigating 
‘thresholds’ of seriousness and threshold dilemmas explored in the ‘Reporting’ section above: 
On certain situations and I wouldn’t necessarily feel comfortable putting myself in that 
situation unless there was an imminent need and there was an imminent danger lurking 
that we need to go down that route. [CR28, Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
50 Post-Reporting
I would just like to know the outcome and be kept informed. Just what is actually 
happening, the steps that would be taken and will or have been taken with Conor.  
I think it would just be for like sort of my own mental wellbeing and just for like,  
not closure but understanding of what is actually happening. [CR04, young  
White male, Greater Manchester]
Accordingly, a key theme present within the large majority of community respondent interviews is  
the idea of information sharing as a two-way process – this is clear from the following observation:
No, I’d rather be like that where I’ve give you the information and that, but, like still want 
them to be in touch to let me know what’s going on. [CR31, White male, West Yorkshire] 
Many community respondents felt that it is important that information shared with the authorities 
does not simply enter a black hole, with no idea for the reporter of what will happen next or what 
the ramifications for all concerned will be. To prevent this from happening, many community 
respondents felt the need to be kept informed: 
I’d want to know what the end result is obviously. I can’t just go there and be like ‘okay my 
job is done and I’m going to go home’. I want to know everything that’s going to happen  
to Adam. I want to know everything that’s going to, you know, affect him, affect me,  
affect everyone around. [CR16, young Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
Being kept informed about what’s happening afterwards – well, it’d be important because 
obviously I’d like to know what’s happening, I’d like to know if he’s been released, I’d like to 
know if he’s’ gonna come back out and do it again or I’d like to know if he’s gone to jail or 
wherever, been prosecuted and everyone’s safe. [CR06, young White female, West Yorkshire]
A number of respondents recognised that this two-way flow of information was difficult  
to achieve, especially given protocols associated with confidentiality and also the potential  
that sharing sensitive information may have for compromising future investigations: 
But then again half of the time, thing they’re not going to let you know because it’s private 
and confidentiality isn’t it? They’re just going to release the information that they want  
you to know. Well, I work in a school don’t I, so I know, if there’s a child protection issue  
or whatever they only tell us the relevant… they don’t, they’re not going to tell us  
anything else. [CR27, Muslim female, Greater Manchester] 
In light of the complexities associated with policies, procedures and legislations, the following 
community respondent demonstrates the need for better information, transparency and 
education as part of a feedback loop associated with sharing sensitive information:
What’s actually happening and what the procedures are and how far the information’s got 
and if the group, if they got hold of the people and if they got punished and things like that. 
Actually the whole of the procedure, really, I would like to know. Because obviously knowing 
that you’ve done such a big thing as well, obviously I need to know what’s happening,  
the outcome of it. [CR12, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
From this respondent’s point of view, information which is shared with authorities such as the 
police or the local authority not only should be acted upon but a regular feed-back loop should 
be established so that that the person who is doing the reporting is kept informed at all stages. 
Community respondents felt that there were four potential benefits for the community and  
also the authorities with establishing such a feedback loop. First, they felt this would help  
with building trust and confident in the system. Respondents argued that tacking extremism 
should be a partnership process and that tacking violent extremism involves the importance  
of sharing information between the following: ‘Communication should be between me, him  
and the authorities, so three like a chain and we would work together’. [CR19, Muslim female,  
Greater Manchester]
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The importance of dialogue and greater communication between the police and Muslim 
communities to improve police-community relations more generally was also touched on  
by respondents: 
My experience has been in terms of – it’s not fully Prevent; it’s that the society that we 
do live in, the British society, there is a perception that young Asians, young black people 
are vulnerable to stop and search in society. You know, they’re treated as criminals. The 
perception is you’re guilty before you’re proved innocent rather than the other way round, 
and that is holding a lot of people from talking to the police. So it’s really important that the 
training and support that the police receive allows them to work better with communities so 
that that perception is justified, whether it’s stop and search, whether it’s engagement that 
young black or Asian and Muslims have with the police. There needs to be better dialogue 
between the groups, better understanding, and again, you know, overall I think should be 
there’s better race relations education in the UK. [CR28, Muslim male, Manchester] 
Secondly, the feedback loop is crucial from a practical point of view. it is important to kept 
informed so that the person in question knows that they have given the information to the  
correct agency or person:
Yeah, absolutely it’s important because say they take that information, how do I know 
that I’ve given it to the right body or the right people, if they don’t tell me what they’ve 
done with that information. So before they actually take Adam away or speak to Adam 
or whatever they’re going to do with Adam, I want to know what it is they’re going to do. 
[CR02, young Muslim male, West Yorkshire] 
Thirdly, feedback is crucial so that the person sharing the information will have an idea of  
the treatment and welfare of the person being reported, which was considered of paramount 
importance. This is another example of respondents’ depth of feeling about the ‘care and concern’ 
of their intimate during the whole reporting process. For example, the following observations  
note how sharing information is predicated upon the hope that the authorities in question  
will demonstrate a duty of care in helping the individual in question, a view shared by many  
Muslim and White respondents:
It’d be very important. That’s my friend, I want to know what’s happening to him, whether 
he’s being treated right or, and whether the incident is being looked into, whether other 
people are getting help as well, and it’s, the incident’s been sorted out, because I’m sure 
other people will have a friend like Adam who will be going through the same thing.  
So it’d be good if the issue gets stopped before it gets out of hand basically, so other  
people don’t have to go through it.  [CR21, young Muslim male, Greater Manchester]
I’d like to be kept in the loop of what’s going on, like what’s going on with my friend,  
what actions were being taken. Support for myself, I think I’d like more information  
about like terrorism and stuff like that so I know what to do maybe quicker.  
[CR32, White female, West Yorkshire] 
However, other respondents from White communities were less concerned with feedback on the 
welfare of the individual and more concerned with feedback on the action taken against both the 
individual of concern and the extremist group their friend had become involved in:
I wouldn’t want no support but I’d want information back if like, they’ve like arrested I’m  
or if ‘e’s going to court or stuff like that. [CR06, young White female, West Yorkshire]
I would like to know maybe what they plan on doing about the actual political group. I would 
want some sort of assurances that something is gonna be done about the group as a whole, 
and I think that would actually be part of a condition I would set in actually reporting and 
agreeing to go through the reporting process. [CR04, young White male, Greater Manchester]
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Finally, the feedback loop provides a sense of accountability that police and other authorities are 
acting proportionately and appropriately in dealing with the concerns that community members 
bring forward. This was motivated, especially for Muslim respondents, by the fear that police or 
related authorities may be harsh or inappropriate in their responses: 
Because they’re reactionary. They don’t understand the person, they just understand  
from a very technical point of view. So they wouldn’t necessarily…it may be something  
or nothing but they’d be acting like a sledgehammer to a small nut and it could ruin  
his life. [CR37, Muslim male, London]
Speaking to his college or school or university, I don’t know if I would be able to trust them 
to understand where he’s coming from. Health authority, I don’t see anyone over there 
who I could turn to. They’d just be reactionary and go straight for the jugular so there’s 
nobody who I’d really be able to trust. [CR15, Muslim male, Greater Manchester] 
[I’d have] concerns that they wouldn’t be able to de-radicalise him, that they would just 
lock him up, that would be a concern. [CR16, Muslim male, Greater Manchester] 
The feedback loop also plays a wider role of educating both the community and the broader 
society that tackling terrorism is a complex issue that involves a partnership between a number  
of agencies and positive contributions by community members:
Currently my view is that it is the Muslim community that they’re after, right? They need to 
have a better understanding and be able to identify potential criminals, whatever you want 
to call them, terrorists or whatever it is, using reliable information rather than ‘yes we are a 
Muslim house and we’ve made an arrest because somebody has made a call’. They need to 
be able to do the background checks and have valid information before going ahead, but 
then if you don’t act on the information and something does happen, then the authorities 
have a high risk stake as well. So it’s really important that we educate the media to be able 
to portray and report sensitively and accurately rather than headline grabbing stories that 
looks good but it actually plays communities against communities. And that’s not been 
helpful for Muslims. [CR36, Muslim male, London]
Several respondents spoke of more emotionally targeted forms of support, including some 
reassurance that reporting their concerns was indeed the best course of action, as well as those 
concerns being taken seriously and actioned:
Reassurance that what I’m going to say is going to be taken seriously, that I’m not going to 
be sort of ridiculed, as in ‘oh’, you know, ‘you’re over-reacting, it’s just your mate stressing 
out over her uni work. What’s up with you?’ So I’d want, I would want the reassurance that 
it would be taken and investigated. [CR11, Muslim female, West Yorkshire]
What happens, and what should happen, after reporting is a very significant consideration 
for most community respondents. Many identified concerns about the negative, collective 
impacts of reporting, including the different forms of anticipated or experienced backlash 
against those concerned. The large majority (although not all) of community respondents 
want to be kept informed of developments after reporting to the police. They understand 
reporting to be a two-way process, with a ‘feedback loop’ that keeps them informed about 
what happened, the status of the investigation, and what will or might happen next. Such 
a feedback loop can have positive impacts on current and future community reporting 
because it builds trust, accountability and a genuine sense of collective partnerships  
in countering the harms of violent extremism.
Key post- 
reporting  
findings
 53 Community Reporting Thresholds
Practitioner Perspectives  
on Community Reporting
For this project, we individually interviewed 18 professional practitioners involved in  
UK policy, community organisations and services, local authorities and policing agencies  
across the three field sites of the study (West Yorkshire, Greater Manchester and London). 
The questions posed to professional practitioners corresponded in general to the key 
themes explored with community respondents. The table below summarises the range  
of organisation and agency types involved in professional practitioner interviews.
We sought state and community  
professionals’ perceptions and  
understandings on topics including:
•  The barriers and enablers for community 
reporting;
•  How community members handled the 
reasoning, navigation and decision-making 
aspects of whether or not to share their 
concerns with authorities;
•  To whom and how people might  
choose to report;
•  Anticipated and actual impacts of  
coming forward;
•  Support needs and existing support 
mechanisms for those who come forward;
•  The scope and limitations involved in 
providing follow-up on reporting outcomes 
for those who share concerns or information 
with authorities.
We also gained rich data from professional 
practitioners – and especially from respondents 
in counter-terrorism policing and Prevent 
coordination roles – on concerns, dilemmas 
and suggestions for improvement related to 
the general operating environment in which 
efforts to encourage communities to share 
information with authorities take place. 
We begin with these views and suggestions 
because they provide useful overarching 
context for the key insights shared by 
professional practitioners across the board 
regarding specific aspects of community 
reporting processes and dynamics discussed  
in greater detail below.
Table 4: Professional Practitioner Sample
Total number  
for category
Professional  
category
Gender 
(M/F/Other)
Project 
Region
6 Police Counter-Terrorism Units 1 F, 5 M GM, WY, GML
2 Prevent Police 2 M WY, GML
4 Local Authority Prevent Coordinators 2 F, 1 M WY, GM
5 Community organisations and services 
(youth work, social cohesion, housing, 
community development)
1 F, 4 M WY, GM
1 Unspecified professional practitioner 
(respondent request)
– –
Total: 18
WY = West Yorkshire; GM = Greater Manchester; GML = Greater Metropolitan London
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Professional practitioners (abbreviated hereafter as PPs) raised a number of contextual points 
concerning the general operating environment in which efforts to encourage and manage 
community reporting take place throughout the UK. These points generally fell into four categories: 
1.   The impact of the Prevent strategy on practitioners’ operating environment and context
2.   The relevance of working with cultural diversity in community engagement and reporting contexts
3.  The impact of mainstream and social media on reporting dynamics, and
4.  Communication issues and strategies.
Prevent
For those PPs who raised general issues around the role of Prevent in the context of community 
reporting, there was little consensus around the impact of the Prevent strategy on community willingness 
to come forward and the ease with which Prevent facilitates the sharing of concerns by intimates. 
Some PPs felt that Prevent had become such a ‘toxic brand’ [PP03, PP06] that conducting professional 
outreach on community reporting through the Prevent framework was now very challenging; as one  
PP put it: ‘Because of that toxic brand labelled as Prevent, it’s quite difficult’. [PP03, West Yorkshire]
Other concerns included a perceived shift in what one PP termed ‘ownership’ of Prevent, one that 
moved away from empowering community efforts to address issues around violent extremism 
toward tighter government management and control with negative impacts for community buy-in:
I think a lot of it is to do with the way the Prevent agenda was handled. There was some 
community ownership given, I think, to begin with, and then that spiralled downward. I 
think those communities were capable of finding resolutions to their own problems until it 
got taken away from them and became more of a dictatorship. [PP14, West Yorkshire]
However, others felt that despite Prevent’s generally poor reputation within communities, the 
strategy was badly underestimated. They argued for greater public-facing explanation of its 
achievements and successes in preventing the take-up of violent extremism, and stronger  
efforts by government policymakers to rehabilitate perceptions of Prevent’s effectiveness.  
One PP called for more: ‘pride in Prevent and what it actually is. But across the board that is the 
downfall of Prevent, negativity and a lack of a robust response to it’. [PP09, London] Indeed, some 
PP respondents were quite bitter about the resistance to Prevent they perceived from some 
community organisations and legal practitioners, which they felt resulted in failed opportunities  
to encourage people to come forward early enough with information that might save someone  
at an early stage of radicalising to violence from arrest, prison or death.
Specifically, in terms of reporting and the Prevent Duty, PPs raised concerns about whether Prevent 
sufficiently educated and empowered front-line education, health and welfare practitioners to 
deal with the phenomenon of misguided or overzealous community reporting. These respondents 
argued that poorly targeted or malicious use of the Prevent Duty had a chilling effect for future 
willingness by intimates to share information reporting because of the adverse consequences it 
created for individuals, families and community groups more broadly. The comments of one PP 
on this issue are representative and offer keen insights into the dilemmas this can create for both 
community members and practitioners:
[People in communities and workplaces are] saying, ‘Right, you told us to look out for this 
and look out for that and this person is exhibiting those behaviours’. One example was a 
lady who’d become more religious and started wearing very religious dress at work. The 
Prevent Officer’s gone along and had a look and said, ‘All she’s done is get more religious, 
it’s not for us’. He sat her down and said, ‘You were referred to us but I can see that there’s 
nothing in it. Thanks for your time’. The story was that she had to give her job up because 
of the stigma. [PP02, Greater Manchester]
These PPs also emphasised the importance of using discreet methods of assessing the validity 
and authenticity of information reported in order to minimise impacts on communities and avoid 
further alienating those who might come forward in future:
[As police] we need to be careful about what we demand. We need to accept that we can’t 
go back down the chain [of the original report] to find out the root of the information. 
Otherwise, that [source] will close off. It’s a massive ask. [PP04, West Yorkshire]
The operating 
environment  
for community 
reporting 
Practitioner Perspectives on Community Reporting
55 Community Reporting Thresholds
Cultural diversity and community contexts
PPs identified a core element of their operating environment around community reporting as 
knowledge and understanding of cultural and religious diversity in all three of the study’s field 
sites. In some of these locales, practitioners noted they were working with a very significant 
diversity of cultures and languages: ‘There’s a hundred and seventy-odd languages spoken in my area’ 
[PP03, West Yorkshire] – and they felt this created particular challenges (educational, cultural, 
financial, logistical) in terms of how messaging around community reporting processes could  
be successfully developed and implemented. 
However, there was very broad agreement across the PP cohort that understanding and working 
with cultural and religious diversity and sensitivities was of crucial importance and can either 
encourage or (if done badly) inhibit timely and relevant community reporting: 
If I go in ham-fisted [regarding cultural or religious awareness] at that job we’ll probably 
still manage to get somewhere with it, but it’s the next one. The next one [comes along]  
and somebody doesn’t report it, and then that fourteen-year-old lad who’s looking at  
ISIS videos goes on to be a nineteen-year old-lad who’s got knives, and that’s the thing  
that you try and stop. You’re always looking down the line really, at what’s the next thing. 
[PP02, Greater Manchester]
And they identified training and handover skills from more experienced to newer practitioners  
as an essential element in the sustainability of cultural awareness: 
There’s quite a few [staff] here now might have come to the job in a position of ignorance, 
but what helps is some of the Prevent leads know all this stuff and then they educate us,  
so we know too. [PP07, London]
Understanding cultural contexts was considered vital not only for creating more effective practice 
skills, but also for strengthening intelligence-led assessment of the nature and quality  
of information provided through community reporting:
Taking further detail [during a report] is always important, and that detail might include 
the cultural relevance of this. You get a job and it’s a fourteen-year-old boy who says, ‘ 
The Taliban are alright’, okay? Now if I said that that was a kid who’s always lived in 
Manchester, spends a lot of time online and he thinks the Taliban are alright, you’ve got 
a higher degree of concern there. But if I say to you this was an Afghan kid who’d been 
in the country three weeks, having previously come as a refugee from a remote area of 
Afghanistan, it puts a totally different slant on it, because if that’s where he’s lived all of  
his life. Make no mistake, I’m not trying to say the Taliban are alright here [but it provides  
a different context for information assessment]. [PP01, Greater Manchester]
Mainstream and social media
The perceived impact of both mainstream and social media dynamics and influences on the 
operating environment for PPs was integral to their sense of the challenges faced in relation 
to community reporting. Most compelling for PPs who commented on media matters was the 
perceived hostility, stigma and imbalance of mainstream media reporting on issues relating to 
Muslim communities and terrorism. They were frustrated by what they saw as the failure of news 
media to take responsibility for the accuracy of and choices about reporting on terrorism issues, 
and particularly about the imbalance they observed when it came to reporting on jihadist versus 
far-right violent extremism. They felt such imbalanced reporting could dampen community 
willingness to come forward when most needed to detect or disrupt potential terrorist actions:
[Muslim communities] are absolutely right that there is unfairness in how things are 
reported. It’s quite clear, you know, the right-wing trials might get a [bit of attention]  
but anything that’s Daesh [Islamic State]-involved… The comparisons [in media handling 
of] a right-wing trial and an Islamist-inspired or influenced trial, it’s significantly different. 
[PP03, West Yorkshire]
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People are now more savvy with regards to the thirst the mainstream media have in order 
to sell newspapers, how things can get blown out of proportion, misrepresented, etc. 
People are fearful that their particular group - irrespective of which extremist sect you  
are looking at – will get clumped all together for the actions of one or a small number  
of people. [PP04, West Yorkshire]
PPs also noted the challenges of keeping up with the volatile influence of social media, which they 
saw as tilting heavily in favour of supporting violent extremist rhetoric rather than opposing it. 
While recognising that social media was a ‘powerful tool’ [PP03] to promote community education 
and awareness about the importance of reporting to authorities, some practitioners felt this 
was overwhelmed by the sheer volume and sophistication of social media products devoted to 
promoting violent extremist ideology and narratives. They also noted the limitations for an agile, 
audience-tailored social media response created by government agencies’ needs to project a 
unified image and messaging strategy:
You look at the extremist rhetoric that’s being promoted and it’s really fancy, really 
attractive and it draws young people in. It’s difficult for us to kind of match that because 
we’re a quite stiff corporate organisation, and we’re only really touching a small 
percentage of communities. [PP03, West Yorkshire]
Communication issues and strategies
However, practitioners also recognised that despite these limitations, stronger and more 
innovative communication strategies remained a key imperative. As one PP noted: ‘As an 
organisation we do try our best, but we’re not necessarily reaching all audiences. We’ve tried everything, 
putting things through doors, leafletting, but is that enough?’ [PP03, West Yorkshire]
Whatever the communication strategies adopted, PPs were adamant that a central improvement 
needed would involve creating an operating environment for engagement between authorities 
and communities that was more transparent, more geared toward facilitating open dialogue on 
sensitive and difficult issues, and much clearer about both the nature, limitations and risks of 
community reporting processes. A key concern for PPs around the current operating environment 
for reporting was the risk of shutting dialogue and transparency down rather than contextualising 
community reporting as part of a continuum of safeguarding approaches: 
I think we need to be open and transparent, and we need to talk about the [reporting] 
processes. We need to be confident, I think, as practitioners to have that conversation,  
not shut the conversation down. It’s about facilitating the dialogue, but it’s also about 
being clear on how the process [for dealing with this] is no different to what we do on  
some of our other safeguarding agendas. [PP15, Greater Manchester]
In doing so, however, PPs were also keenly aware of the need to ‘make sure that we’re not  
targeting a certain area, which just causes hostility and suspicion’ [PP03, West Yorkshire], emphasising 
that ‘the delivery and terminology are very, very, very important when you’re talking to the different 
community groups, making sure it’s collective and the language is reflective.’ [PP01, Greater Manchester]
In this context, many PPs noted that more work was needed on communicating effectively  
about the spectrum of violent extremist threats faced within the UK and disabusing people  
of the idea that terrorism was a feature only of certain groups:
We’ve got to be really careful when we’re talking about a target audience because we 
do get right-wing referrals. When we’re out there presenting, I’ve had people [in local 
communities] say, ‘Well, we don’t have any Muslims in our area’ and you’re thinking,  
hang on a minute, we’re missing the point here, you know? We were talking about 
terrorism. [PP03, West Yorkshire]
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For community members, pre-reporting is the point at which people may voice private concerns 
(sometimes only to themselves) and/or start exploring the issue and thinking about the pros and 
cons of coming forward with worries about someone close to them without yet taking the next 
step of formally reporting to authorities. For professional practitioners, pre-reporting is the space 
in which issues around knowledge, preparedness and judgment in dealing with often incomplete 
or tentative information or concerns from family, friends and others are considered, assessed, 
managed and acted on. This section is in two parts: professional practitioners’ perspectives on 
their own behaviours and actions in the pre-reporting space, and their perspectives on community 
behaviours and actions prior to making a decision on whether or not to come forward to authorities.
Practitioner perspectives on own pre-reporting behaviours and actions
As we saw above, PPs consider cultural awareness and the ability to tailor behaviours and  
actions when interacting with different cultural groups as essential to best practice approaches  
in encouraging community reporting. These include cultural awareness of specific practices  
and sensitivities relating to language and gender in particular.
Beyond this, however, the main theme to emerge from PP interviews on their own behaviours 
and practices in the pre-reporting space relates to two issues: 1. The importance of discretion 
and privacy in dealing with those who are considering reporting, and 2. The relevance of real-life 
scenarios in training frontline staff involved in aspects of delivering on the Prevent Duty.
Discretion and privacy in dealing with those considering whether or not to report
Practitioners noted that whatever the initial point of contact may be for people who explore the 
possibility of reporting to authorities, ensuring that family members, intimates or other members 
of the community feel both as comfortable and as protected as possible from unwanted or 
unwelcome scrutiny and attention when following up on a contact is essential. 
Some of these issues are easy for practitioners to identify and manage: for example, driving to 
someone’s house in an unmarked car and parking a few streets away, or meeting in an area outside 
that where the person who may report lives. Failing to observe the need for discretion and privacy 
can stifle or inhibit further contact with a potential referrer, and respondents suggested these 
lessons are now changing behaviours and approaches in pre- or early-reporting contexts:
Obviously the police have to act on any information they get, but sometimes the police turning 
up on somebody’s doorstep without enough evidence wasn’t the best way [to gain community 
cooperation]. Whereas now, if [community reports or concerns] are coming through us [as a 
local authority], we can vet the information, get further information and make the judgement 
on whether it does need action from police or whether we can do early intervention, unpick 
some of the concerns and work with the individual in that way. [PP06, West Yorkshire] 
Other issues require more in-depth consideration of the risks and sensitivities that may be involved: 
for example, where language translation is required for a person to explore the possibility of reporting, 
it was important to source an interpreter who does not live in the same area or move within the same 
community networks to avoid potential community leaks or backlash.
Real-life reporting scenarios when training frontline workers
The second key theme relating to PP’s own behaviour and actions in the pre-reporting space 
concerned approaches to training frontline staff involved in making referrals to Prevent or 
Channel coordinators. This was helpful as a reminder of the fact that not only intimates and 
other community members, but also those with responsibilities for making judgments under the 
Prevent Duty, are all potentially involved in reporting decisions and processes. Respondents talked 
about the shift toward using de-identified real-life cases, rather than hypothetical or theoretical 
examples, to develop expertise in when and how frontline staff with responsibilities under the 
Prevent Duty should respond: 
When we deliver training to schools or other frontline staff we’ve started using real  
cases that we’ve worked on coming through the Channel process, and we ask them,  
‘What would you have done in this [real-life] scenario?’ Question, don’t just take for 
granted what somebody’s saying. Research, ask somebody else, speak to somebody  
about it. It’s about developing those skills, really. [PP06, West Yorkshire] 
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As this practitioner goes on to note, the main concern revolves around developing better  
skills in critical, knowledge-based, non-stereotypical judgment and assessment of what is  
and isn’t important in generating a referral. This was particularly so when it came to misguided  
or potentially harmful assumptions about the link between religion and violent extremism: 
‘Somebody who started going to a local snooker centre could be more at risk of being radicalised  
than attending a faith centre, so it’s just raising awareness’. [PP06, West Yorkshire] 
When it comes to perceptions around what family and community members do in the pre-reporting 
space, there is a reasonable concordance between practitioners’ and community respondents’ 
understanding of this phase of the reporting process, as well as specific points raised by PPs on  
pre-reporting issues for communities.
Seeking further information on radicalisation to violent extremism
As did community members, PPs identified doing initial background research both online and 
offline as a common action by those considering reporting, largely to help confirm, contextualise 
or assuage their intuitive concerns about someone who may be radicalising to violence: ‘I think 
generally you ask someone who you think’s more knowledgeable on the matter than you are. We like to  
think we’re covering those networks as best we can … but I suppose if you’re not affected by it you might  
not necessarily have [taken much notice].’ [PP01, Greater Manchester]
‘Known faces in known places’
However, what PPs saw as the most probable course of action – also according with data from 
community respondents – was the seeking of information, reassurance and help with decision-
making from what one community practitioner pithily referred to as ‘known faces in known 
places’. People within familiar, trusted and localised networks were seen by PPs as critical sources  
of influence and support in the pre-reporting phase who could move people either forward or away 
from the reporting continuum. Practitioners identified local service providers and community figures 
such as community leaders or elders, teachers, the local authority, local police and others with  
whom community members interact on a regular basis or are familiar with in their local area:
I think when you’re talking about that next level of reporting, you know, the mother 
reporting, that’s far more likely to come via personal engagement with a GP, teacher, 
local cop, that sort of thing. So we’ve concentrated on those professional people and key 
community contacts that can facilitate that on our behalf. [PP01, Greater Manchester]
If people in communities have got concerns, they can go along and speak to some of the 
hub members. The hub is made up of health professionals, ASB (Anti-Social Behaviour team) 
people, so it’s a range of services. Police pop in. It’s a real hub where people can go and ask 
questions, raise any concerns and get advice. These early help hubs are probably the first 
point [of contact] if we were looking at generic reporting or advice. And they act as a real 
triage. [It’s about] known faces in known places, as we call them. [PP15, Greater Manchester]
However, PPs stressed that these background sources of guidance and support in the  
pre-reporting phase are organic and informal networks generated by practice and relationship 
building rather than policy or strategy:
So we do end up getting some reports that come [directly] from members of the 
community, but it’s more people coming through those specific routes. There’s not 
specifically community reporting. There’s no specific community reporting process,  
though that’s not to say that some community groups might not provide a route for  
that on an informal basis. [PP13, Greater Manchester]
Other PPs saw merit in developing stronger structures and messaging around pre-reporting 
networks through contact between neighbourhood police and communities:
[Encouraging early reporting] has to be regular, it has to be consistent and it has to be at 
grassroots level. It has to be delivered with our neighbourhood policing teams. Those people are 
already in the community, have already got the contacts, have already got the understanding  
of the specific local and cultural issues, whatever they may be. [PP04, West Yorkshire]
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Building capacity: lessons learned from other community reporting contexts
An intriguing element of PP thinking about the community pre-reporting space for violent 
extremism was what models and practices from non-terrorism related reporting contexts could 
offer. Some practitioners cited the changes witnessed by police and service providers around 
reporting domestic violence, for example, ‘that you would never have had maybe ten years ago’  
[PP08, London], and greater awareness of safeguarding responsibilities for vulnerable  
community members more generally:
That’s what we preach a lot on, that when it comes to any kind of safeguarding, whether 
it’s grooming or exploitation of any kind, young people or vulnerable adults, people with 
mental health needs, older people – that we all have a responsibility and duty of care to 
these people. [PP06, West Yorkshire]
Others referred to the normalisation of reporting in the area of hate crimes, where those 
communities that had long experience with prejudice and discrimination had developed both 
robust community reporting systems as well as the confidence to bring information forward 
because they believed it would be taken seriously and acted upon by authorities.
In this regard, however, a number of practitioners suggested that not all communities have  
the same confidence that reporting systems will demonstrate efficacy or be responsive to  
their concerns:
I think in the Muslim community we’ve said, ‘Oh, it don’t matter. What’s anyone going  
to do?’ Or people will say, ‘You don’t go and report it’ for this reason and that reason, 
‘nothing ever happens’. [PP15, Greater Manchester]
However, the same respondent also felt that Muslim communities’ lack of confidence in the 
efficacy of reporting on hate crimes had started to change: ‘We have seen increasing reporting 
[about Islamophobia] over the last two years with organisations like MEND and others who work in  
that real network space and engage at a very grassroots level.’  [PP15, Greater Manchester]
Nevertheless, despite perceptions of recent shifts toward increased reporting on matters like 
Islamophobia, reporting on concerns relating to violent extremism can still pose significant ethical 
and practical challenges for various faith-based and community organisations. These challenges 
persist despite these organisations’ ability to handle information brought forward with cultural 
care, awareness and sensitivity, as this practitioner expands on:
Mosques don’t want to lose credibility within their own communities where they’re 
viewed as snitches [because] they’re the ones reporting. They don’t want to take on that 
responsibility because they feel they don’t have the support. There are structures within 
our own communities, but people are either afraid to use them or to be the sounding 
board for other people’s concerns. So what is the only avenue left? The police. But there’s 
a feeling that the police and authorities will do what they want to do [regardless of our 
willingness to contribute]. So really, us reporting, will it bring any resolution? Will it bring 
more harm to the Muslim community? There is already a lot of anti-Muslim sentiment in 
the community. [PP14, West Yorkshire]
Navigating the decision-making process for community members
Professional practitioners had great depth of understanding regarding the internal and social 
conflicts experienced by intimates such as family and close friends when it comes to navigating 
the decision-making landscape for reporting to authorities. 
Reading the signs: lack of certainty and confidence for families
A critical issue for PPs was how well people understood the signs they were seeing, and – even 
when they did – how confident they were to take the next step of contacting someone with their 
concerns. Most PPs felt that, especially in the case of families, it was extraordinarily difficult 
for those close to someone who may be at risk to link a change in behaviour – especially for 
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adolescents and young adults – with receptiveness to or involvement with violent extremist ideology, 
particularly if the family was not familiar with early warning signs of radicalisation to violence:
I think [the family] just sensed a change of behaviour – perhaps not having dealt with 
this type of thing before they didn’t really want to raise false alarms, and they didn’t want 
to jeopardise a relationship with their son. Where’s the line between just reading on the 
Internet and being naturally curious to going out and acting on that? You know, he was  
a young man who was recently married. [PP10, West Yorkshire]
Being unsure or unfamiliar with how to identify and filter the differences between harmless and 
harmful changes in people’s behaviour and attitudes means friends and families can remain at 
a disadvantage in being able to read the signs and intervene, and early reporting or assistance-
seeking suffers as a result:
The London bombers from Leeds, there must’ve been so many people who thought,  
God, he’s got some views, him, but he won’t do anything. Then off they go and do it. It’s 
difficult to think, ‘This might be the one and I’ve seen it, I am the person who can stop it.’ 
Your average guy in the street probably just thinks, ‘Oh, it’ll go away’, and that’s a  
big blocker, that people just don’t see the seriousness of [potential indicators for  
violent action]. [PP02, Greater Manchester]
[Having to distinguish between] ‘Is that something you would report, or is that just 
community gossip?’ is expecting an awful lot from the community. [PP08, Greater 
Metropolitan London]
Practitioners also noted that even where intimates are closer to believing that something is wrong, 
however, the decision to come forward can be agonising, particularly in terms of worrying about 
the multi-layered consequences of reporting, and this makes the identification of what ‘crossing 
the line’ might mean even more difficult to assess:
What is the point at which you feel, okay, this is becoming dangerous now and I need to 
report this? And would you do that to somebody that’s close to you? I’m not sure if you’re 
a parent that you’d know how to deal with that, or whether you would want to believe it. 
There was a case where I’d worked with the family quite closely, and they didn’t know  
where the line was. [PP10, West Yorkshire]
They’re torn. They’re concerned about the ramifications of what they say, insomuch they 
want things to stop but they don’t necessarily want to see somebody go to jail for a long 
period of time. Or if that person or family’s identified as being of concern, I think people 
are more aware nowadays of the impact of Prevent. [PP04, West Yorkshire] 
There are also the additional stigma and risks associated with being seen as a ‘grass’ or a ‘snitch’, 
involving yet more negotiation of implications and consequences by reporting decision-makers 
(and as confirmed by community respondent data):
They don’t necessarily want to be involved because of the ramifications of getting caught 
up in the process and being exposed as a snitch, a snout, a grass, with the potential threat 
[this involves] to them personally, to their families, and potentially to their community.  
They think about the huge impact it could have, not only on them and their local 
community but the wider community, the north of England potentially. They get a bad 
name for breeding terrorists and extreme violent people. [PP04, West Yorkshire]
Navigating the decision-making process for professional practitioners
In turning to how practitioners themselves navigate the decision-making process about whether 
or not to refer or report on concerns they may have, PPs with experience in law enforcement 
or Prevent coordination were sympathetic to the difficulties of making these judgments by 
inexperienced frontline personnel involved with the Prevent Duty, as they were for community 
Practitioner Perspectives on Community Reporting
61 Community Reporting Thresholds
members more generally. However, they were also critical of what they saw as reluctance to jump 
the gun or draw on available expertise (and at times common sense) in how frontline services 
interpreted the signs that informed their decision to report on to Prevent or Channel authorities.
Reading the signs: lack of validation and crosschecking
The most prevalent concern for PPs in this context was failure to crosscheck the legitimacy and 
validity of concerns brought forward through local intermediaries such as schools or health 
services. While Prevent coordinators were careful to point out that they regularly ask frontline 
personnel to ‘get the full picture, not just a snippet of an information - where’s that information come 
from? What’s the source? How legitimate is it?’ [PP06, West Yorkshire],
There is often a failure to challenge or even discuss the issue with kids prior to completing 
the [Channel referral] forms. There is the example of a Muslim boy saying out loud at 
school that ‘lots of Muslim people were dying in Syria’, whereupon the school saw this 
as a red flag, creating the problem of false positives. [PP05, West Yorkshire]
Lack of confidence or being overwhelmed by the subject matter helped explain this gap in good 
practice for at least one frustrated practitioner:
They weren’t checking, they weren’t putting things into context, because they didn’t feel 
confident to do their own piece of work in order to put things into context. But it should  
be no different to doing this [in relation to violent extremism] if a fifteen-year-old is 
coming in and they smell of drink. [PP04, West Yorkshire] 
Others, however, felt that locally based frontline personnel needed a better understanding of  
their role in the reporting ‘supply chain’ and the importance of validating the accuracy of 
information received through various reporting channels:
You can’t expect people giving this information to know everything that we want. What 
you hope is that the person receiving the information is saying, ‘Look, you’ve given us 
information. We just need a little bit more, can I just talk to you about it?’ and getting the 
rest of the stuff. It’s making sure that they know that you value the information that they’re 
giving and you want to speak to them because you want to make sure that what they’re 
giving you is accurate, it’s up to date, it’s valid. [PP09, London]
PCSOs and frontline police officers and neighbourhood teams are the people that perhaps 
the police service need to work better and more regularly with to up the ante with regards 
to this specific message. It’s about making sure they’re geared up to what’s happening in 
the world, what’s relevant, and if they’re in doubt about anything at all just make sure that 
goes through the system to our office where you’ve got people with a bit more expertise. 
[PP04, West Yorkshire] 
Most compellingly, there was a view amongst PPs that the Prevent Duty needed to become 
better integrated within broader safeguarding policies and procedures both to accelerate 
cross-harms understanding of when and how to refer and report, and also to reduce the stigma 
and anxiety of terrorism as opposed to other kinds of harm-prevention reporting duties.  
One professional offered detailed practical advice on how this might be achieved within  
school settings:
The key thing for the schools is, don’t write a separate policy for Prevent. Just put in a 
Prevent section within all the different elements of your safeguarding policy. If you think, 
this is beyond our understanding or our capability to put this into context and manage 
it, the ‘share’ is to come to the Prevent team and have the professional conversation as 
to what the school knows and, bearing in mind the safeguarding concern for the person, 
what’s the best form of action? [PP04, West Yorkshire]
62
Practitioners commented extensively on a range of issues they saw as actual or potential barriers 
to community members coming forward to share information with authorities. Major themes to 
emerge from this portion of the practitioner data were fear and uncertainty about reporting channels, 
processes and consequences; loss of control during the reporting process; fatigue and mistrust in relation 
to authorities; perceived cultural influences, and chilling conditions for dialogue and partnerships between 
practitioners and communities.
Fear and uncertainty about reporting channels, processes and consequences
Police are the last port of call for community reporting
PPs focused overwhelmingly on what they saw as community fears relating to dealing with  
police – whether locally, through Prevent or through the national counter-terrorism hotline – 
when it comes to sharing concerns with authorities about someone close radicalising 
to violence:
I would imagine [reporting] would be the last thing people would want to do, because 
immediately they will equate raising a concern with [their report going to] terrorism  
police and terrorism police will then start the investigation. I would imagine that  
would cause quite a bit of blockage. [PP08, London]
Identical to the Australian study, there was broad consensus amongst practitioners that  
police would be a ‘last port of call’ [PP14, West Yorkshire] because police are rarely perceived  
by communities as playing a central safeguarding role:
People will not perceive the police as being the people who are going to adopt a 
safeguarding approach, who are actually going to try and help. [PP09, London]
They see the hard edge of policing, they don’t equate it to just somebody coming along  
and wanting to have a chat just to clarify something. So we’re turning up with people  
who have preconceived notions as to what may happen. [PP08, London]
And some practitioners acknowledged that police themselves were in some instances still 
grappling with the shift toward safeguarding and support rather than traditional detection  
and investigation approaches:
Realistically, it is very new to us as police officers to sit down and help people and say, 
‘How can we support you?’ instead of, ‘We want to nick you’. It’s very new to us, and I think 
maybe the public are still trying to get their head around that as well. People are scared. 
[PP09, London]
Many practitioners felt that this created serious problems for early intervention and diversion 
options, with communities attempting first to resolve challenges themselves and only resorting  
to police when all other efforts have failed:
It’s a shame, because what ends up happening in those instances is that they end up 
reporting it at the last minute after they’ve tried themselves, they’ve got family members 
to try, and as a last resort they tell us. At that point perhaps [the person at risk has] moved 
down the line six months and they’ve committed offences, and they end up getting locked 
up and going to prison for ten years. Whereas if [those reporting had] told us six months 
earlier it might have been in that pre-crime space that we can [initiate] safeguarding  
and help divert them away before they get there. [PP01, Greater Manchester]
When things are really, really wrong, that’s when you ring the police as a last measure,  
but [first people try to] take ownership of their own problems and resolve them themselves. 
And in this current climate police are not the first port of call. PP10, West Yorkshire]
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Fear of consequences for those being reported
The theme of exposing loved ones to harsh consequences, including arrest, imprisonment, 
damaged reputations and alienation of intimate relationships also preoccupied practitioners.  
PPs felt that the ‘anxiety’ [PP01, Greater Manchester] and lack of ‘assurances’ [PP03, West Yorkshire] 
from police about what the potential or likely outcomes of a report might be was a major barrier  
to coming forward; as one PP remarked:
You could make [reporting] the easiest thing in the world to do, that everyone has access 
to, but it’s not the process that’s the barrier, is it? It’s the mental leap to say, ‘I’m going 
to report this’ [which invokes] all those concerns about getting the person into trouble, 
wrongly labelling them as a terrorist. [PP01, Greater Manchester] 
However, other PPs thought the absence of any clear articulation by authorities of feedback or 
information about what happens during and after the reporting process did in fact create another 
layer of barriers to reporting:
So I think there’s that blur around ‘if I report something nothing’s going to happen anyway, 
and I don’t get no feedback’. Or else, ‘What are they going to do? They don’t do anything’.  
I think it is about that [lack of] confidence in communities [about the process] and also 
their understanding of the process. [PP15, Greater Manchester]
No one’s going to report anything to you while they’ve got the anxiety of not knowing  
what happens to that report. [PP01, Greater Manchester]
Fear of consequences for the reporter, their families and their communities
PPs were generally highly empathetic with community fears and concerns relating to the spectre 
of reputational damage, unwanted media attention and shame (for oneself, one’s family and one’s 
community) as well as fear of backlash, isolation or ostracism by others in the community for  
those who are considering coming forward. This could include the impact of being associated  
with those identified as radicalising to violence – ‘The fear of being labelled as a family member  
or a loved one or an associate of a terrorist and the impact that has on the wider family and friends’  
[PP03, West Yorkshire] – and also the wider ripple impact that reporting can have for others  
within family, social or community networks:
[There is] the impact that [reporting] has on even smaller siblings who are going to primary 
school, who potentially will end up getting bullied. There is the fear of going to work and 
people then sending you to Coventry, not talking to you, through no fault of your own.  
And being isolated by other family members not wanting to know [the person who’s  
come forward]. So there’s all sorts of ramifications, really. [PP03, West Yorkshire]
Practitioners thought that the fear of ‘dropping your own family in it’ could lead those with 
concerns to practice denialism or wishful thinking: ‘You know, [thinking] maybe it’ll go away,  
maybe a bit of a naïve thought process – but what mum wants to report her own son if she  
thinks he’s going to start getting convicted of offences?’ [PP02, Greater Manchester]
Community distrust of Prevent and the Safeguarding agenda
As we saw in the opening section on ‘Practice-related concerns’ above, many PPs focused on the 
‘toxic’ nature of the Prevent ‘brand’ and the extent to which this was hampering their efforts to 
build community trust and confidence both in the Prevent duty and in police and local authorities 
more generally. Lack of trust in authorities for reporting purposes was directly linked by these 
respondents to mistrust of Prevent more generally including safeguarding initiatives, as these 
representative observations suggest:
Everybody’s paranoid at the moment, and when you deliver [a programme] they’re 
thinking, so whose agenda are we delivering on and who’s watching us? Even if the 
mosques would like to help, how genuine and sincere is that partnership with the 
government or with other organisations? I think there’s a feeling that Muslim institutions 
have been cornered. The government will do what the government will do, so, and I  
think there’s a sense of fatigue in the Muslim community. [PP10, West Yorkshire]
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People really don’t trust us. They really don’t trust us because there’s so much 
misinformation and bad publicity out there [about Prevent] that we really don’t  
counter. So getting that message out [about being here to help those with concerns]  
is incredibly difficult, because the people don’t trust us. You can say it but people  
don’t hear it. [PP02, Greater Manchester]
Although we promote [Prevent] as safeguarding and we say it is everybody’s duty to 
safeguard and protect communities I think that buy-in is still not there, you know?  
We’re not quite there with it yet, there’s still suspicions. [PP07, London]
Chilling conditions for open dialogue and partnerships
Closely related to these concerns were statements by practitioners on the difficulties of facilitating 
open dialogue and partnerships between communities and authorities on the importance 
and processes involved in coming forward. From the vantage point of community organisation 
practitioners, the closing down of dialogue on violent extremism, in part due to the imbalanced 
sensationalism whipped up by media reporting, was having a notable chilling effect on willingness 
to share concerns or information:
Even the dialogue around extremism has been shut down a lot, so people are afraid to 
talk about extremism. So even if you were to suspect that perhaps your daughter or son’s 
involved in something, you’d have a heavy concern that if you did go and report this, what 
would be the ramifications, not just for your child but for the family as a whole? What 
would you be labelled as? We’ve all seen what’s happening in the media at the moment, so 
people are even afraid to have this dialogue or to approach anyone. [PP14, West Yorkshire]
Police practitioners agreed, citing devolution and ‘detachment’ from the neighbourhood policing 
model that informed earlier iterations of the Prevent strategy [PP10, London] in which police were 
more firmly embedded within community networks and consciousness, as well as community 
perceptions that Prevent was fundamentally opposed to Islam as a religion rather than to violent 
action on behalf of ideologies or beliefs across the political spectrum: ‘They don’t want to be seen  
to be associating with something that’s this beast, something that’s against Islam’. [PP09, London]
One consequence of this is to make practitioners: ‘a bit wary about actually actively promoting Prevent 
publicly’ [PP04, West Yorkshire], which in turn makes promoting dialogue and the use of Prevent 
strategies in safeguarding contexts more difficult to implement and manage when trying to 
encourage reporting by community members.
Social influence can inhibit willingness to report
Finally, PPs explored their perceptions of some of the social and cultural issues that might create 
barriers for intimates coming forward to share concerns with authorities. They cited concerns 
about ‘grassing’ – ‘Reporting often is seen as grassing or backbiting in communities’ [PP05, West 
Yorkshire] – and about fear of being involved or being seen as unable to solve their own problems 
as key influences that could inhibit timely reporting:
Partly there’s a fear of getting involved and about repercussions within the community. 
And there’s huge cultural barriers about the methods people can go about reporting in 
a safe way. Either it’s because they want to remain anonymous or that they just think it’s 
none of their business, let other people do it. [PP08, London]
You’ve also got a degree of fear in that you don’t want to be seen as a grass, particularly  
in certain communities that have a tradition perhaps of dealing with things in-house  
and not bringing shame on yourself or on your community by making things public.  
[PP01, Greater Manchester]
Although [the risk of violent extremism is] real, [some] communities just want to sort  
things out for themselves. They don’t want authorities coming in and sorting their 
problems and issues. [PP06, West Yorkshire]
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However, other PPs identified problems with who is seen as a potential violent extremist and who 
isn’t in the eyes of community members. This was brought home by practitioners who observed 
that when it comes to far-right violent extremism, potential violent actors were more likely to  
go unremarked as possible threats in the eyes of their local communities because they had  
been culturally normalised within British cultural discourse:
For example, you’ve got a concern about a neighbour because he’s openly racist,  
he’s got a swastika tattoo on his arm or something like that. People don’t report it  
because traditionally that’s just so-and-so who lives next door, he’s just an old racist, 
you know? They don’t report it because it’s almost ingrained as part of the community. 
Everyone knows that he’s a bit of a racist, a bit of a nutcase but nobody reports it because 
they don’t look at the bigger picture; they don’t think that this person could then become 
the next attacker. [PP09, London]
This suggests that as long as ‘terrorism’ and ‘violent extremism’ are framed as issues 
relating primarily to Muslim communities, under-reporting of right-wing threats  
by community members would continue to characterise the reporting landscape,  
inhibiting early intervention and safeguarding opportunities as well as detection  
and investigation down the line.
Practitioners made a number of suggestions for how to address or improve issues  
related to barriers for community reporting. These focused largely on making much  
better use of existing community networks, organisations and platforms to try to bypass the 
credibility issues besetting Prevent and police [PP07, London; PP06, West Yorkshire; PP14, West 
Yorkshire], and thinking about how to promote greater confidence, awareness and understanding 
amongst community leaders and groups to respond proactively to issues as (or before) they erupt 
into media and police consciousness. Critically, this also involved thinking about where and how  
to invest in local community initiatives around reporting so that they become sustainable and do  
not come and go within a short timeframe; as one practitioner said, 
What messaging and what process can you put in place to make it strong, and once  
you’ve put in all that work and effort, how do you maintain it? Because funding some 
initiative for twelve months then that’s it, as soon as you step away it’ll weaken.  
[PP04, West Yorkshire]
The same practitioner also spoke about the importance of not merely bypassing but attempting 
to rehabilitate public confidence in government initiatives around preventing violent extremism, 
especially in relation to policing:
The main thing – and it’s an ongoing quest – is confidence in the police service, first  
and foremost, as to what we do. The word ‘service’ suggests we are there to serve and 
protect the public. Protect and save life is our highest priority and it has been since  
Sir Robert Peel. But we’ve become somewhat militarised with the equipment that  
we’ve got and some of the functions that we have, such as riot control, and [people 
therefore] see us as a force as opposed to a service. We need to reinforce and pursue 
that [service] approach we have with the public [in order to regain] public confidence. 
Specifically, we need people to understand what Prevent is, and just as importantly  
what it isn’t. [PP04, West Yorkshire]
Practitioner  
suggestions  
for addressing 
community  
barriers to  
reporting
66
Practitioners identified two key issues in relation to their understanding of why people might be 
willing to come forward to share concerns or information with authorities about those who  
may be radicalising to violence: 1. Heightened awareness of risks and impacts of terrorism and  
2. Care and concern for loved ones who may be radicalising to violence. 
However, they also had a range of suggestions and ideas about how to further enhance community 
willingness to report, in particular around 1. Messaging on the importance of early reporting for  
effective safeguarding interventions and 2. Personalising and localising the reporting process.
Heightened awareness of risks and impacts of terrorism
Some PPs spoke of increased willingness to report concerns, including ‘spikes in reports’ when  
major attacks occur ‘because these issues have become more prevalent’ [PP03, West Yorkshire] in  
public consciousness, especially when they hit close to home in local regions or neighbourhoods:
A lot of work that we do we uses anonymised real life case studies, and when we tell  
them that these are people that we know, that we’ve worked with, it makes it a little bit 
more real for them than just seeing a photograph on the television or in the newspaper. 
[PP06, West Yorkshire]
However, such reports are often driven by general community reporting that reflects cultural  
bias or stereotyping:‘“Oh, I saw two Muslim males walking down the street with a rucksack’” [PP03, West 
Yorkshire], rather than information provided by intimates. For those close to someone radicalising 
to violence, however, PPs thought the trigger was most often: ‘when loved ones have fled [overseas]. 
Or parents have caught young people online looking at extremist right-wing stuff and become really 
concerned, and they’ve tried to tackle it at home [without success]’. [PP03, West Yorkshire]
Love and concern for those at risk
The willingness to come forward for these reasons is related directly to love and care for the person 
of concern. As one practitioner recalled,
I dealt with a family where it was the father who reported their loved one going off  
[to fight in Syria]. For him it was – he had no option. Straight away he contacted police 
because he knew that if he didn’t, then that loved one would have eventually gone off to 
Syria. Luckily, we stopped that and [the father is] eternally grateful for that. On the other 
side, I’ve had families who have reported a loved one that was potentially getting more 
involved in extreme right-wing activity, so they reported it out of love, because they  
wanted that stopped and they needed that support. [PP03, West Yorkshire]
Messaging considerations to enhance community reporting
However, practitioners also felt that much more could be done to enhance willingness to come 
forward by focusing on improved communication strategies on these issues. There was a broad 
sense that the key messaging around reporting needed to be ‘the earlier, the better’ in terms of 
promoting the safeguarding aspects of preventing violent extremism and reducing the risk of 
arrest, imprisonment and potential death for those at risk. Over and over, practitioners emphasised 
the importance of stressing safety, protection and early intervention as the core elements of the 
messaging strategy:
Remember: report early because then we can safeguard. [PP01, Greater Manchester]
The fact that we would deal with it in a common-sense safeguarding manner,  
certainly if it’s early enough and they’ve not already committed offences,  
would help. [PP02, Greater Manchester]
One practitioner broadened this further to the issue of safety not only for the person at risk and 
the community, but also for those doing the reporting, saying it was vital to develop messaging 
about reporting that would create trust and: ‘confidence that they can submit the information and  
it will not come back on them, ever. That could be one way we can get information from somebody  
who would otherwise be fearful of ever contacting us.’ [PP04, West Yorkshire]
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PPs also called for a communication strategy that involves lifting the curtain on reporting 
processes in order to demystify safeguarding approaches:
I think when you see behind the scenes, when you draw back the curtain and show the 
possible response to [a report], people will believe it and buy into that a lot more. People 
will be far more likely to make a referral once they’ve seen what people are going to do 
with it. This demystifies the [referral] process and I think that that’s where we need to be 
at. I think it’s only by seeing behind the curtain as to what goes on that they have that 
confidence that actually it might be worth doing this early and getting them some help  
and support. [PP01, Greater Manchester]
Other concerns with messaging related to getting the balance right between offering safety and 
support during the reporting process on the one hand, and being transparent and honest about 
the possible outcomes of the process on the other. As in the Australian study, PPs spoke of the 
challenges of getting this balance right. In terms of safety and support, practitioners thought the 
messaging needs to be:
‘Anything that you say will be treated in confidence. But we will support and protect you’. 
You just want the communities to know, ‘We’re actually there to help you as much as  
we are to, we’re not there to get you, we’re there to help you.’ [PP03, West Yorkshire] 
People will lose confidence in the system if they can’t get a good response when they have 
got up the courage to share something or say what their concern is. The call might not 
even be that important from the CT point of view, but the key here is that it is important  
for the caller, and we need to recognise and respond to that. This is all part of building 
trusting relationships with community members. [PP05, West Yorkshire]
On the other hand, 
It’s about having increased awareness and understanding of the ramifications of the 
reporting and we can’t be dishonest about it, because if the reporting leads to serious 
offences they’ve got to be managed and if they’ve crossed the criminal line in a serious  
way they’re going to jail, if we can prove the offence. It’s a fact we can’t get away from.  
But this means that a key message to create confidence in people in the world of Prevent  
is geared up to early reporting. [PP04, West Yorkshire]
Personalising and localising the reporting process
Practitioners demonstrated keen awareness of the importance of personalised, face to face 
contact as a method of enhancing reporting confidence and comfort, and their comments 
reflected strong alignment with both UK community respondent reporting preferences and  
also with data from the Australian study. As PPs put it, the importance of being ‘a friendly 
understanding face’ [PP06, West Yorkshire] or a ‘known and trusted face’ [PP04, West Yorkshire] 
reinforces the understanding that reporting is most likely to occur in local contexts with  
‘known faces in known places’.
Instead of giving somebody the counter-terrorist hotline number if you’ve got information, 
actually going there and saying, ‘Well, I’m so-and-so, I’m Scottish and bald, I’ve got  
a beard. You know who I am, I’ve got a face’, I think it makes it that bit more intimate  
and easier to report stuff. [PP09, London]
[As a community practitioner I’d want to report in the context of] a relationship with 
someone, because these things can go terribly wrong. You wouldn’t just walk into a  
police station and say, ‘This is what I would like to report’. It has to be handled with 
sensitivity because there’s a real conversation to be had around whose agenda this is. 
[PP10, West Yorkshire]
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Practitioners’ comments above relating to localising and personalising the reporting process as 
a means of enhancing community reporting are borne out by their perceptions of how reporting 
channels function in terms of community reporting preferences.
Local reporting channels: community brokerage
A significant number of PPs referred to the relevance of what may be termed community 
brokerage in facilitating the transmission of concerns or information about someone 
radicalising to violence. Given the perception above that family and community members are 
less likely to go to the police at earlier stages of concern, community brokerage emerges as a 
key element in understanding and working with community perspectives on the ways in which 
reporting preferences and channels actually play out.
Community brokerage is a model of reporting transmission that allows those reporting to share 
concerns while retaining some sense of agency, trust and confidence in both the people and the 
informal processes they are using to bring their concerns forward, simultaneously ‘keeping it 
within the community’ while enabling information to be passed on from within the community  
to authorities at some degree of personal remove and through a staged process: 
They may speak to a trusted member of the community rather than coming to the police. 
A trusted member could be an elder, it could be the coach of a football club, or somebody 
who’s seen within that community as a person who can be trusted, somebody who knows 
things, seen as probably quite intelligent and has got maybe more exposure to the outside 
world than [the person reporting] would feel [they have]. [PP08, London] 
There are some good unofficial routes, and I know that my colleagues have similar 
experiences on other [police] divisions. You know, where there are people who are trusted. 
They’ll come through community leaders, or if there’s somebody that they can trust who’s 
working with the local authority. You don’t get reports direct through a community and 
they are very unlikely to use official routes. So we get them through the back door.  
[PP02, Greater Manchester]
The next channel of reporting discussed by PPs is at the level of local services and authorities. These 
reporting channels were widely commented on as being the most common sources of reporting 
from practitioner points of view, albeit the greater proportion of these are likely to come in through 
‘professional bystander’ reporting rather than through staged community reporting per se:
Speaking personally, I think a majority of our [Channel] referrals will come from education, 
schools, primary schools, and frontline workers in the social services or the local authority. 
[PP09, London]
[As police] we get the reports from partners. A little bit from the community but it is more 
from partner agencies, whether it be social care or through a local authority or through 
health. So although the police have a formal [role in receiving reports], there are different 
mechanisms. [PP03, West Yorkshire]
As part of the Prevent Duty now there are an awful lot of specified authorities such as 
education, the NHS. All those sorts of people are Prevent-trained, certainly in Greater 
Manchester, to make referrals into Channel. You would like to think people would be able 
to ask for advice from their local neighbourhood police officer or a local teacher at their 
kid’s school. Or their GP or someone on the committee at the local mosque perhaps, who 
would’ve had more involvement with the Prevent team and know how to put referrals in. 
[PP01, Greater Manchester]
Some PPs within local authorities spoke positively about having Channel Officers embedded within 
their local Safeguarding Hub, which they saw as helpful in creating more meaningful and efficient 
flow-through and assessment of information that can come from diverse locally-based reporting 
channels. However, not all practitioners were as sanguine about the image of Channel in the eyes 
of those who may want to come forward, noting: ‘When we talk to communities we don’t mention 
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Channel because we recognise it comes with a loaded set of media [coverage] where Channel might not 
have been as great as it could have been or where it’s been misrepresented in the media. … What we say  
is just get it through to the local authority’. [PP15, Greater Manchester]
Concerns with reporting channel functionality
However, while community brokerage and local authority brokerage were seen as reasonably 
effective in general, some practitioners raised concerns about a number of aspects concerning 
the functionality of various reporting channels. As we have already seen, some practitioners have 
doubts about the efficiency of information flow-through when it comes to frontline personnel who 
are charged under the Prevent Duty with bringing information forward to authorities for further 
assessment and follow-up:
Sometimes [someone with a statutory Prevent Duty] is aware of the process [through 
previous Prevent training] but they perhaps wouldn’t know what to do to refer somebody 
directly. They think, well my boss is the safeguarding lead. If I go and tell my boss that 
there’s something going on at least I know it’s gone in. So stuff does come through,  
but it’s not the open door that you want it to be. It’s stuff sneaking round the edges,  
a trickle-through. [PP02, Greater Manchester]
Others wanted to see greater standardising of processes for reporting concerns to combat  
‘different protocols in different boroughs’ [PP09, London] and variations across different local 
government areas that can make reporting channels less timely or reliable. Yet others called  
for simplifying and streamlining reporting processes to help enhance community awareness and 
understanding of what the reporting process actually involves and to strengthen confidentiality:
I think [we should be] simplifying the process, with more information in communities on 
reporting and how they will be protected when reporting. [This includes] using established 
community groups or faith organisations [as points of contact] because a lot of people 
have a lot of trust in faith organisations and will access those. Then to streamline things 
it’s easier just to pass everything onto the Channel Officer rather than everybody filling in 
various forms and keeping information. [It’s a better assurance of] confidentiality at the 
end of the day as well. [PP06, West Yorkshire]
PPs also raised the challenge of measuring the effectiveness of various reporting channels and 
mechanisms given the importance of anonymity to many people when bringing information 
forward, suggesting that reporting channels can be opaque even to those receiving the 
information in various agencies: ‘We don’t know how many people use [particular channels]  
because we don’t know how many people don’t use them, is what I’m trying to get at. So we don’t  
know the answer [as to how well they are working]’. [PP02, Greater Manchester]
Bringing the local and the national together
Ultimately, practitioners felt that the array of reporting channels available to community members 
for reporting on concerns about someone radicalising to violence was helpful. The key for many 
was the combination of broad national awareness through online or media campaigns about the 
importance of early reporting alongside local, accessible, face to face contact for those taking  
the first steps in coming forward to explore concerns:
You’ve got nationally marketed [reporting mechanisms] such as Crimestoppers, the 
anti-terrorism hotline, and obviously reporting via standard police systems like 101 or 
999. You’ve also got the national campaigns which we all promote, such as the Prevent 
Tragedies, Syrian mothers, etc. There is a contact officer film that people can go to online. 
But I think possibly more likely is that face-to-face ask for some advice that ends up 
coming in. I’d say those two things hand in hand, really [PP01, Greater Manchester]
The bottom line is that even if somebody reports through an app or through the web, 
somebody’s going to have to follow that up and have a conversation with them because,  
as with our children’s safeguarding [processes], you’d never get all the information you 
need from [the online referral form]. It needs more discussion, ‘Well, what do you mean  
by that?’ and so on. [PP13, Greater Manchester]  
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The mode of reporting generated lively discussion amongst PPs. While there was a strong 
emphasis above on the importance of face to face community and local services brokerage  
in enhancing the likelihood of community reporting, most comments on mode related to 
 the ins and outs of telephone and web-based reporting mechanisms. 
Face to face reporting modes
The key theme to emerge across PP views was the extent to which different reporting modes 
encouraged or inhibited community perceptions of trustworthiness, safety and confidence in the 
process. For this reason, face to face reporting was seen as highly desirable by some practitioners 
because it means those reporting are:
In a position to be able to ask some of the key questions that will help then the inquiry 
further down. It’s all packaged in a safeguarding context, that this is a safe space, you can 
do this reporting here. And this takes out [concern about] the notion of a terrorist hotline 
altogether, it takes out the fear that you may have police arriving round at somebody’s 
door or your own door because they want to ask you more questions, which is what  
[those reporting] don’t want. [PP08, London]
The national Anti-Terrorism Hotline
On the subject of the national Anti-Terrorist Hotline (ATH), practitioner views were mixed 
but tended towards more negative assessments of its efficacy in the context of intimates 
reporting. Strong concerns were articulated by practitioners around the intimidating or traceable 
nature of the hotline and the likely chilling effect this would have on people’s willingness to use  
the service, particularly at the critical point of facilitating early intervention:
The counter-terrorism hotline is anonymous but people are not confident that that’s the  
case, because people know if you use your mobile phone then you leave a digital print.  
If anybody wanted to really know who’s made that call it’s possible. So if we want to 
encourage more people to be confident they can tell us something with it being totally 
anonymous, then electronic devices are a challenge. [PP04, West Yorkshire]
Who would you rather report something to? The counter-terrorism hotline where you’re 
thinking, ‘My god’, or instead, ‘I know so-and-so from the police, I know that PCSO,  
actually I’m going to give them a call or email them.’ [PP03, West Yorkshire]
When you give this counter-terrorist hotline number I think it’s probably seen as this  
beast that perhaps people will be scared to phone. I mean people are scared to phone 999  
at the best of times, let alone a number that says ‘counter-terrorist hotline number’.  
[PP09, London]
Practitioners were much more supportive of working through local reporting mechanisms that 
allow for staged responses to avoid unnecessary escalation to a formal counter-terrorism 
response. This view was underwritten by the perspective that counter-terrorism and Prevent are 
two different strategies and that Prevent efforts require different tools for both communities and 
practitioners. As one practitioner observed, this can help enhance trust and confidence for callers 
without compromising safety or risk:
We advise people about our [local authority] hub number, which is a local number.  
It’s a non-threatening option for a lot of people because it’s a landline number and they 
know that it’s going to be one of us at the end of the phone, so they can have an informal 
discussion with us before it goes any further. If there is an immediate threat, we advise 
people to ring the police. [PP06, West Yorkshire]
Other practitioners questioned whether complacency or misunderstanding about the role of the 
national counter-terrorism hotline undermined the early prevention work with which Prevent 
initiatives are centrally concerned:
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I think there’s an expectation that people will use the counter-terrorist hotline, but people 
will not equate [early or intuitive concerns or suspicions] to terrorism, so why would you 
contact the terrorist hotline? I think we’re expecting a lot from communities and we’re 
not giving them the right tools that they can use to do this: through safe contact places, 
through appropriate telephone lines that people can ring in to with concerns, through just 
understanding what it actually means to make a phone call or raise a concern. The stuff 
we’re talking about around Prevent is not about stopping a terrorist attack. What we’re 
trying to do is disrupt that journey at an earlier stage and we need people to have the 
confidence to do that at a much earlier stage. [PP08, London]
Police telephone reporting lines 999 and 101
Beyond the issues raised about the national counter-terrorism hotline, practitioners also had 
mixed views on the efficacy of reporting using crime reporting lines such as 999 and 101. While 
some practitioners said they felt that both 999 – ‘if it’s urgent’ – and 101 ‘if it’s non-urgent but people 
would still like the police to be aware of something’– were the most likely ‘route if people are going to 
report’ [PP04, West Yorkshire], others felt that the variable quality of information and the absence 
of capacity to probe for further information or develop trusting relationships rendered these 
services problematic:
The information we get through can be pretty poor and not give a complete picture 
because [over the phone] we haven’t had the opportunity to press the person giving the 
details for more information or for some kind of corroboration or further evidence as to 
what their concerns are. A lot of the time it will just be, ‘This is my concern and that’s  
it, that’s all the information I wish to give’. Sometimes with the 101 operator as well,  
there will be limitations to what the information has been. And the 101 operator is  
more likely to be primed to deal with an ongoing criminal incident [rather than a 
preliminary or tentative reporting contact]. [PP08, London]
Whatever phone line was used for reporting, however, practitioners stressed that it must  
be available on a 24/7 basis; avoid using automated call routing to prevent the ‘leaky pipeline’  
of people second-guessing their decision to report while they are waiting for an actual  
person to answer the phone, and should preferably be a Freephone number staffed by  
well-trained non-police personnel that facilitates streamlined community sharing of  
early, non-imminent concerns:
You’ve got Crimestoppers but you’re not saying this is criminality, you’ve got the  
counter-terrorist hotline which is terrorism, but this is in a pre-criminal space,  
so I always thought there was a benefit in having a central hotline number  
[in the pre-crime, early intervention space] that wasn’t CT, wasn’t terrorism,  
wasn’t criminality. [PP08, London]
Online and social media reporting
Online reporting was seen as relevant primarily for young people and with the potential to  
exclude those from different language backgrounds or levels of knowledge and confidence  
with digital technology. Some practitioners were wary of online reporting because they thought  
it would unnecessarily ‘complicate the issue’ of how to report; as one practitioner put it, ‘If somebody 
came up with a good idea I’d consider it, but I can’t think of anything adding to the methods already there.’ 
[PP04, West Yorkshire]
Only one practitioner mentioned a potentially ‘big role’ [PP06, West Yorkshire] for social media  
apps aimed at young people and connected to reporting, situated within a broader array of  
app-based information and services related to keeping young people safe in relation to 
radicalisation to violent extremism.
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The major theme to emerge from practitioner interviews on the question of support  
before, during and after reporting for those who come forward with information or  
concerns revolved around the absence of any identified formal support mechanisms  
either within or outside the Prevent framework.
Some practitioners spoke of ad-hoc support measures undertaken by individual Prevent Officers, 
depending on practice orientation, capacity and willingness to offer this:
I know the investigating officer and the family liaison [officer] would be quite supportive 
and making sure that there’s no media attention and that it be kept confidential. So we 
would probably go [to the family involved] and [we’d ask], ‘Are you okay? What support do 
you need? What agencies are involved with you at the moment?’ It might be that we have 
to draw on our colleagues from different agencies because we’ve thought, ‘Actually, mum 
needs support here really’, and I will make a referral or [source] a contact and find out what 
support mum can [access]. Although there’s nothing formal, it’s something that we would 
do anyway. [PP03, West Yorkshire]
[In terms of support for those who have reported], it’s more of an informal unstructured 
thing that we’re talking about, not a formalised process; it would be down to the individuals 
and the relationship and the strength of the information. … But it isn’t part of a formal 
process, and it doesn’t always happen. [PP04, West Yorkshire]
Other PPs mentioned home visits to explain reporting processes [PP06, West Yorkshire] new 
training for Prevent contact offers to help deal with ‘sensitive family issues’ [PP04, West Yorkshire], 
and the development of already well-established family liaison officer roles with a ‘specific edge 
on Prevent’ [ PP04, West Yorkshire] in terms of assessing the impact of reports and consequent 
investigations on families. 
However, as some PP contributions suggested, the line between offering support to individuals 
or families who may be vulnerable as a consequence of coming forward, and offering support 
in aid of further intelligence-gathering as a technique for gaining trust and cooperation, can 
sometimes be murky. This occurs when genuine concern for the support needs of those who 
share information about intimates cannot be distinguished from strategic efforts to gather more 
information – for example, when families are given ‘day and night’ phone numbers on which to 
ring investigating officers not only if they need support but also to pass on intelligence about 
contact made with loved ones at risk or involved in violent extremist activity. As one PP said,  
‘The honest answer is I would try to get as much out of them as I possibly could’.
Validation and reassurance
Most PPs, however, felt that genuinely empathetic and reassuring support from investigating 
police was crucial and should be offered right ‘from the outset’ to those coming forward with 
concerns. This included both validating their coming forward regardless of the ‘quality’ of 
the report and also reassuring people that the response to their concerns would not be 
disproportionate:
People should be reassured that they are doing the right thing by reporting their  
concerns, and that they will be taken seriously, even when what they are reporting is 
‘rubbish’, because it might not be rubbish the next time that they report. So there is a  
need to build the relationship. It is about the right personality, and the need to show 
empathy. Officers need to ‘chill out’ and not to be thinking about the points to pressure  
in a statement or legal points to pursue, but rather to just chat with the person and to  
go slow. [PP05, West Yorkshire] 
[You need] to reassure them that we are very grateful for the information, that they’ve 
done the right thing and we will act appropriately and in context with the situation,  
as opposed to smashing a door in because somebody’s been looking at something  
on a video. [PP04, West Yorkshire]
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People should be 
reassured that they are 
doing the right thing by 
reporting their concerns, 
and that they will be taken 
seriously, even when 
what they are reporting is 
‘rubbish’, because it might 
not be rubbish the next 
time that they report. 
[PP05, West Yorkshire]
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Tailoring support for individual circumstances
They also pointed to the importance of tailoring support for specific circumstances, including 
being mindful of practical as well as emotional support relating to the need to protect those 
reporting from exposure to others in the community; for example: ‘If it is a family member that  
is being reported then you may have to deal with [support in relation to] the house being searched,  
the street being closed’. [PP05, West Yorkshire]. Other practitioners commented:
So the support might be different [depending on each individual] but [the political 
orientation] wouldn’t make that much difference [i.e. whether they were reporting  
on jihadist, far-right or other violent extremist concerns]. The support would be  
tailor-made for that individual. [PP03, West Yorkshire]
Some PPs observed, however, that not everyone will welcome such support and that this  
depends heavily on the individual case or circumstances of the report:
If the subject engages with you and they [accept] a degree of support, e.g. they have  
the parent in, they get extra mental health support, you get them better accommodation 
and what they need to put their lives right, then great, they’re going to think that it was  
a positive process. If, however, the subject tells you to sod off – in the end it’s voluntary.  
So if they tell you to sod off and we’re not [able to be] involved, it’s going to be quite  
difficult to do too much with the person. [PP01, Greater Manchester]
Support means protecting those who come forward
Most of all, however, a critical element of support for many practitioners meant putting a premium 
on the protection and confidentiality of those who report. The professional obligation to provide 
support through ‘protecting a source’ was highly important to many practitioners, whether this 
meant protecting them from backlash and ostracism by other family or community members; 
protecting them from media attention and intrusion; protecting them from shame and exposure 
to neighbours, or protecting their relationships with the intimates on whom they were reporting. 
The commitment to manifesting support through protecting those who share information from 
various forms of social harm was a dominant and deeply held concern for many practitioners,  
as the following statements indicate:
If somebody comes to you and they want to report and they say, ‘They cannot know  
it’s me that’s made this report’, and there’s no way we can disguise the fact – say it’s 
someone’s mum who knows he’s keeping something in his bedroom, okay? Then we  
can’t act upon that. We will not drop her in it. [PP02, Greater Manchester]
For instance, if it was a daughter reporting her father who was involved in extreme  
right-wing activity, we’d obviously have to consider her safety, because they’re living  
within the same family home or the same dynamic or the same area as the person at  
risk. We’d have to make sure that the daughter was definitely protected. Sometimes  
we have to make that call in terms of the information that we get. We have to be  
quite sensitive as to how we can [avoid] identifying the source so there’s kind of  
no leakage. [PP03, West Yorkshire]
Impacts for those reporting
Continuing the theme of protecting those who report from various social harms related  
to coming forward with concerns about an intimate’s involvement in violent extremism,  
most PP comments on the actual and anticipated impacts of reporting focused on similar  
issues. Practitioners recognised the potential trauma and vulnerability that can emerge as  
a consequence of reporting, particularly for people unused to contact with authorities:
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It’s really hard because if you’ve got somebody that’s never had any contact with the police, 
then all of a sudden this happens, you know? Their world is absolutely turned upside down.  
I’ve seen families where they’ve suffered from mental health, sleep deprivation, exhaustion  
[in the aftermath of a terrorism investigation], and I wouldn’t want anyone to go through 
that. [PP03, West Yorkshire]
PPs also spoke of the importance of minimising reporting impacts through reducing, where 
possible, potential exposure of those who share information and also impacts on the broader 
community by behaving with tactical discretion and confidentiality:
We are very conscious of the impact of our actions as police. If we have to go and arrest 
somebody, it may just be one member of the family but when you’ve got masses of police 
in uniform, you’ve got the street closed off, you might have the helicopter in the sky, then 
the impact on that family, that street, that community, is massive. If we can get in, do 
what we need to do and get out without anybody realising the police have been in, that 
is the number one preferred option because it has less impact and it gives people more 
confidence that we are only doing what we have to do because we have no choice. Then 
that [police-community] barrier is more likely to have been broken down, because they can 
go out on the street that day and people are not saying, ‘Why are the police at your house? 
Are you a terrorist?’ which is a massive thing. [PP04, West Yorkshire]
And they were highly aware of the negative impact on future reporting if people felt they had been 
unnecessarily or carelessly exposed as bringing concerns or information forward:
[There is the impact of] exposure if it came out that it was them who actually reported, the 
consequences and repercussions for themselves as well. You know, what are the safeguards 
for them? That not only stops that person from ever doing it again, but other people will 
think, oh no, I don’t want to get involved in anything. [PP06, West Yorkshire]
However, PPs also acknowledged that sometimes, the impacts of reporting cannot help but realise 
people’s worst fears about the consequences for the loved ones on whom they are reporting:
We may have to arrest people. They may end up going to jail. But that may be necessary  
to stop somebody else getting hurt or somebody else travelling to a location where they’ll 
end up ultimately dead. That’s what we’re there to do, to stop bad things happening. 
[PP04, West Yorkshire]
Confidentiality versus transparency
The final section drawing on practitioner data involves their views on how to handle the issue 
of what family and community members expect in the aftermath of sharing information with 
authorities.
How do practitioners reconcile the need for protecting the confidentiality and integrity of 
investigation and case management processes on the one hand (which includes protecting 
these processes but also the confidentiality of people identified as being at risk) with the 
need to keep those who share information out of care and concern as informed as possible 
about reporting outcomes and consequences? This emerged as the major issue when PPs 
considered the issue of what communities expect in the aftermath of coming forward,  
and how they are best able to respond to these expectations.
Many practitioners indicated both understanding of and sympathy for the anxiety that can beset 
those who report on intimates, and the vulnerability they experience after they have ceded control 
of the information or concerns they have shared with authorities. PPs returned to the theme of 
respecting the implied social contract between those who report and those who receive reported 
information for both ethical and pragmatic reasons, even when this is done informally:
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Personally, if somebody does tell me something and I know who they are I would endeavour 
– maybe not immediately but at some point – to say, ‘Thank you very much. We did take it 
on board, you might not see anything happening but please be aware that we do take your 
information seriously. You might think we’ve just ignored it; we haven’t, but there’s other 
things we have to consider’, to try to put things into context for them. [PP04, West Yorkshire]
People do need to know [the outcomes of the reports they make]. Sometimes there’s 
nothing in it but we would then like to tell them why they were right to refer it anyway.  
We always say, ‘There’s no such thing as a wrong referral’, because there is always the  
next one. We don’t want the next one to not happen. So it might be, ‘We’re not going to  
take this any further but this is why’, and we’ll tell them what we can. Sometimes it might 
be, ‘You know what, we’ve had to get this person involved with an intervention provider  
to give them a new narrative, thank you very much.’ [PP02, Greater Manchester]
Because if you don’t give them any feedback the likelihood is that they’ll think, well there’s 
no point in me reporting things because it doesn’t go anywhere anyway. So I think that 
communication needs to be there, whatever decisions get made, whether or not it goes 
any further. To give them that confidence, ‘Oh yeah, they’re alright, them, if I need to make 
another referral I’ll do it again’. Whereas if they were just ignored and don’t know what’s 
happened… [PP06, West Yorkshire]
A number of practitioners also mentioned formal feedback mechanisms when Prevent and 
Channel personnel are involved in the reporting chain. These involved systems including case 
management mechanisms such as six-monthly case reviews designed to allow Prevent and 
Channel coordinators to provide those reporting with general updates on where things are at:
You tell them, ‘These are my details, I’ll keep you as informed as I can. If you think you want 
to know something ring me and if I can answer your question I will, but I promise I’ll get 
back to you’. We do get on to our investigators and ask, ‘Can we speak to our informant 
yet? Can we let them know what’s happening?’ There’s got a little box [within the case 
management system]: ‘Have you got back to the person who referred it and let them 
know?’ [PP02, Greater Manchester]
There is a six-month review [following an initial referral to Prevent/Channel]. The referrer 
will then be invited in again to receive an update on where we’re at, for example ‘the case 
is closed’ or ‘this is the intervention that’s being provided. So they’re kept informed in  
that way. [PP06, West Yorkshire]
However, PPs were also clear about the limitations that govern what they can and can’t share with 
those who have initially brought forward concerns. As PPs from different regions described the 
feedback process:
We wouldn’t go into any in-depth conversation about the intervention that somebody 
on the Channel programme has been given, or about an investigation, because that 
information’s confidential. But at least we would get back to the reporting person, and say 
thank you for allowing us to do our jobs and credit to you, you’re the reason that person’s 
been stopped, so we really, really appreciate that. But that’s about it. [PP03, West Yorkshire]
Sometimes there might be good reason why we can’t tell people [about outcomes], and 
that is life. So [we could use] a general improvement in feeding back to people, but with  
a recognition that we might not always be able to do it, especially in our line of work. 
[PP01, Greater Manchester]
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These practitioners recognised that such constraints could prove highly frustrating for those who 
come forward and suggested there could be some improvement in how these limitations were 
handled: ‘The difficulty is people always want to know what exactly has gone on, and we can’t do that. 
Because you don’t give them the ins and outs, they’ll say, ‘Well, we never got to hear anything’, and actually 
maybe our responses could be a little bit more encouraging. But we can only give limited information and I 
know people get frustrated’. [PP03, West Yorkshire]
Some who report on intimates: ‘are perfectly happy [with being contacted after sharing information]. 
We keep them as informed as we can’ [PP02, Greater Manchester]. However, several practitioners 
noted that not everyone who reports is interested in or even receptive to being kept up to date 
by authorities, particularly if they are feeling raw or remorseful about their role in relation to 
a reporting outcome such as arrest or imprisonment for an intimate. PPs also connected the 
likelihood of receiving information about reporting outcomes to the mode of reporting that  
people have chosen, noting that those who report anonymously to a hotline or online cannot  
be informed of the impacts or outcomes of their report unless they are ‘reading it in the paper, 
maybe’. [PP01, Greater Manchester]
Improvements to the process of sharing reporting outcomes with those  
who come forward
However, police-based practitioners had several ideas for how they could improve responsiveness 
to community desires for reporting outcomes after coming forward. The most concrete of  
these was the suggestion that those who receive concerns or information shared by family  
and community members are explicit in asking people what their expectations about follow-up 
information and also support are, for example: ‘I want to be kept as informed as possible’, ‘I don’t 
want to be contacted again’, ‘I want confidentiality but I’m willing to stay involved as long as no 
one knows’, ‘I want support for the person I’m concerned about, I do/don’t need any support for 
myself’, and so on. Practitioners canvassing this approach felt there was room to improve the 
protocols used in Prevent, policing and local authority responses to information shared by families 
and community members by factoring these kinds of questions in to their recording systems.
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Process Mapping:  
Community and Practitioner 
Understandings 
In this section we offer a condensed flow-chart of how both community respondents and 
professional practitioners understand the processes and dynamics involved in community 
reporting. We have clustered the various ‘activity’ types and preferences of reporting processes  
and pathways for community respondents as individual activity and interaction, networked activity 
and interaction, informal activity and interaction and formal activity and interaction to help better 
identify some of the key relational dynamics that occur in reporting stages and pathways.
We can see from the community respondent 
process mapping below that individual informal 
activities are the most prevalent features of 
reporting pathways in the pre-reporting phase, 
whereas networked informal activities and 
interactions are most prevalent in the reporting 
phase, whilst networked formalactivities become 
more important in the post-reporting phase. 
These accord closely with the staged process 
identified in the discussion of community 
reporting data above.
Correspondingly, professional practitioners 
had a similar understanding of how community 
reporting behaviours and actions develop and 
proceed with some variations, mostly involving 
the ‘back of house’ roles in reporting chains 
and relationships between those under the 
Prevent Duty and the Prevent Strategy more 
broadly. Practitioners identified a similar 
movement from individual informal activities 
through to both networked informal and 
networked formal interactions, culminating  
(if warranted) in formal reporting activity 
either by community members or front-
line professional practitioners and their 
organisations to Prevent Coordinators. 
Their understanding also reflects the 
forking pathways that different community 
respondents may take within the ‘networked 
interactions’ phase of sharing concerns  
about intimates with others.
Pre-reporting
1.   Conducts independent research/intelligence 
gathering online or through private  
conversations to learn more about specific 
groups or ideologies with which intimate  
appeared to be aligned (individual, informal)
2.   Attempts to personally dissuade the 
intimate from course of violent action  
(individual, informal) and/or
3.   Mobilises intimate-focused family and  
intra-community resources (peers/friends,  
parents and/or other relatives, religious or 
community leaders or influencers) to help  
dissuade the intimate (networked, informal)
Thresholds for reporting
1.   Intimate refuses to listen or engage, 
respond to others’ interventions; attempts 
to dissuade are unsuccessful (individual 
and/or networked, informal)
2.   Respondent believes can no longer cope 
with knowledge/concerns on own and  
seeks assistance/support from authorities  
(FROM individual TO networked)
3.   Respondent assesses risk or harm to 
intimate and/or to others as imminent 
and/or severe and proceeds directly to 
authorities (individual, informal)
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78 Community Reporting Process Mapping: Community and Practitioner Understandings 
Reporting conduit preferences 
A.  Most likely 1:  A relative (own and/or the 
intimate’s) (individual, informal)
  Most likely 2:  Friends of the reporter 
(but not mutual friends of both reporter  
and intimate) (individual, informal) 
 Most likely 3:   tied preferences
  3a.  A trusted community leader/figure 
(networked, informal) (but Muslim women 
less likely to turn to a community leader due to 
perceived lack of representativeness for women)
  3b.  Local police (networked, informal  
or formal) 
B.  Somewhat likely 1: Local authority/council 
(networked, informal or formal)
  Somewhat likely 2: A teacher  
(networked, informal)
  Somewhat likely 3: A community leader 
(networked, informal)
C. Least likely 1: MI5 (networked, formal)
  Least likely 2: Local GP (networked, informal)
  Least likely 3: Telephone hotline 
(individual, informal or formal)
Reporting mode preferences
Most preferred: Face to face with local police, not 
counter-terrorism specialists (networked, formal)
Somewhat preferred: Specialist telephone 
hotline for advice and support, but NOT the  
Anti-Terrorism Hotline or 999 (individual, 
informal or formal)
Least preferred: Online and social media  
apps (networked, formal)
2.  Express train reporting: minority of respondents, but especially where threat is deemed imminent or where high  
level of confidence in police efficacy to intervene exists. This is likely to be a local pathway but in some instances 
may be a nationally supported pathway. This route goes directly, possibly after an initial stop to seek family/
community guidance, to local police contacts. (Individual, formal)
Reporting pathways
1.  Local train reporting: majority of respondents, especially with no imminent threat of violent action. This is  
a local reporting pathway. Main stops along this route include informal sharing of concerns with relatives  
(own and intimate’s), trusted community leaders/figures, local authorities, teachers, then potential formal  
reporting to local police. (Individual, networked, informal, formal)
Post-reporting
1.   Majority of respondents clearly want and expect 
to be kept informed of reporting outcome and 
impacts for intimate – this is seen as a form of 
support and validation through a feedback loop 
instigated by authorities (networked, formal)
2.   Almost all respondents place a high premium  
on confidentiality by authorities relating to  
their reporting role (individual, formal)
3.   Validation, reassurance, respect, honesty 
and empathy are the key modes of support 
behaviours most valued by respondents 
(networked, informal, formal)
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1.   Self-directed research on the internet and 
through trusted local information sources 
(individual, informal)
2.   Networked interactions to address or  
resolve concern
 a.   Information, advice and support seeking 
from ‘known faces in known places’  
(local authorities, social workers, schools, 
GPs, child welfare, community leaders) 
(networked activity, informal), OR
 b.   Share concerns indirectly through local 
community brokers or intermediaries  
(networked activity, informal), OR
 c.   Share concerns directly with local or 
national police channels, bypassing local  
networks (reporting activity, formal)
3.  Information relay by Prevent Duty  
personnel and/or community intermediaries 
to local Prevent Coordinators (networked 
activity, formal)
4.  Formal report to police by Prevent 
Coordinator if deemed warranting further 
investigation (reporting activity, formal)
Professional 
practitioner 
mapping of 
community 
reporting 
processes
3.  Local bus reporting: minority of respondents, may get on and off the reporting pathway at various points. This is a 
local reporting/pause in reporting pathway characterised by both boarding and disembarkation at various 
stages depending on: perceptions that local social influence has succeeded in deterring intimate; doubts about 
validity of concerns; lack of clarity about to whom to report or share concerns; doubts or anxiety about consequences 
for intimate, self, family or community, and/or unease with accountability or trustworthiness of local processes for 
reporting. This pathway may still ultimately result in formal reporting but is less likely to do so compared to local  
train or express train reporting above. (Individual, networked, informal, potentially formal)
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Future Considerations
Aims and  
objectives of  
the research
In this final section we identify learning points and conclusions identified from the data relating to 
each of our research aims and objectives. This enables us to focus on a number of areas for future 
consideration and direction in relation to effective policy and practice that can better encourage, 
enable and support community sharing of concerns around intimates to prevent them becoming 
involved in violent extremism.
The research aims and objectives for this study 
were as follows:
1.   Identifying triggers, thresholds and barriers 
for when someone would consider reporting;
2.   Understanding more from participants’ 
perspectives about the experience and 
process of (considering) reporting on an 
individual or group who may be involved 
in, or actively supporting involvement in, 
overseas conflicts, or violent extremism 
(including far-right extremism);
3.   Understanding the experiences and 
perspectives of professional practitioners 
– both those involved in the police and 
Prevent and those representing community 
organisations – around the current reality of 
community reporting and what approaches 
could encourage and facilitate greater 
community sharing of concerns and;
4.   Developing from the data usable insights 
for government and community agencies 
in future community-focused policies, 
strategies and campaigns around 
facilitating and encouraging community 
reporting related to violent extremism.
With regards to identifying the triggers, 
thresholds and barriers for when someone 
would consider reporting a person ‘intimate’ 
to them, it is clear that each of the research 
scenarios raised authentic, troubling and 
serious concerns for all respondents. Here, 
considering what to do and whether to 
share their concerns with the authorities 
raised difficult, burdensome and often 
conflictual feelings and emotions for almost 
all respondents. One of the first responses 
to the scenarios often involved respondents’ 
need to collect further information, usually 
through talking to the ‘intimate’ in an effort 
to determine the veracity of what they had 
learned and gauge how seriously involved 
they were, or as an opportunity to challenge 
or reason with the views and beliefs they were 
espousing as a first step in deciding how to 
proceed. Here, community respondents were 
overwhelmingly motivated by care and concern 
for the welfare of the intimate, suggesting  
that this can act as both a push and pull  
factor towards or away from reporting. 
One key issue for many respondents was 
deciding the threshold upon which they would 
raise the alarm and share their concerns with 
authorities. This often presented difficulties 
in thinking through the implications for 
community respondents, particularly in 
balancing the need for confidence that 
their concern was valid, whilst avoiding the 
potentially grave consequences brought  
about by failing to act. For some, this threshold 
remained high and involved a consideration 
of whether the actions under consideration 
were illegal (active law-breaking) or presented 
an imminent threat of violence. For others, 
however, earlier reporting was considered in  
an effort to seek help and support from 
authorities to stem further escalation or  
harm both by and for the intimate.
There were a number of barriers for community 
respondents as they considered reporting a 
concern to the authorities. These included 
concerns about harming the friendship with 
or the welfare of the intimate; the reporter 
getting ‘into trouble’ or somehow implicating 
themselves; and an insufficient knowledge 
about when to report and how to go about 
sharing a concern or suspicion. For all these 
reasons, many respondents said they would 
first want to seek advice on making a decision 
to report from a trusted close friend or 
relative. However, the utilitarian calculation 
of preventing potential greater harms to 
wider society by failing to acting was a key 
consideration in preparing to report.
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Our data and conclusions around understanding 
more from participants’ perspectives about 
the experience and process of (considering) 
reporting covers two distinct stages. First, 
we explored the likely experiences, concerns 
and expectations for respondents as they 
made the significant step towards reporting 
to the police (or deciding not to), alongside 
the channels/conduits they would choose to 
use and their preferred modes of reporting. 
Following this grave step of formally reporting 
someone ‘intimate’ to them, what would their 
expectations be about what could and should 
happen next, and what impacts did they expect 
their act of reporting to have?
The overwhelming motivation for reporting  
by community respondents is care and concern 
for the ‘intimate’, even if the act damages the 
relationship/friendship, a key finding very much 
echoing findings from the earlier Australian study. 
Alongside this are strong moral and ethical 
rationales about a wider social/civic duty to 
report concerns around such a potentially 
serious issue.
For most respondents, the police are clearly 
the best placed people to deal with such 
situations. However, given the gravity of 
reporting someone close to them, virtually all 
respondents would first go through a staged 
process of attempting to personally dissuade 
the intimate and/or drawing on others close 
to them within their community to intervene 
before eventually, and often reluctantly, 
reporting to the police. The assistance sought 
from others within the family, friendship group 
and community took varied forms, including 
advice on what to do as well as bringing into 
play emotional aspects such as receiving 
reassurance that could mutually reinforce 
and validate the seriousness of the behaviour 
or intentions they were worried about. As 
part of this staged process of reporting, many 
community respondents would first draw on 
family members and/or close mutual friends, 
sometimes followed by trusted figures in the 
community (‘community leaders’), to get 
further support, advice and guidance on how 
to proceed before reporting formally. However, 
the existence and reality of who is actually 
included in the category of ‘community 
leaders’, and how genuinely representative 
they may be, is disputed by some respondents, 
particularly women.
Within the staged reporting process, threshold 
judgments are crucial, with respondents willing 
to report directly to the police once they judge 
that the situation has passed beyond a certain 
point of seriousness and/or tangible evidence. 
However, such threshold judgments are 
difficult in the making and often far from clear.
Community respondents were also asked 
whether they would consider sharing concerns 
with or drawing advice from professionals. 
Young adults expressed willingness to 
consider talking to teachers or lecturers, but 
all respondents were dubious about sharing 
concerns with GPs/Health staff, whom they 
saw as inappropriate or lacking subject matter 
knowledge about these issues. They were 
also uncertain about the practicalities of 
approaching local government.
In approaching the police (which virtually all 
respondents would be willing to do at some 
point, and which would be the first option  
for some), an overwhelming majority of 
respondents wanted to report to their local police, 
not counter-terrorism specialists. Alongside  
this, an overwhelming majority of community 
respondents also wanted to report to the local 
police through face-to-face means, so they could 
judge the reactions of those receiving the 
report before proceeding further or deciding 
not to continue with their reporting. The 
chief reasons for face to face reporting were 
respondents wanting to assess how seriously 
their concerns were being taken and actioned, 
and wanting to have the opportunity for 
questions about implications (for the reporter, 
the intimate and others) and what might 
happen next.
Reflecting this clear and strong preference  
for face-to-face reporting, telephone modes  
of reporting, including the national Anti-
Terrorism Hotline, were largely seen as 
unhelpful or inappropriate for something  
not defined as an emergency, whilst the 
security and confidentiality of the internet  
and social media modes were often not 
trusted or seen as insufficiently interactive.
The overwhelming 
motivation for reporting 
by community 
respondents is care 
and concern for the 
‘intimate’, even if the act 
damages the relationship/
friendship, a key finding 
very much echoing 
findings from the earlier 
Australian study.
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Despite this overwhelming willingness to 
report an ‘intimate’ to the police, if the 
situation appeared to be serious enough, many 
respondents would feel guilty about reporting. 
It was often seen as a betrayal of someone 
close to them, even though respondents are 
clear that reporting would be for the intimate’s 
own good, a decidedly preferable outcome 
for someone they care about than turning 
a blind eye and not reporting. They would 
also be anxious and fearful at the possible 
ramifications of reporting for the reporter 
themselves, the intimate, the families of both 
the reporters and the intimate, and their 
wider local community because of concerns 
about stigma and shame. However, many 
respondents said they would also feel relief 
that their concerns had been shared, alongside 
pride at doing the ‘right thing’ by reporting to 
the police.
Much of the public discourse about community 
reporting focuses on the lack of community 
reporting of extremism involvement and how 
to encourage greater reporting. There is much 
less consideration of what happens for all 
concerned after a report is made, particularly 
about an ‘intimate’– what do those reporting 
experience, what do they hope for and need? 
What happens, and what should happen, after 
reporting is a very significant consideration for 
most community respondents. 
Many identified concerns about the negative, 
collective impacts of reporting, including the 
different forms of anticipated or experienced 
‘backlash’ against those concerned. Some 
respondents were concerned that if they 
reported, such backlash might come from 
the extremist group or network themselves, 
although the more common concern was 
about receiving a negative reaction, open 
hostility or even ostracism from wider members 
of their own community. A different but 
important concern for a significant number 
of Muslim respondents was a backlash from 
the wider society and the media, adding to 
negative stereotypes enveloping entire Muslim 
communities. Here, the concern over the 
impact of bringing a further case of violent 
extremist involvement to potential public 
attention was a social, collective one, based  
on the fear that it would be a further stick to 
beat Muslim communities with.
This means that how the police and the 
authorities handle reports of violent extremist 
involvement and/or activity and talk publicly 
about these can play an important role. 
Despite these concerns, countering societal 
stereotypes is one of the motivations for 
Muslim respondents to do their ‘civic duty’ and 
report. Respondents wanted both reassurance 
and protection as they reported, highlighting 
the need for genuine confidentiality and good 
communication from the authorities. Respondents 
had additional concerns about the individual 
impact of reporting to authorities, the potential 
risk of they themselves being criminalised for 
their association with the intimate reported  
(or some other similar act or omission). Here, 
being given official recognition (on a private 
basis) and credit for their role in reporting 
would assure respondents that they won’t  
face accusations, or suspicions by association, 
in the future.
The large majority (although not all) of 
community respondents want to be kept 
informed of developments after reporting 
to the police– they want reporting to be a 
two-way process, with a ‘feedback loop’ to 
them about what happened; the status of the 
investigation and what will or might happen 
next. Such a feedback loop to community 
reporters would be effective in a number of 
ways: it would assure the reporter that they had 
reported to the right place, that their report 
was not inappropriate, and that despite their 
personal turmoil they had done the right thing; 
it would reinforce the reporter’s dominant 
motivation of care and concern for the 
intimate, and these things in turn can further 
bolster and positively develop community/
police relationships of trust through the 
embodiment of partnership and respect. This 
preference suggests a partnership approach to 
community reporting that treats and supports 
community reporters as equal partners, not  
as one-off informants.
These findings confirm many aspects of the 
Australian study’s original results. In terms 
of community perspectives, the primary 
reporting motivation of care and concern for 
an intimate; the strong preference for face to 
face reporting; the initial seeking of counsel 
advice from friends, relatives and community 
figures as part of the decision-making 
process; the antipathy to nationally delivered, 
terrorism-focused hotlines and the mistrust of 
digital reporting mechanisms; the relevance 
of trust and accountability when dealing with 
authorities; and the expectations and needs 
regarding information-sharing and feedback 
in the post-reporting phase are all virtually 
identical to the views expressed by Australian 
community respondents.
However, a key difference from the Australian 
data is the greater willingness shown by British 
respondents to reporting directly to local 
police, whereas Australian participants ranked 
local police as a low preference for sharing 
initial concerns. Another obvious difference 
is the structural and procedural scaffolding 
that is in place through implementation of the 
Prevent Strategy, the Channel programme and 
Conclusions and Future Considerations
What happens, and 
what should happen, 
after reporting is a very 
significant consideration 
for most community 
respondents. 
This preference suggests 
a partnership approach 
to community reporting 
that treats and supports 
community reporters as 
equal partners, not as 
one-off informants.
83 Community Reporting Thresholds
the Prevent Duty’s focus on safeguarding, with 
little equivalence in the Australian context at 
the time the original study was conducted. A 
final shared perspective, however, across both 
countries relates to the damaging impact of 
negative or biased media coverage of Muslim 
communities and of Islam more broadly, and 
this presents continuing challenges for both 
nations in terms of strengthening community 
cohesion and resilience and demonstrating 
leadership and reassurance on these issues.
Our in-depth interviews with 18 professional 
practitioners in varying relevant professional 
roles sought to help us develop an 
understanding of the experiences and 
perspectives of professional practitioners’ 
around current dynamics of community 
reporting and what approaches could 
encourage and facilitate greater community 
sharing of concerns. This process provided rich 
data around three key themes: how to ‘optimise 
the field’ of community reporting relationships 
between authorities and communities, how 
best to address existing challenges and 
barriers, and how to leverage opportunities 
created through identifying areas of improved 
policy and practice. There were somewhat 
fewer similarities between the British and the 
Australian data from professional practitioners 
compared to the similarities between 
community respondents in each country, 
and this may reflect the different policy and 
operating environments in which each group 
of professionals work. However, both British 
and Australian practitioners acknowledged 
that key improvements needed to be made in 
relation to community reporting around, first, 
public communication strategies, and second, 
the design and delivery of more formalised 
and consistent support mechanisms for those 
who do come forward with concerns about 
an intimate. There was broad agreement with 
Australian professionals that more needs to be 
done to understand the unique and difficult 
position in which family members and friends 
find themselves when it comes to sharing early 
concerns about someone they care for who 
may be radicalising to violence.
For UK practitioners, the theme of ‘optimising 
the field’ focuses on the need to build stronger 
partnerships and the sense of shared 
responsibilities between communities and the 
authorities over the threat of violent extremist 
involvement. Here, professional practitioners 
who shared their knowledge, views and 
expertise on community reporting issues with 
us were, by and large, empathetic with and 
responsive to the complexities and challenges 
posed by community fears, concerns and 
conflicts when considering sharing information 
with authorities about someone close who may 
be radicalising to violence. For our professional 
respondents, this development can only occur  
if certain challenges are successfully addressed.
One of the major challenges is a clear lack 
of public trust and confidence in various 
authorities and agencies. This includes the 
Prevent programme, Channel, and the police as 
an organisation in some parts of communities. 
Professional practitioners detailed their 
perception of a sense of community fatigue 
over the long-running public focus on violent 
extremism and terrorism, and a mistrust 
and sense of ‘us and them’ in relation to the 
controversial Prevent agenda. Professional 
respondents feel that there is an overemphasis 
by both communities and government on the 
security rather than the safeguarding elements 
of Prevent and Channel strategies. This has 
not been helped by what was perceived as 
some biased and imbalanced media reporting, 
especially concerning the disproportionate 
reporting on Islamist versus far-right violent 
extremism and threats.
In this context, there was significant 
recognition of challenges and problems with 
current policy and practice approaches to 
encouraging community reporting. Practitioner 
respondents recognise and often sympathise 
with the very real community fears of reporting 
consequences, including the potential for 
overreaction by authorities to tentative 
expressions of concern that are the domain 
of ‘Prevent’, not ‘Pursue’. Here, practitioners 
believed there is insufficient recognition of and 
engagement with the role of communities in 
safeguarding contexts and they thought this 
directly feeds into a lack of broad community 
awareness about reporting processes, modes, 
channels and outcomes.
Specific challenges around increasing 
community reporting identified by professional 
practitioners included maintaining the 
protection of those who report from both 
community- and media-led forms of 
social harm, including isolation, ostracism 
and backlash. While all practitioners were 
fiercely committed to these protections, 
they acknowledged that the diffusion of 
responsibility for reporting through the Prevent 
Duty could potentially compromise these 
efforts. Alongside this are tensions between 
disclosure and confidentiality when sharing 
reporting outcomes for family and community 
members. The potential for community 
reporting systems and cultures that work for all 
parties is hampered, in the view of professional 
practitioners, by uneven training and 
awareness by frontline public sector personnel 
with a Prevent Duty in relation to what should 
and shouldn’t be reported onwards.
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Additionally, respondents recognised the 
ineffectiveness and inappropriateness of the 
national Anti-Terrorism Hotline for reports at 
the early stages of concern about an intimate, 
as well as the remoteness and intimidating 
nature of the Hotline more generally. While 
it remains a valuable resource for reporting 
imminent threats and dangers in relation to 
terrorist action, it was considered unlikely to 
be used in early reporting contexts concerning 
intimates radicalising to violence, and the 
community respondent data reinforced  
this perception.
Despite the significant challenges outlined 
above, professional practitioner respondents 
also identified significant opportunities to 
encourage community reporting. These broadly 
focus on the opportunity to build stronger 
and deeper relationships with key community 
leaders and organisations to enhance 
partnerships in preventing violent extremism, 
including those that may fall outside the formal 
Prevent framework. Within this, practitioners 
felt there could be more explicit and committed 
policy support for the strengthening of community 
brokerage models to enhance reporting 
channels using trusted local intermediaries. 
Alongside this could come a fostering of 
more opportunities and mechanisms for open 
dialogue and partnerships on the risks and 
mitigation strategies for violent extremism. 
A number of practitioners, however, warned 
that merely saying these things were desirable 
without investing resources in their practical 
implementation would leave communities 
– and practitioners themselves – frustrated 
at the lack of practical follow-through and 
potentially more alienated from efforts to 
foster such partnerships in future.
This greater emphasis on community 
partnership could enable the encouraging 
of early community reporting of concerns 
by highlighting the benefits for intimates of 
preventing further harm. This could be done by 
strengthening training and awareness for face to 
face reporting channels in local contexts. Such 
processes could use real-life, de-identified 
scenarios in community awareness and training 
to help personalise and localise the issues. 
Respondents saw the potential for greater 
involvement of neighbourhood police teams  
in reducing divisive community sentiment,  
of promoting the ‘safeguarding’ message  
and being available face-to-face to hear 
individual concerns in a supportive and 
contextualised fashion. 
Such a development, however, would need 
to avoid confusion between genuine police 
support for the community on the one hand, 
and strategic intelligence-gathering on the 
other. Conflation of these agendas would 
propel further mistrust and suspicion for 
communities, rather than reducing this. 
For this to be meaningful there is a pressing 
need to develop formal support mechanisms 
for those who report, and identifying early what 
individuals’ support needs may be when they first 
come forward. Within this, there is now the 
opportunity to re-think how best to maximise 
telephone-based advice and support services 
for those who are reluctant to share concerns 
face to face, and to develop more streamlined 
and standardised reporting processes across 
local authority areas and across regions.
Overall, professional practitioner data suggest 
that worthwhile improvements in the general 
operating environment around community 
reporting should focus on enhancing three 
core dimensions of practitioner awareness  
and attitudes towards communities:
1.  Demonstrating greater trust and 
confidence in the desire of communities  
to stay safe and keep others safe.
We have to take it as read that people want the best 
for their communities as well, they want people to 
remain safe. We need to trust them, engage with 
them, and when we speak to them [show that] we 
understand what their concerns are, listen to those 
concerns and try to answer them. [PP02, Greater 
Manchester]
2.  Affirming that preventing violent 
extremism is a shared responsibility for  
all and not just a ‘community’ problem.
We’ve all got a responsibility. Some staff don’t get it 
because they think it’s such and such a community’s 
problem. Well, actually it’s our problem. [PP03, 
West Yorkshire]
3.  Acknowledging the role of ordinary 
community members in promoting 
safeguarding through better communication 
and feedback by authorities when families 
and community members do come forward 
with concerns or choose to report.
We probably should be better at feedback [and 
advice] to people [who call in with concerns]. I’ve 
absolutely no doubt there’s improvements to be 
made there, if we’re honest. [Ordinary] people do 
have a role to play within safeguarding. [PP01, 
Greater Manchester]
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Common ground: 
shared community 
and practitioner 
perspectives
Future  
considerations 
for policy and 
practice
The project findings make clear that both 
community respondents and professional 
practitioners already have a number of shared 
understandings around existing reporting 
processes and dynamics, as well as challenges 
and improvements that can be made to 
enhance better reporting outcomes. Both 
groups have acknowledged the significant 
emotional and social challenges involved in 
sharing concerns about loved ones and other 
‘intimates’ with authorities, and have suggested 
ways to ensure that trust, confidentiality 
and minimisation of harmful social impacts 
associated with community reporting can be 
pursued. Both groups have also emphasised 
the value of strengthening genuine community 
partnerships so that those who come forward 
feel they are doing so with the recognition, 
validation and support that is a key ingredient 
of willingness to share difficult information 
about others who are close and cared for. 
There is a shared understanding that, 
motivated as it is by care and concern, the 
more personalised and localised the reporting 
process is, the stronger it will likely be, and 
both community and professional respondents 
expressed reservations about more remote 
and impersonal methods of bringing forward 
concerns during the early stages for someone 
who may potentially be radicalising to violence.
However, community respondents were more 
interested in face to face reporting to local 
police, as well as other community figures and 
intermediaries, than professional practitioners 
believed to be the case. There are clear 
implications here for rethinking the structures 
and mechanisms that are put into place in local 
areas that can facilitate face to face sharing 
of concerns. Professional practitioners were 
also less aware than community respondents 
of the importance of post-reporting support 
and information, and more focused on the 
dilemmas around post-report information 
sharing in terms of potentially compromising 
confidentiality and the legal or investigative 
integrity of their work. 
These common understandings and points of 
divergence both point towards ways in which 
the future landscape of community reporting 
can be further developed and refined, and 
below we detail some key considerations and 
potential strategic directions for policy and 
practice based on the project’s findings.
Our fourth and final research objective was 
to develop from our data usable insights 
for government and community agencies in 
future community-focused policies, strategies 
and campaigns around facilitating and 
encouraging community reporting related 
to violent extremism. As outlined above, the 
professional practitioners involved in this study 
bring considerable professional experience 
and insights to the focus of this research. 
As a result, they are able to offer informed 
critique and comment on current policy and 
practice around community reporting of violent 
extremism, and whether existing approaches 
and policy settings are helping or hindering 
individuals with a concern about an ‘intimate’ 
to come forward. 
From a different vantage point, community 
respondents involved in the research were 
able to provide, based on their responses to 
hypothetical scenarios, detailed reflections 
and considerations as to how they would feel 
and what they would do if the person at risk 
of violent extremist action in the scenario 
was ‘intimate’ to them. This method worked 
very well, with respondents ‘thinking through’ 
the scenario in order to reflect on aspects of 
their own lived experience that are relevant to 
community reporting dynamics and contexts. 
The data from both community respondents 
and professional practitioners shows a very 
high degree of consistency and congruence 
around key issues explored during the research 
process. This has enabled us to propose some 
clear areas for strategic future consideration 
in terms of policy and practice. Moreover, the 
fact that key insights from both sets of data are 
strongly consistent with the data and findings 
from the earlier Australian study gives us further 
confidence that the directions canvassed below 
are based solidly on evidence derived from 
comparative primary research streams. 
There is a shared 
understanding that, 
motivated as it is by 
care and concern, the 
more personalised and 
localised the reporting 
process is, the stronger 
it will likely be.
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Strategic direction 1: Consider 
rethinking the tone, content and 
targeting of social messaging initiatives 
around community reporting. 
Counter-terrorism and Prevent policy and 
practice can benefit from shifting toward 
greater recognition that the primary drivers for 
those considering reporting concerns about 
an ‘intimate’ will be care and concern for their 
welfare and the prevention of further harms 
to both the intimate and others in the wider 
community and society. Therefore, public 
messaging and policy practice that emphasises 
‘safeguarding’ and ‘health promotion’ 
messaging in tone and content, rather than 
a focus on criminality and threat, is likely to 
be more effective in encouraging community 
reporting concerning intimates who may be 
radicalising to violence. 
Moreover, there is clear evidence that the 
‘safeguarding’ dimension of the Prevent 
duty in schools and colleges is accepted by 
educationalists35 and is perceived by them to be 
largely working. Policy messages and practice 
approaches that foreground a safeguarding 
message and approach and which can actually 
deliver safeguarding activity and support within 
communities can be effective in encouraging 
greater community reporting.
Strategic direction 2: Sharing 
concerns with authorities is a  
staged process
Preventing violent extremism policy and 
practice would benefit from applying in greater 
depth the understanding that a staged process 
of sharing concerns will be very common for 
community members, with advice, guidance 
and support first sought within family and 
friendship networks and within the local 
community before reporting to the police 
occurs. Some individuals will only go beyond 
this to contact the police with reluctance 
and with support from others. Community 
intermediaries and conduits thus play an 
absolutely vital role in the ‘supply chain’ of 
reporting processes and pathways.
There is an opportunity here to strengthen 
considerably the awareness of communities, 
through education and community partnership 
models, of their role in safeguarding people and 
communities that they care about. This is best 
achieved through developing and strengthening 
a ‘working partnership’ model between police, 
local authorities and credible community 
organisations and community influencers. Such 
community organisations and individuals need 
to be shown trust and respect by being treated 
as equal partners in the process of taking 
educational messages out to communities 
about warning signs, understanding and 
defining thresholds of concern, and avenues 
available for seeking help. 
Alongside this, auditing and where necessary 
improving the skills, confidence and 
understandings of front-line professionals in 
education, health and social services with the 
responsibility of the ‘Prevent duty’ needs to be 
continually supported and developed. The data 
suggest that more emphasis should be placed 
on education and training for education and 
social service workers, with less emphasis on 
health services whom community respondents 
see as playing only a minor, if any, role in the 
process of sharing concerns.
Strategic direction 3: Localise and 
personalise the reporting process
A large majority of community respondents 
expressed a strong preference to report 
concerns to local police staff and other 
community sites through face-to-face 
interaction. This means foregrounding in 
policy and practice the role of mainstream 
neighbourhood policing teams in such 
community partnership work, as well as 
dialogue and training for mainstream front-
line policing personnel to ensure that they are 
ready and feel equipped to positively engage 
with reports of concerns when they present.
There is also scope to consider establishing 
local community forums that promote 
open dialogue and discussion about the 
reporting process, its implications and its 
risks and benefits that will itself create 
greater opportunities for further face to face 
interaction between locally based authorities 
and communities. These discussions may not 
be easy, but they are important and can help 
develop trust and mutual understanding so 
that when reporting dilemmas do arise, there is 
a stronger sense of where and to whom to turn 
for advice and support. 
35Busher, J., Choudhury, T., Thomas, P. 
and Harris, G. (2017) What the Prevent 
duty means for schools and colleges in 
England: An analysis of educationalists’ 
experiences, London: The Aziz 
Foundation
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Strategic direction 4: Develop  
support mechanisms for reporters
Community respondents have very significant 
worries and concerns about what happens 
to the ‘intimate’, to themselves, their family, 
and to the wider community after they take 
the grave decision to report someone close 
to them. They want support and guidance, 
protection, and to be kept informed as far as 
possible about what is and will be happening 
through a ‘feedback loop’. 
There are currently existing mechanisms within 
Channel reporting and follow-up to indicate 
whether family or other community members 
have been contacted with updates.
However, similar mechanisms do not exist 
within police services at present. It would  
be highly beneficial to consider developing  
a formal system of feedback and updating 
when community members come forward  
with concerns and information. An essential 
part of this system should be making clear  
from the outset the limitations of what can  
be disclosed to those who report, and why.
Support mechanisms need to be established 
at the local level for those who come forward. 
Again, at the outset of taking information, 
police and those operating under the Prevent 
Duty should be asking people who come 
forward what if any kind of support they feel 
they need, and have in place mechanisms for 
accessing this support in culturally and socially 
appropriate ways that respect privacy and 
confidentiality.
Strategic direction 5: Clarify  
reporting mechanisms
There is confusion and uncertainty for 
many community respondents, and some 
professional practitioners, around how 
reporting processes actually work and what 
choices people may have in coming forward. 
There are also different local practices across 
local authority areas and policing regions 
for managing the information and follow-
up elements of information and concerns 
received. Strong consideration can be given to 
developing both an information protocol around 
reporting processes for communities, and to 
standardising the information management  
of reports to enable effective and efficient 
cross-sharing of information and also follow-
up with those who come forward.
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Scenario 1: 
Adam
Adam is 24 and was born and raised in the UK. 
As a teenager he wanted a stronger connection 
to a religion that he felt met his needs. Through 
friends he became involved in a religious group 
that fitted his sense of the kind of person he 
wanted to be. Adam’s identity is now strongly 
grounded in the beliefs and activities of  
this group.
Adam has become especially close to two older 
men in the group, who give him advice and 
guidance. One of these older men has become 
a father figure for Adam and he often seeks 
advice from this senior figure, who is also the 
religious group’s leader. However, Adam is 
also strongly influenced by younger men in his 
group. He shares common interests with them 
and several have become good mates.
Recently, Adam’s view of the world, influenced 
by both his friends in the group and what he 
reads on the internet, has led him to see violent 
conflict as necessary and inevitable. He has 
also started to view large amounts of extremist 
literature, instructional manuals and material 
from overseas conflicts. Adam has started to 
advocate for the use of violence to change 
government policy, and to idolise as heroes 
those who use violence for political ends.  
He is eager to take violent action that he 
sees as advancing the cause of justice. He 
understands the risks of this and has not told 
his older mentor about his plans, fearing his 
disapproval. But he has told in confidence 
one close friend and one relative outside his 
religious group about the plans he is making 
to take violent action which he believes is the 
right and necessary thing to do. 
You are close to Adam. While you don’t share 
his world view or beliefs, you have been 
supportive of his religious development and 
think in many ways it has done him a lot of 
good. He tells you, in confidence, about his 
plans to commit acts of violence in the service 
of his beliefs. You know he is sincere and that 
he has struggled a lot in his life up until now. 
But you are also very worried for Adam’s safety 
if he becomes involved in violence either 
overseas or at home. You care about him  
as a person, and about the impact his  
choices may have on his family.
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Scenario 2:  
Sophia
Sophia moved to the UK with her parents 
when she was a small girl. A shy person, she 
sometimes found it hard to develop close 
friendships at school but enjoyed being with 
smaller groups of people who did the kinds  
of things she liked. She is close to her parents 
and her two brothers and continues to spend 
 a lot of time with her family. At university, 
Sophia met a young man whom she liked a 
lot. This young man asked her to come to a 
group he was involved with who believe  
that direct political action was the most 
effective way of protesting against various 
social problems and injustices. 
The young man became Sophia’s boyfriend 
and Sophia now spends most of her social 
time with her boyfriend and his friends in the 
group. Some members of the group argue 
that to achieve their political goals at home, 
they need to learn skills in armed combat. 
The group is planning a training camp for this 
purpose. While Sophia does not want to go 
overseas or involve herself in any direct action, 
her boyfriend asks her if she can help organise 
financial and other practical support to aid  
the group in their plans for action.
Sophia becomes very secretive when working 
on her computer at home, shutting it down 
whenever any of her flatmates come into her 
room. She sounds angry when news items 
come on TV or radio dealing with various  
social issues and conflicts. She visits her  
family less than before.
You are close to Sophia. You have noticed her 
secretive behaviour around her computerwhen 
you are nearby, her withdrawal from casual 
conversations and her rising anger about 
various world events. You feel something is  
very wrong, but when you ask Sophia about this,
she tells you it’s just stress from her studies. 
You don’t believe her and think there is some 
other problem that she is not telling you about. 
You have met her boyfriend and are aware of 
the political group he is involved in. You know 
Sophia engages with this group but you are not 
sure how involved Sophia herself is. You believe 
it’s a free country and people are entitled to 
their opinions, but you are worried that Sophia 
has become involved in something that may 
lead to violence that harms her and others.
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Scenario 3: 
Conor
Conor is 24 and was born and raised in the UK. 
As a teenager he became interested in politics 
and as this interest grew Conor got introduced 
to more politically active people in online chat 
rooms and other social media. This led to Conor 
being invited to attend some day trips to beauty 
spots with other young people organised by a 
small British political group. On these trips the 
young people would pose with the movement’s 
banners and symbols as well as enjoying 
sightseeing and having political discussions 
with older members of the group. After these 
trips Conor expressed heightened grievances 
about foreigners and immigrants taking jobs 
and housing from white British people.
Over time Conor’s identity has become strongly 
grounded in the beliefs and activities of this 
political group, including regularly attending 
some political meetings and demonstrations. 
He shares their belief in the importance of 
patriotism. Conor is especially close to two older 
men in the group, who give him advice and 
guidance. One of these older men has become a 
father figure for Conor and he often seeks advice 
from this senior figure. Conor is also strongly 
influenced by younger men in his group, and has 
become good mates with many of them.
Recently, Conor has started to view large 
amounts of extremist literature, which includes 
instructional manuals and associated material 
from other far right political groups. Conor has 
started to advocate the use of violence against 
minorities whom he believes pose a threat 
to the culture of the nation and who do not 
belong in the UK. He has experimented with 
some chemicals in his garage and has openly 
discussed targeting a religious establishment. 
He has told in confidence one close friend and 
one relative outside his political group about the 
plans he is making, which he believes is justified 
in defending Britain against this perceived 
threat. Some of Conor’s friends have also started 
to plan spectacular acts of violence against 
minorities as well as those who they support.
You are close to Conor and you care deeply 
about him despite not sharing his political 
beliefs. He tells you, in confidence, about 
his plans to develop a weapon to target a 
nearby religious establishment. You know he 
is sincere and that he has struggled a lot in his 
life up until now. But you are also very worried 
for Conor’s safety if he becomes involved in 
violence. You care about him as a person,  
and about the impact his choices may have  
on his family.
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Australian  
Community  
Reporting 
Thresholds Study
Background
In 2013, the Australian Government’s 
Countering Violent Extremism Subcommittee 
funded a research study titled Community 
Reporting Thresholds: Sharing Information with 
Authorities Concerning Violent Extremist Activity 
and Involvement in Foreign Conflict.36 This study, 
the first of its kind world-wide, was premised 
on the basis that communities are a front line 
of defence against threats to national security 
and social cohesion, particularly in relation to 
the recent increase of foreign fighter travel and 
involvement in overseas conflict. 
Close friends and family members in particular 
are often amongst the first to see changes 
or early warning signs that someone close 
to them may be heading towards, or already 
engaged in, violent extremist activity both 
at home and abroad. A key element of the 
Australian study design was thus its special 
focus on what the research team called 
‘intimates’ reporting – that is, what it may 
mean to bring forward concerns to authorities 
about a close relative or friend. 
However, common practice for law enforcement 
has been to focus primarily on perceived 
offenders, and not to prioritise the importance 
of having strong and trusting relationships 
with families, peer networks and community 
members. Yet both community leaders and 
kindship and social networks are often those best 
positioned to know who in the community may 
be at risk of criminal activity, whether terrorism-
related or otherwise. When a young man or 
woman begins a trajectory towards criminality 
or antisocial activity, such events rarely occur 
without someone from that community noticing 
a change in the person’s behaviour, attitudes, 
and/or social networks.37 Yet communities that 
do not trust law enforcement are often unwilling 
to share their observations and knowledge.  
Without strong partnerships, vital information is 
likely to be withheld.38 
Moreover, virtually no public evidence-
based research had been conducted at that 
stage about community-based views on 
or experience of reporting involvement in 
extremism to authorities, and the implications 
of this for policy, programme and operational 
models and approaches 
by government, communities, law enforcement 
or security agencies. This was despite a range 
of information and persuasion campaigns 
developed and conducted in countries 
including Australia,39 the UK,40 Germany41 and 
the USA42 that sought to encourage people in 
communities to come forward with information 
or concerns about people in their local 
neighbourhood, kinship or social networks  
who might be radicalising to violence.
However, these campaigns often focused, 
especially in Australia, on reporting by the 
general community of observed activity or 
behaviour that may be suspicious or concerning 
from national security perspectives to law 
enforcement and security agencies. While 
certainly valuable as an information, detection 
and intervention resource, general community 
reporting is only part of the story, and gaining 
new knowledge about the dynamics of 
‘intimates’ reporting was thus seen to address a 
critical blind-spot in current Countering Violent 
Extremism (CVE) thinking and strategies. 
The Australian Community Reporting Thresholds 
project broke new ground in seeking to 
identify community knowledge and concerns 
around reporting processes, to propose new 
understandings and approaches to community 
reporting based on these insights, and to 
develop new platforms for community education, 
awareness and increased willingness to report 
based on the data gathered and analysed here.
The key research aims for the Australian 
Community Reporting Thresholds study 
focused on:
1.   Identifying triggers, thresholds and barriers 
for when someone would consider reporting;
2.   Understanding more from participants’ 
perspectives about the experience and 
process of (considering) reporting on an 
individual or group who may be involved 
in, or actively supporting involvement in, 
overseas conflict, and
3.   Developing from the data usable insights 
and tools for government and community 
agencies in future community-focused 
policies, strategies and campaigns around 
facilitating and encouraging community 
reporting related to violent extremism.
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Design and methods
Community Reporting Thresholds was designed as 
a qualitative research study, with data collection 
conducted between July-November 2014, at a 
time when significant numbers of Australians 
had attempted to travel (many with success) to 
join and fight with ISIS forces in Syria/Iraq. The 
research methodology and questions sought 
to understand and assess the experience and 
views of those who have shared, or considered 
sharing, concerns about others with authorities 
in relation to suspected involvement in violent 
overseas conflict. The study also sought to elicit 
views from government stakeholders involved 
in developing and implementing reporting 
mechanisms and channels that enable 
information brought forward by community 
members to be analysed and operationalised. 
Both community- and government-based 
project participants were asked interview 
questions covering the following general topics:
•  The reasons Australian Muslim community 
members and leaders might feel motivated 
to share concerns about those suspected  
of involvement in violent overseas conflict 
with authorities;
•  What they would want to know or find  
out more about before deciding to share 
their concerns;
•  What factors might encourage or 
discourage people to share their concerns; 
•  Expectations, if any, about the kind of 
support people might need or want at 
various stages of the reporting process, 
including after they make a report;
•  Expectations, if any, about the outcomes 
of the process;
•  Concerns and fears, if any, about the 
process and its impacts (personal, family, 
community);
•  Views on what authorities who listen to 
community members’ concerns during 
reporting need to know from a community 
point of view when dealing with members  
of the public on these issues;
•  Strategies for improving existing approaches 
to community reporting;
•  Strategies for strengthening public 
awareness and knowledge about the 
process coming forward with information  
to authorities.
Because of the sensitive nature and risk 
elements of the research topic from community 
perspectives, community-based participants 
were offered both semi-structured interview 
questions and also two detailed scenarios 
to ‘think through’ in responding to the 
questions posed by the research team. These 
hypothetical yet realistic scenarios were based 
on aspects of validated scenario modelling 
included in the Australian Multicultural 
Foundation’s 2013 TRIM (The Radicalisation 
Indicators Model) community education 
resource. However, the research design also 
introduced new scenario elements appropriate 
to the Community Reporting Thresholds project’s 
focus. The scenarios were slightly revised 
following initial pilot interviews and were 
thereafter commended as highly realistic by 
community-based participants, who felt able 
to respond candidly to questions without fear 
of disclosing sensitive, personal or confidential 
information that might place them or others at 
risk. This was a successful strategy, generating 
trust and confidence in the research process as 
well as very rich data and findings. 
At the end of each interview, community 
participants were given the opportunity to 
speak, if they so wished, about actual events 
or scenarios in which they may have been 
involved or had knowledge of. It was made 
clear that this was in no way a requirement of 
the research, but rather an opportunity to be 
taken up at their discretion. A small number 
of participants took up this opportunity, while 
the majority chose to stay with the scenario 
throughout the interview.
Participant sampling
Research participants across three cohorts 
(community members, community leaders, 
and government stakeholders) were engaged 
in individual, in-depth face to face (n=27) 
and telephone-based (n=4) interviews of 
approximately 1.5 hours each. A total of 33 
participants contributed to the study (slightly 
in excess of the 24-30 participants anticipated 
in the study design). Of these, 16 participants 
were Australian Muslim community members 
(including community leaders) and 17 
were Australian State and Commonwealth 
government stakeholders. The gender 
distribution of male to female participants was 
approximately 2/3 male (n=22) to 1/3 female 
(n=10) across the combined cohorts. 
Study design, 
methods and 
sampling
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Australian  
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Reporting 
Thresholds  
findings
The psycho- 
social landscape 
of community 
reporting
Community-based participants were sampled 
purposively and through snowball techniques 
in Melbourne, Sydney, Brisbane and Canberra, 
while government stakeholders were 
drawn from Victoria, New South Wales and 
Queensland policing jurisdictions; Australian 
Federal Police; Australian Security and 
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO); Department 
of Immigration and Border Protection; 
Attorney-General’s Department; federal  
and state-based government service providers, 
and the National Security Hotline.
Recruitment of participants on a sensitive 
and confronting topic for Australian Muslim 
community members presented some 
challenges, but the project was able to slightly 
exceed its community and government target 
sample populations for the study as a whole. 
A number of cross-cutting themes emerged 
from data analysis across the three participant 
groups that helped researchers understand 
more clearly the key factors influencing the rise 
or fall of triggers, thresholds and barriers for 
community members as they are considering 
reporting to authorities. 
Based on the data, five core ‘landscapes’ 
of influence on reporting thresholds were 
grouped into the psychological, informational, 
communication, support, and education and 
outreach dimensions of community reporting 
experiences, and the impact of each of these on 
thresholds for decision-making around whether 
and when to come forward to authorities with 
information and/or concerns.  
The threshold for reporting by Muslim 
Australian community members to authorities 
in cases of suspected or known involvement 
in foreign conflict or other aspects of violent 
extremist activity was high at the time of the 
study, with significant psycho-social and 
structural barriers and blockages described 
relating to individual and community 
sentiment; impact on social networks and 
relationships; flawed or confusing reporting 
processes and channels; lack of trust in 
government; lack of confidence in protective 
rather than punitive reporting outcomes; lack 
of support following reporting, and – most 
prominently - fear or anxiety about the personal, 
social and legal impacts and consequences  
of reporting. 
Reporting is a last resort
Reporting to authorities is a last resort for 
an overwhelming majority of community 
members, who will seek to deploy a range 
of other intra-community strategies before 
choosing to come forward. This means that 
particular attention needs to be given to 
understanding the reasons why reporting is 
so challenging and difficult, what different 
levels or dimensions of challenge may emerge 
within particular communities, and how best 
to encourage and facilitate greater ease of the 
reporting experience and process from the 
vantage point of diverse individuals who may 
be thinking about or in the process of sharing 
information with authorities.
Reporting is deeply personal and 
motivated by care and concern for 
intimates and the broader community
Both community and government stakeholders 
affirmed that when people do decide to come 
forward, they do so because reporting is 
deeply personal. While the main psycho-social 
barrier to reporting is fear or anxiety, the main 
trigger for people who are able to overcome or 
tolerate feeling conflicted or uneasy is because 
they care deeply about an individual, because 
they are frightened of the consequences of 
someone’s actions, or both. This suggests that 
people are more likely to report on someone 
they know than as a bystander.  
Yet the deeply personal nature of reporting 
also means that special care and consideration 
needs to be given to how front-line personnel 
are trained to handle and address the concerns 
people may articulate about close or intimate 
others in their lives. Empathy, respect, trust and 
sensitivity and integrity are vital characteristics 
of the reporting encounter, and these need 
to be evinced within the first moments of a 
conversation involving person-to-person 
encounters. This is linked to the fact that 
reporting is motivated overwhelmingly by 
care and concern (for individuals, families, 
communities) on the part of those who are 
willing to report. Government stakeholders 
and community members agree that failure 
to recognise and capitalise on the central 
motivators for those who report will result in 
lower rates of reporting now and in the future.
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Reporting is complex and conflictual
Reporting is also a complex process, rather 
than a single act or moment in time. It 
involves a range of stages in decision-making, 
comparison, judgment and sometimes 
consultation that need to be better understood 
in order to support people who think they 
may need to come forward and avoid their 
dropping out part way through the process. 
As well as being complex, reporting is also 
highly conflictual for those who contemplate or 
have already come forward. It can be isolating, 
frightening or intimidating, and arouse a range 
of intensely conflicting emotions, loyalties, 
anxieties and fears. It invokes deep-seated 
issues and feelings concerning betrayal, 
responsibility, duty, shame and remorse, 
and can be a volatile see-saw experience for 
those who share information or concern with 
authorities. All of these represent significant 
psycho-social barriers to why people may be 
reluctant to come forward with information, 
or may only progress part-way through the 
process even after taking initial steps to do so.
People who have considered or imagined 
reporting emphasised the loneliness of this 
experience because it is so difficult to share 
the decision-making process with others 
whom they would normally turn to for support. 
Coming forward requires courage, fortitude 
and strong belief in the rightness of one’s 
actions, even when there may be negative 
consequences for others. The psycho-social 
vicissitudes of reporting need to be expertly 
considered and built into training and 
operations for those who receive information 
on behalf of government and law enforcement.
Australian reporting processes and 
mechanisms were not well understood at the 
community level and lack a clear framework 
and guidelines that could be used to educate 
communities about what reporting involves. 
There was no clearly established reporting 
process that had broad purchase in terms of 
community knowledge, and in many cases 
government stakeholders also identified a  
lack clarity and expertise in their own grasp  
of reporting processes and channels. 
Existing channels were either poorly 
understood or else seen as inappropriate 
or undesirable (e.g. telephone reporting) by 
community members because of concerns 
about lack of agency, where the information 
goes and how it is used, surveillance and 
monitoring of those who report, negative 
consequences for those reported on even 
where concerns prove to be unfounded, and 
anxiety about confidentiality. 
For government stakeholders, the lack of 
clear guidelines, consistent information and 
messaging, appropriate training and the ability 
to share information and intelligence across 
inter-agency boundaries were priority areas 
for improvement in the information landscape 
around community reporting.
The leaky pipeline
As a result of this, participants described 
perceptions and experiences of a reporting 
processes as involving a leaky pipeline. The 
reporting pipeline leaks as people drop out 
of the reporting process before they share 
relevant information because they are bounced 
back and forth between different agencies 
or personnel who may be unsure of the right 
protocols or channels. This included directing 
people straight to Australia’s National Security 
Hotline even when they were seeking face to 
face reporting. This applied in particular to 
people who approached local law enforcement 
in person or by phone. The more initial 
‘non-starter’ or dead-end encounters people 
experience when trying to make a report, 
the more disheartened and disengaged they 
become from carrying through. The first 30-
60 seconds of encounter between someone 
trying to report and the person taking the 
information are the critical point at which 
those reporting can become encouraged or 
discouraged to continue with the process.
The expectation gap between 
communities and government 
authorities
The most significant informational disconnect 
revolved around community expectations, and  
the lack of fit between why people report  
to authorities (out of care and concern) and 
what happens after they do (loss of power, 
control, information). Because people 
overwhelmingly report on intimates out  
of care and concern, they harbour in many 
cases a clear expectation that authorities  
will use the information reported to help  
those heading towards or engaged in violent 
extremism and prevent them from continuing 
down this path. 
However, participant fears and experiences 
centred on the fact that, once they share 
information, they believe authorities are more 
likely than not to use this instead to prosecute 
or punish rather than diverting or (if too late 
for prevention) rehabilitating those involved. 
The information 
landscape of  
reporting
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This is particularly the case in relation to foreign 
travel to participate in overseas conflicts, and some 
participants spoke with great bitterness about 
government failure to use information provided 
to stop family members and friends from 
traveling. This bitterness was compounded 
by lack of community understanding about 
limitations and constraints inherent in where 
information they provide may be taken and 
how it may be used by authorities. 
Both government stakeholders and community 
participants agreed that more transparent  
and accessible information about the 
limitations and constraints involved in sharing 
information by authorities once a report is 
made is essential in ameliorating community 
confusion, distrust and frustration about  
this aspect of the reporting process.
Multichannel approach
Reporting was seen to require a multichannel 
approach for Australia to leverage its capacity 
to encourage and support community 
members coming forward by allowing them 
to share information through a number of 
different channels that may vary according to 
circumstances and experience. These channels 
may include community and/or faith-based 
leaders or elders, local police, telephone advice 
and support services, or web-based channels. 
Clarity and transparency
There was a strong identified need for clear, 
consistent, easily accessible information about 
the processes involved, the benefits and risks 
involved, and clarity about the limitations of 
what law enforcement and security agencies 
can share in the aftermath of a report being 
made. Participants repeatedly stated they 
would be more accepting of limitations on 
what they could be told following a report if 
they knew from the beginning that constraints 
on information sharing were in place, and why. 
The same multichannel information sources 
that apply to direct reporting, above, should be 
mobilised in relation to providing information 
about the reporting process itself, using 
the internet, social media, print, television, 
radio, community-based publications and 
community languages outlets.
Social media
Social media was seen as a mixed blessing by 
government participants in the campaign to 
encourage and increase community reporting. 
While recognising that social media now 
dominates communication and peer network 
dynamics for young people in particular, the 
slightly more dominant view was that social 
media should be considered more of a guide or 
pointer to other resources, rather than serving 
as a destination point itself for community 
reporting information campaigns. This 
related in part to concerns that government 
will never be sufficiently well resourced to 
compete effectively in this space. Community 
participants shared this view but for different 
reasons, citing concerns about monitoring, 
targeting and surveillance due to the relative 
ease with which digital footprints can be traced 
and stored, undercutting the anonymity and/
or confidentiality that is seen as essential for 
confidence in the reporting process.
Reporting was found to highlight the need 
for a continuum of support options at various 
stages of the process. This included immediate 
validation that the person reporting is doing 
the right thing; empathising and validating 
the difficulty and courage involved in coming 
forward; follow-up on the outcomes of a report 
within the confines of security or investigative 
requirements; clear understanding of the 
process at the initial point of making a 
report; and, for some (but not all), individual 
counselling and debriefing, including ongoing 
confidential liaison.
The experience of reporting was seen by many 
to be about the loss of power and control for 
those who come forward. Careful thought 
needs to be given to the critical transition 
when a person who has the capacity to report 
and holds all the cards in their hand cedes 
power to authorities through delivering 
information to them that the reporter then 
no longer controls. This is a deeply unsettling 
and threatening, even traumatic, process for 
most people, and reassurances, to the extent 
they can be given, need to be prioritised in 
relation to how the reporting process works, 
what the range of outcomes may be, and 
where the person reporting may seek support 
and help after they report. Included in this is 
the importance of telling people that some 
information may not be able to be shared 
with them as an investigation progresses, 
and helping law enforcement and service 
providers to develop skills and strategies for 
communicating effectively and empathetically 
about information and disclosure limitations.
The  
communication 
landscape  
of reporting
The support 
landscape of  
reporting
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Relationships
At its core, successful community reporting 
is about relationships – with government, with 
law enforcement, with community leaders 
and with family and friends. Coming forward 
to authorities needs to gain legitimacy at 
community level when other, community-
led measures to prevent someone heading 
toward or engaging in extremist violence 
fail. Building key relationships not only 
between communities, government and law 
enforcement, but also within communities 
about the risks and benefits of reporting  
was considered essential. 
Mode of reporting preferences  
and capacity-building
Reporting is also about the specific relationship 
between those who make reports and 
those who receive information. The strong 
preference for face-to-face reporting expressed 
by community participants highlighted the 
ways in which trusting relationships at the 
local level are essential components of a 
successful reporting model. Capacity to improve 
the ability of front-line local law enforcement in 
particular, as well as community leaders and 
service providers, to engage appropriately and 
supportively with those providing information, 
and to pass this information on effectively, was 
seen as vital. Enhanced education and training 
to make more visible and accessible the 
support and face-to-face channels preferred 
by community members, particularly for local 
law enforcement, was a key imperative from 
both community and stakeholder viewpoints.
Education and awareness
Effective approaches to community reporting 
were seen to depend on education and 
awareness campaigns that focus on what 
reporting achieves, how it works, why early 
intervention is important, and what it means 
for everyone involved. There was broad 
agreement amongst both government 
stakeholders and community members that 
a new campaign approach to community 
reporting was needed that moved away from 
campaigns targeting general community 
awareness toward more nuanced, community-
specific campaigns that personalise and 
humanise the process of talking to authorities 
about concerns.
This included the importance of designing 
campaigns using strategies shown to be 
effective in public health outreach initiatives 
that balance a focus on the ‘negatives’ of 
violent extremism itself (multi-level harms, 
consequences, impacts) with the ‘positives’ 
of coming forward as early as possible with 
concerns and/or information (care, support, 
resources, prevention and intervention). 
Accessible, personalised, multichannel 
and multimodal approach
To minimise reporting barriers, information 
and outreach campaigns need to ‘talk 
the language’ of communities in order to 
encourage and demystify reporting; personalise 
the approach by demonstrating understanding 
of the very personal concerns and worries 
that bring people and information forward to 
begin with; foreground better outcomes through 
early intervention; avoid fear-mongering and 
punitive registers of communication; allay fears 
and anxieties and provide reassurance where 
possible, and validate them when not; provide 
clear direction toward resources for support, 
further information and assistance as required; 
demonstrate respect, sincerity and empathy; 
be transparent about the purpose, limitations 
and outcomes of reporting from government 
points of view, including what can’t be shared 
by authorities as well as what can; and socialise 
reporting as much as possible to make it less of 
a social and cultural taboo. 
These campaigns must be carefully 
informed by deep community consultation 
and meticulously tailored and targeted to 
reach segmented audiences (parents; young 
people; community leaders; peers). Like 
reporting avenues themselves, education and 
awareness campaigns about reporting must be 
multichannel, including both government and 
non-government education and information 
portals, platforms and personnel. They should 
move toward interactive rather than passive 
modes of information sharing and exchange 
around community reporting processes, and 
employ multimodal (image/text/sound) as well 
as multichannel strategies in order to maximise 
use of contemporary communication media 
and technologies in order to reach and impact 
people’s ‘hearts’ as well as their ‘heads’ when 
they are making difficult decisions and choices 
about what actions to take when they are 
concerned about someone close who may be 
involved in violent extremist activity.
The trust  
landscape  
of reporting
The education 
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landscape of  
reporting
97 Community Reporting Thresholds
Based on these findings, the project developed a prototype messaging strategy based on the five 
‘reporting landscape’ elements summarised above:
•  Talk to someone … because you care
•  You have choices about who you can talk to, 
when and where
•  We know it’s hard, but you are not alone
•  The earlier you say something, the better – 
for everyone
•  If you share your concerns with others,  
you will be supported
The Australian Community Reporting Thresholds study has had a number of impacts and outcomes 
since it was delivered to the Australian Government in 2015 and shared with other academic 
researchers. These outcomes include:
•  Endorsement by the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) of the study’s findings 
for new policy and programming initiatives 
in the Australian CVE environment, 2015.
•  Delivery of a range of community-focused 
awareness and dialogue initiatives around 
community reporting in various Australian 
states and communities, 2015-2016.
•  A national pilot telephone hotline and 
web-based Community Advice and 
Support Service, ‘Step Together’ (https://
steptogether.com.au) being trialled in  
New South Wales in 2017. The trial will  
be evaluated and the evaluation findings 
used to support the national roll-out of  
this service in 2018.
•  Replication of the Australian study through 
CREST-ESRC funding in the United Kingdom, 
with expanded sampling and the addition of a 
new cohort of White British youth, 2016-17.
•  Support for programme and policy 
recommendations on community reporting 
in the USA through work conducted by  
the START Consortium (Horgan and 
Williams), 2016.
•  Discussions with Public Safety Canada  
and Canadian universities within the 
Terrorism, Security and Society (TSAS) 
network interested in replicating the 
Community Reporting Thresholds study  
in Canada, 2017.
Community  
reporting  
messaging  
strategies for  
government  
and community  
agencies
Post-project  
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